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PEASANTS IN SOUTH INDIA

A study of social values in Telangana

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Foreword

This foreword gives me the chance to express my thanks for the many suggestions and ideas I have received. I do this gladly even though I did not follow all of them. There are so many different approaches, views and feelings concerning the Third World and especially India that it is not surprising that there are different approaches. The decisive thing is whether the approach is responsive to the experiences of the people concerned.

My thanks are due to the editors for making this study part of the series. They go to the staff of the Institute of Development Research and Development Policy at the Ruhr University in Bochum for their kind help. My thanks are due especially to the head of the Andhra Pradesh Project in the years following 1972, Prof. Dr. Karlernst Ringer. Apart from many others at the Institute they go to Dr. Habil. E. El Shagi, Prof. Dr. Hans Kruse and Akad. Orat E.A.V. Renesse. I am grateful to the German Research Association for providing the research funds.

The Institute supplied me with an organisational basis and enabled me to carry out field work in India in co-operation with Osmania University in Hyderabad. The Indian government granted permission to undertake the research.

Since I considered it essential to develop the categories from within the Indian social context I needed the help of Indians and this was gladly given me. The data were gathered by four Indians in co-operation with myself. My thanks go to the other members of the Indo-German Board (Aachen-Bochum-Osmania Co-operation Scheme) and of the Field Office: to Prof. Dr. C. Lakshmanna as senior

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Klaus Mäding

Contents

Foreword v

Chapter I : NEGLECT AND PERSPECTIVE IN THE PERIPHERY 1

The perspective 3

Social structure and human consciousness 4

The reality of social structure 4

Application to India 5

The influence of social structure on consciousness 7

Value-orientations as "enlightening" of "mystifying" forms of consciousness 8

The relevance of the concept of value-orientations to India 11

Chapter II : VALUE CONCEPTS 17

Rationality in its specific context 17

The value concepts as part of the experience of Indian peasants 20

The categories of value-orientations 24

Respect for the power of the environment 24

Ideal of harmony 27

Concepts of equality 30

Readiness to co-operate 31

Propensity for innovations 32

Inclination to education 33

Value-orientations and social action 36

Chapter III : METHODOLOGY OF FIELD RESEARCH 47

Empirical data and social reality 47
On the experience of conducting survey in India 48
The research methods 48
Role of interview in survey in India 49
Telangana—the region of investigation 54
The sample 55
Question formulation 56
Analysis of the interviews and statistics 59

Chapter IV : VALUE-ORIENTATIONS OF INDIAN PEASANTS 63

The level of subsistence in the class structure 69
New impulses in the class structure 73
Caste structure 74
Social hierarchy based on birth 74
The caste structure as a constraint on social opportunities 82
Disintegrating tendencies in the caste structure 85
Under privilege 87

Chapter V : FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 96

Chapter VI : SOME FURTHER DETERMINANTS 139

At the individual level 139
Communication—an expansion to experience ? 139
Age—a factor modifying experience 141
Determinants at village level 142
Quantitative situational data 142
Groupings inside the village and relations with the outside world 143
Caste domination 143
Social history of the village and its conflicts 144
Developmental impulses 144

Chapter VII : TENACIOUS STRUGGLE WITH SOCIAL BARRIERS 148

The intensification of social pressures 148

Peasant consciousness in the social framework 149

Approaches to reducing social pressures in rural India 156

Appendix

I Production : Irrigated area under cultivation 165

II Production : Forms of Peasant work 166

III Castes 167

IV Inequality in the caste system—i 168

V Inequality in the caste system—ii 169

VI Standardised questionnaire concerning basic problems in English and Telugu 172

VII The relativity of restrictions 179

VIII New forms of co-operation 182

IX Unequal educational opportunities by sex 183

X Continuing class restrictions on education 184

XI Restrictions resulting from the village situation 185

Bibliography 186

Chapter I

Neglect and Perspective in the Periphery

The mass media in the industrialized countries, already overloaded with information, tend to ignore the peasant masses in the various regions of Asia. Poverty, degrading working and living conditions pass through the mesh of the newsgatherers' nets. In the case of India, exceptions are natural catastrophes and the solemn holding of elections. Then all of a sudden these silent figures in the Third World are in the limelight, only to be hustled away when everything is over.

This being so, scientific social analysis of rural society in India has two aims: not only the collection of experimental scientific data and the formation of theories, but also the filling in of gaps in public awareness in the industrialized countries.

Undoubtedly, those concerned in the Third World have an interest in their situation being not only deplored but also analysed with a view to human emancipation and the lessening of social oppression. The present work can only make a highly fragmentary and incomplete contribution. In doing so it has to contend with the problem of making the peculiarity of rural experience comprehensible. At the same time there is the need to describe various particular aspects of South Indian peasants experience. Naturally people belonging to the rural context of South India would be the most qualified to present the specific context of their daily lives. Those belonging to other societies can

only try to analyse Indian society from a standpoint, which is their personal mixture of nearness and remoteness.

Finally, one must bear the uniqueness of Indian society in mind. Nonetheless, it is meaningful to try to find points of comparison with other societies. Such comparisons can, in the first instance, proceed from the subordination of certain groups to others, known in almost all societies. Restricted opportunities of this kind are upheld by social norms. The person's desire to develop to the fullest possible extent arise in conflict with this. Starting from such basic processes one obtains the tools for working in societies other than one's own, both on a scientific basis and from the point of view of development. One cannot adopt the point of view of those concerned in all its specific aspects. But the conflict of basic human needs with social restrictions opens a well-founded and meaningful approach to other societies.

The interest of people in the Third World in examining and gradually eliminating the constraints placed on their opportunities goes hand in hand with a similar interest among people in the industrial societies. The unfamiliar society sheds new light on what one has become accustomed to in one's society: the way that every existing social order destroys human opportunities. Analysing crass mechanisms of oppression opens one's eyes to the more subtle forms.

Public opinion in the industrial societies—in capitalist as well as so-called socialist states[1]—is trying to negate to which extent people in the Third world are subjected to continuing fundamental pressures. Nevertheless these constraints are part and parcel of the power structure of industrial societies which is spreading worldwide. The industrial societies are part of an international system which is constantly increasing the social pressure on millions of people in the peripheral societies. The fact that living standards in the industrial countries to a great extent depend upon unequal international exchange and on economic and political power, threatens our sense of satisfaction.

If one takes note of the international context of social

oppression, this raises fundamental questions and fosters the recognition of new political principles.

The barriers standing in the way of social emancipation are at present not being lowered, as some optimistic "modernizers" would have us believe. Rather, barriers to development solidify all round the world including ecological problems. Even where societies do not otherwise resemble each other very much, there is a continuous growth of new forms of hindrance and suppression to human development. This question occurs everywhere: does human self-determination have a chance in the face of such constraints?

The perspective

It is the function of the theoretical approach to bring out the way that social structures interrelate with the consciousness of those living in them. A. Etzioni classified social science theories under three metatheories.[2]

1. the atomistic, which views societal processes as the consequences of mechanistic relations between a large number of micro-units (as an example Etzioni cites the model of complete competition in the economic sciences);
2. the collectivistic, in which one starts from "quasi-organic relationships among the parts of the societal whole" (as an example, concepts of "social systems");
3. the voluntaristic approach which assumes an nearly unlimited freedom of action of the social actors (Etzioni subdivides this further from the viewpoint of rationality/irrationality).

The theoretical appraoch applied should include the possibilities of both "collectivist" and "voluntarist" theory. It seems undesirable to do without either of these two: on the one hand one should keep the totality of social structure in view while on the other the approach should not curtail the scope of human action from the outset. Ultimately, the aim should be to find an adequate means of understanding the specific character of the Indian situation. Irving L. Horowitz' contributions to development

research are relevant here. In his fundamental work, "Three Worlds of Development", he begins the section on "Personality and Social Structure in Comparative International Development" with the sentence "The tension between human volition and social necessity is central in development analysis".[3] He draws the conclusion that "the need, therefore, is for 'Contextual types' of analysis which take both attitudes and structures into consideration".[4]

The connection between social structure and human perspective, however, calls for clarification. How about the possibility of applying Max Weber's theses to Asia[5]? Even if one does regard "protestant ethics" a vital starting point for European capitalism, one must still take into account that Max Weber did not maintain that social action derives directly from religious ideas.[6] Instead, in accordance with his views one must look for basic social conditions and forms which can absorb such religious impulses. It is not justified to assume that consciousness constitutes a historical force which precedes socio-structural conditions. On the basis of a "contextual" analysis we have to look closer at the relationship between social structure and forms of consciousness under the conditions of present-day Indian society.

Social structure and human consciousness

The reality of social structure

Social structure which in the broadest sense is determined by the actions of all members of society is paradoxically experienced by the individual as a block of opportunities and denials. It came into existence without him and he finds it already in force. His starting point is not an invitation to help shape an unfinished social structure, but rather an existential challenge to find nooks and crannies in this block to which he can hold on.

Social structure is not just a great classificatory net[7] which is thrown over society. It is not only the combined actions of autonomous individuals and their complemen-

tary role-expectations. It is also a historically shaped reality which the individual experiences first of all as limiting his scope. Only when he withstands this social pressure and counters it with energies of his own, does he begin to act in society.

The socio-economic structure lacks any formulated plan for the social actors. Karl Marx's approach should not be interpreted in the sense of socio-economic determinism. All the same, it seems desirable to adopt some basic Marxist categories where they appear promising because of the broad perspective.

This investigation also profits from Marx's view that "underdevelopment" fetters the potential of a society. He holds that labour is the main form of action through which the individual exerts influence on social structures.

It is important to cast off all dogmatic inflexibility in order to preserve the broad scope which in my view makes Marx's categories fruitful where societies of the Third World are concerned.

Application to India

It is generally accepted that the system of land ownership shapes the social structure in rural India.[8] Agrarian Indian society is basically characterised by a scarcity of land and capital, and by a surplus of labour. This labour force is not completely recruited in the open market, but there are bonds restricting its free mobility.

C. Bettelheim puts this issue as follows:[9]

"The absence of a labour market in a large part of the rural sector;

"the personal subservience of the immediate producer to the landowner;

"the excessive importance of land rent;

"the underdeveloped marketing system resulting in little social division of labour, a low rate of accumulation, and the use of produce mainly to satisfy immediate needs".

The Hindu caste system, originally, conferred on certain castes the ownership of land and on some others the obligation to render service to the whole of the village (craftsmen) or to the landowners (agricultural labourers).[10] Such bonds and affiliations existed not only in regard to certain persons but also towards groups and the whole of the village. And these bonds were mutual.[11]

Various scholars characterise the dominant mode of production prevailing in rural India as "feudal"[12] or "semi-feudal".[13] But unquestionably these feudal structures are different from those evolved in Western Europe, Japan and early Chou-China. As long as no convincing, clearly understandable concept relevant to India has been worked out, it suffices in our study to speak of "pre-capitalistic" or "traditional" modes of production in the existing agrarian society in India.

In order to grasp the essential economic dimension of the social structure we start our enquiry from landed property. Unequal distribution of this factor of production leads to traditional class structures which are linked with systems of stratification such as the hierarchy of castes.

It is possible to apply the concept of class to societies not dominated by the capitalist mode of production. Then certainly it is not to be used in its 'pure' form. But it seems useful to use this category in order to grasp the historical dynamics inherent in the unequal control over the means of production.

At the same time, the basic economic dimension cannot be separated from the other socio-structural dimensions pertinent to Indian society. The caste system can of course be comprehended in economic terms, according to C. Bougle,[14] as a system of division of labour. This would not rule out ethnic differences at the origin of the system. Occupation does not completely cover caste membership. Instead, there is an intimate and indestructible religious connotation.[15] While greater concurrence between the class and caste systems existed in traditional Indian society the growth of the modern means of economic production has prompted a considerable divergence.[16] Caste turns out to be the rigidly defined element that does

not immediately conform to economic processes. This aspect of social structure in India requires adequate research because it shows the peculiar course of evolution of Indian society which is not included in the analyses of modern western societies. To apply uncritically the analyses developed for production relations in European conditions will not be fruitful. Relating caste to the basic economic dimension complicates the issue, but it can deepen the analysis because it decisively modifies any purely economic interpretation of the social processes.

The influence of social structure on consciousness

Evidently, to analyse processes of consciousness in Indian Society creates peculiar difficulties. By and large this problem has been dealt with very unsatisfactorily or casually.[17] This criticism seems valid for large areas of contemporary economics and sociology.[18]

Our enquiry seeks to make a contribution in this regard. We start from the assumption that the processes of consciousness in their cognitive, evaluative and affective forms are an integral component of human action. Social development just cannot be reduced to laws of economics. Indeed, it is vital that the correlation between social structure and the processes of consciousness are elucidated and elaborated further.

Social structures do not determine the thinking of the people "automatically". Processes of consciousness can, in fact, occur in contradiction to the prevailing relations of production.[19]

An example from India illustrates as to how forms of consciousness can be detached from production relations.[20]

T.S. Epstein compares an Indian village in which irrigation was introduced with another that continued with dry cultivation. The basic findings of this empirical study in the state of Karnataka (bordering our region of investigation) are applicable to Andhra Pradesh.[21] It is obvious that in spite of far-reaching change through irrigation and the resulting economic growth, and in spite of the change-over to a monetary economy, the traditional social structure remained intact in "Wet village" while in "Dry vil-

lage" far-reaching social changes occurred even though conventional methods of cultivation continued there. To infer consistency here would be misleading since it mistakenly assumes ready acceptance of the main economic impulses in the consciousness and the value system of the persons concerned.

Social change cannot be reduced to a mere alteration of economic relations; one must analyse as well the linkage, as the partial detachment of the consciousness-processes from their structural basis. To ignore human ideas, goals and ideologies and confine the analysis just to behaviours alone would amount to narrowing the possibilities of perception. Thus B F Skinner,[22] maintaing that rewards, reinforcement processes, and so forth render analysis of consciousness processes superfluous. But he cannot precisely explain which of the postulated factors cause which action. Accordingly, the strict economic behaviourism advocated by J Kunkel[23] does not seem to be very convincing. So, it will not do to perceive consciousness as just a reflection of the economic base. Such a direct correspondence presents a mechanistical and onesided concept.

From the flexible linkage of forms of consciousness to the social structure it follows that a comprehensive strategy is required which includes the material conditions of inequality and the further increase of these conflicts in the growth process.

Value orientations as "enlightening" or "mystifying" forms of consciousness

The various forms of consciousness cannot be derived completely from a Society's system of production. On the one hand consciousness buttresses the prevailing power structures in an ideological sense, and on the other it breaks through the existing economic and social relations of dependence. Where interests of the individual concerned are in opposition the need emerges to disengage from social compulsions. A. Touraine sees the need for such an orientation as antagonistic to the social conditions prevailing, and for this he uses the term "imagination".[24] According to him, this faculty of imagination enables

grasp of the concepts of freedom and justice even in oppressive and unjust social conditions.

In this context, I consider it to be very essential to distinguish clearly between "enlightening" and "mystifying" forms of consciousness. By "enlightening" I mean the concepts that are the very foundations of rational analysis and have the potential of overcoming the prevailing social oppression. Oppression can manifest itself in economic exploitation or in the preservation of dependence in consciousness such "enlightening" orientation should enable people to find adequate answers to social challenges and to break through social restrictions. In sharp contrast to this are concepts that justify social oppression: they are "mystifying" in the sense that they cast an ideological veil over social oppression.

Of the forms of consciousness determined by the social conditions of the individuals we have chosen in our enquiry those that are the most fundamental, *viz*., the value concepts. Their specific connotation must be spelled out. We define "value" in the words of C. Kluckhohn,[25] which have been accepted extensively in research and sociological literature:

> "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action".

In our analysis we use the notion of "value concepts" rather than "value" so as to stress upon the contribution of the *individual-in-action* whom we call "actor". By "value or "value-norms" we mean the "standards which measure as to whether something is valuable or not".[26]

Milton Rokeach, in his fundamental reserach on values, has developed a somewhat divergent view of the concept:

> "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an "opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence."[27]

The term "end-state of existence" as the "final condition", in my view, has the basic flaw that it dilutes the concrete relation to action stressed by Kluckhohn. "End-States of existence"—Rokeach mentions for example, world peace are cherished by all individuals in a somewhat non-committal way not calling for concrete action or sacrifices here and today.

In our study, therefore, wherever reference to "end-state of existence" appears it must be concretised in the context of the particular socio-cultural situation. I do not think that Rokeach's definition offers a precise yardstick for action in concrete situations. Moreover, it is too narrow when he speaks of "kind of preference" rather than the "conception of the desirable" as Kluckhohn does.[28] I find it unacceptable, for I feel that too much stress is put on the individual who prefers something, while the roots of value concepts in culture and society are too much left aside. The concepts of values and value concepts have exactly the merit in that they provide a "convergence-point"[29] of the various systems of analysis social, cultural personal[30] and thus are of far greater importance. Accordingly, I follow C. Khuckhohn's definition. Its clarity and expliciteness makes his definition particularly useful.[31]

In order to distinguish "value concepts" from related ideas, one must first consider "attitude". The concept of "attitude" has been widely used in research, especially of social-psychological type.[32] Attitudes are less fundamental concepts which, in contrast to values and their central position, are limited to specific objects and situations.[33]

In this study we have also not used the concept of "value orientation" as is understood by C Kluckhohn[34], F Kluckhohn and F Strodtbeck[35], or divergently by Talcott Parsons.[36] It is a concept that concerns basic philosophic assumptions and their relations. C Kluckhohn, and F Kluckhohn and F. Strodtbeck hold that "value-orientations" have five dimensions, *viz*., those relating to human nature, the external nature, the time perspective, being doing, and to social relations. Such an approach

had definitely to be modified in our study, to suit the particular conditions of the peasants.

The category "social-image" represents a some what complex concept. For example, it was inferred in the case of agricultural labourers that the individual can relate himself to different "images" in different situations.[37] Therefore, its fluctuating nature hampers precise analysis.

Finally, we have tried to avoid in our work approaches with a clear ethnocentric bias. This presents a basic problem,[38] especially in regard to what David McClelland describes as "achievement motivation".[39] The relevance of the phenomena that developed in Europe under certain socio-economic conditions cannot be readily assumed in other, different societies.

In applying the concept of "values" to the peasant society of India there is a problematic element in "the selection from available modes, means and ends of action". Such premises of a theory of decision in Kluckhohn's definition must be definitely restricted where pressures of situation are strong. However, even in a dry region such as the one studied in India where the conditions of production are unfavourable, there is no justification in asserting deterministically that all possibilities of choice are absent; in fact an essential core element of decision remains.

One cannot cut the Gordian Knot of barriers in orientation processes of the Indian peasants that exist for them by denying any opportunities of taking decisions. Indeed, analysis has to aim at comprehending the compulsions that limit social action and that arise as well from the conditions of external nature, the means of production and from the prevailing social inequality. Decision making is not absent here, but materially restricted.

The Relevance of this concept of value orientations to India

One has to grasp the content of value concepts and contours as shaped by the process of production in a society. The social structure suppresses or limits the chances of orientation. The following list presents a number of

important values confronted with the restricting forces of social reality.

The classification given below is to be seen as an outline of the central category system that will later have to be filled in with details. To the individuals the relation between the production process on the one hand and value concepts on the other seems as follows :

	Barriers in the Production process	Reflection or Conflict in the value Concepts	Focal Relationship
1.	Fragmentation of agricultural labour and irrigation	Readiness to Co-operate	Man to man
2.	Hierarchical social relations in the village, traditional system of service	"Harmony-Ideal"	Man to man
3.	Unequal supply of the means of production, caste discrimination	"Egalitarian Concepts"	Man to man
4.	Low productivity, Dependence on weather	"Deference to External Environment"	Man to nature
5.	Insufficient work tools and technological know-how	"Proneness to Innovations"	Man to nature
6.	Limitation of socially-relevant knowledge and communicative competence	"Openness to Education"	Man to man

Quite clearly, the mutual relations of individuals cannot be segregated from the manifestations and forms in which they try to master nature. The concepts concerned with specific values aim either at preserving or at contesting the conditions of production. We believe that the genetic development of the value concepts from the social structure makes it imperative that the different experience of the classes in the village be included.

Alex Inkeles[40] has tried to deduce values from the social structure by applying a theory of action. But does not quite succeed, because he assumes a similarity of social experience for his "industrial" or "modern" man that does not exist in social reality. It is inapt to infer that the structure of modern industrial society produces a man who strives at the same time for more efficiency and individual dignity while opposing hierarchical subordination.

Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck[41] further develop the theme in that they systematically discuss the variations in value orientations. But they confine themselves only to an analysis of the life style of cultural groups without bothering about the socio-economic structure of the society.

We in this study, however, are persuaded to take the contrasting view that the limits in the production process are reproduced in the consciousness of the peasants. The value concepts of particular groups arise from their experience, which is shaped in the system of inequality. Social experience[42] is blocked when social constraints become so overwhelming that they check, limit, divert or oppress possibilities of orientation for emancipation.[43] From early on this happens to every individual in varying degree: from the "concepts of equality" on the emancipatory pole to the "respect for the power of nature" and the "harmony ideal" on the restrictive pole.

Research in western societies[44] and in the Third World[45] bears out that in a system characterised by inequality the value concepts of the under-privileged groups, like for instance the working class, have a different content than those of the privileges groups. How far the values claiming general validity in a society are in fact accepted by the ruling and the ruled groups, or are eventually reinterpreted, must be carefully examined in each case. Liebow found that even a marginal group like the low class blacks in the American cities generally accepts the basic cultural model of the whole society.[46] These people, however, view it in the mirror of their repeated failures to achieve their goals. The level at which they try to integrate value concepts is determined by such experiences. Beginning from a

basic stock of general values deviating concepts of specific groups gradually develop. Rodman's concept of "value stretch", signifying reinterpretation of values,[47] corresponds to such observations.

The ultimate content of value concepts can only be determined by qualitative methods which grasp as well the fate of the group as the situation of the individual.

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3. Second edition ,New York, 1972, p. 377 .
4. *Ibid.*, p. 396
5. R Bellah, "Reflections on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia", in G.D. Ness (ed) : *The Sociology of Economic Development*, New York, 1970, pp. 199-206; M Singer: *When a Great Tradition Modernizes*, London, 1972; *Cf* also M. Weber, "Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen" in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 2: *Hinduismus und Buddhismus, Tübingen* 1963.
6. K H Horning: *Gessellschaftliche Entwicklung und soziale Schichtung*, München 1976, p. 92.
7. F Fürstenberg differentiates between "Social Structure" used as a system of statistical classification, a "network of existing social relations", a closed social system on the basis of roles, an equilibrium of sub-systems, and an interaction of multiple social fields. "Social structure" as a key concept of social analysis in *Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 18 (1966) pp 439-453.
8. See. for example among others, Bettelheim, Ch.: INDIA INDEPENDENT (New York) 1968, p. 22ff, Djurfeldt, G. and Lindberg, S: BEHIND POVERTY, *The Social Formation in a Tamil Village*, (Lund) 1975, p. 173.
9. INDIA INDEPENDENT (New York) 1968, p. 23. In the text that follows this passage Bettelheim discusses also the changes an intruding capitalism brings about.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 126ff.
11. Section 3.3.2.
12. For instance, R.K. Sau "Indian Economic Growth", *E P W*, Annual number, February 1972, pp. 361-78.
13. Bettelheim, *op. cit.*, p. 23. His concept of "semi-feudal" is of little use since it is silent as to what constitutes the other half and there is the danger of using the component "half" to disguise the issue.

Divergent views: K. Gough ("Comment", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 4, 1974, pp. 498ff) is of the opinion that right from the middle of the 20th century trade capitalism has prevailed in Indian agriculture. Similarly, *cf* J. Banaji, "For a Theory of Colonial Modes of Production", *E P W*, 23 December 1973, pp. 2498-2502. In view of the mass of literature on the subject, a reference to the discussion in the *E P W* of the years 1970-73 should suffice. J. McEachern, "The Mode of Production in India", *J C A* 6 (1976), pp 444-57 gives a summary of the discussion.

14. *Essais sur le regime des castes* (Paris) 1927.
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16. Beteille, Andre: CASTE, CLASS AND POWER (Berkeley) 1971, pp.191, 223.
17. *Cf*, for instance, Bettelheim, *op. cit.*, p. 369, who takes too narrow a view of the processes of consciousness and has therefore taken pains to limit its meaning. Only after his experience in China did he later revise his earlier views and criticize them as "economism". *Die Klassenkampfe in der USSR*, vol. I, 1917-23 (Berlin) 1975, pp. 20. 36.
18. Hartfiel, G.: *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Rationalitat* (Stuttgart) 1968, p. 280.
19. *Cf* for discrepencies between structural and motivational data Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 387, 392.
20. "Ist Emanzipation strukturell moglich ?", Greifenhagen, M. (ed) : *Emanzipation* (Hamburg) 1973, p. 212.
21. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTH INDIA (Manchester) 1962, *Cf* also Sinha, D.: VILLAGES IN TRANSITION, A Motivational Analysis (Allahabad) 1966, p. 246, who discovered that in an economically developed village a relatively low aspiration-level continued to exist.
22. BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (New York) 1971.
23. SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (New York) 1970; "Verhaltenstheoretische Perspektiven der wirtshaftlichen Entwicklung", Konig, R. *et al* (ed): *Aspekte der Entwicklungsoziologie* (Koln) 1968, pp. 552-86.
24. His elucidation of the workers' consciousness which he finds relevant to the countries of the Third World is of basic importance here. *La conscience ouvriere* (Paris) 1966, p. 121.
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26. Lautmann., R.: *Wert und Norm* (Koln) 1969, p. 26. His view of "value' has found a prominent place in recent sociological literature.
27. THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES (New York) 1973, p. 5.
28. *Op. cit.*, pp. 9ff.
29. The term originated in the work of the Cornell Value-Study Group, and is cited in *ibid.*, p. 389.
30. Besides Rokeach, *op. cit.*, p. 3, see Parsons and Shils, *op. cit.*; and

Kroeber, A K and Kluckhohn, C, *op. cit.*, pp. 125ff.
The "function" of convergence" arises from the various overlapping value systems prompting social action. It would be one-sided and apparently not entirely correct to lay down values as "common values" for different societies and cultures ignoring specific class differences.
In this regard, at the very outset I entirely agree with the valid criticism directed at Talcott Parsons. (*Cf* the early views of C. Wright Mills : *Kritik der soziologischen Denkweise*, Neuwied, 1963, pp. 84ff, and the subsequent criticism of structural-fuctionalism developed by other scholars). The "general acceptance" of values reveals itself as an ideological assumption that cannot be verified.

31. For a discussion of related concepts see, Friedrichs, J.: *Werte und soziales Handeln* (Tubingen) 1968, p. 22.
32. H P Frey, "Die Brauchbarkeit von Einstellungen als Pradiktor fur Verhalten", *Soziale Welt* 23 (1972), pp. 257-68. *Cf* Crutchfield, R and Ballachey, E: INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY (New York) 1962.
33. Rokeach, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
34. *Op. cit.*, p. 409.
35. VARIATIONS IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS (Evanston) 1961, p. 4.
36. Parsons, T and Shils, E A (eds): VALUES, MOTIVES AND SYSTEMS OF ACTION, p. 59.
37. C Bell and H Newby, "The Sources of Variation in Agricultural Workers' Image of Society", *Sociological Review* 21 (1973) pp. 229-53.
38. Mading, K: *Dritte Welt: Handlungsanleitungen-Zur westlicher Modernisierungsvorstellungen* (Bonn, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) 1978.
39. *Psychologische Analyse der Voraussetzungen wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, Die Leistungsgesellschaft) 1966.
40. "Industrial Man", *A J S* 66 (1960/61) pp. 1-31, and "The Modernization of Man", Weiner, M (ed): MODERNIZATION (New York) 1966, pp. 138-52.
41. VARIATIONS IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS (Evanston) 1961.
42. Negt, O and Kluge, A: *Offentlichkeit und Erfahrung* (1972) 2nd edition, pp. 60ff.
43. Freire, p: *Padagogik der Unterdruckten*)Reinbeck bei Hamburg) 1973, p. 41.
44. Kohn, M: CLASS AND CONFORMITY (Homewood) 1969, P. 350; Kern, H and Schumann, M- *Industriearbeit und Arbeitrbewuptsein* (Frankfurt am Main) 1970; Ortmann, H: *Arbeiterfamilie und sozialer Aufstieg* (Munchen) 2nd edition, 1972, p 76.
Cf the discussion by Han Wan-sang, "Two Conflicting Themes, Common Values versus Class Differential Values", *A S R* 34 (1969), pp. 679-90.
45. Lewis, O.: *La Vida* (London) 1967, p. xlii.
46. Liebow, E: TALLY'S CORNER (Boston) 1967, pp. 221ff.
47. H Rodman argues that the socially deprived sections "share the general values of the society with members of other classes, but in addtion they have stretched these values or developed alternative values which help them to aujust to their deprived circumstances". "The Lower Class Value Stretch", *Social Forces* 42 (1963-64), p. 209.

Chapter II

Value Concepts

Rationality in its specific context

It is of crucial importance how value orientations determine social action. The sequence of determination runs from social structure/production process, forms of consciousness to social action, but it may also be seen in the reverse order.

The theory of decision, in its strict application, holds action to be governed by the principle of rationality. And the principle of rationality must be distinguished from the value systems which differ with different people.[1] In its strict sense, the theory of decision is unrealistic and inapplicable in empirical analysis since it presupposes "idealized action under pure conditions".[2] In no society does social action meet the demands of strict rationality.[3] As a result, attempts have been made to make the principle of "instrumental rationality"[4] which concerns ends and means- more meaningful by developing the concept of "comprehensive rationality". This concept takes into account also the possibilities of choice from the whole range of aims and values.[5] "Rationality... is, thus, not the maximization of instrumental rationality but a proper balance between the selection of means according to their instrumental merits and sustaining the goal commitment."[6]

The inevitable limits of all types of rationality resulting from the particular situation[7] become apparent when the following prerequisites of rational decisions are laid down,

as has been done by A. Etzioni :[8] (a) information about the options and their consequences, (b) assessment of varying consequences in regard to the ends and means, (c) a system of binding values, and (d) a comprehensive view of all pertinent alternatives.

Needless to say that (a) the requisite information is available to each social actor at best as "fractional information",[9] (b) the requisite calculation cannot be made since a proper evaluation of the various consequences is not possible, (c) values are not arranged in clear hierarchies[10] and (d) the relevant consequences and choices cannot be exhaustively grasped and given content.[11] It can be stated categorically that in social action these prerequisities are never actually met. A closed model of decision-making founded on the concept of such rationality can never be wholly applied to social reality. Since at all levels the requisite conditions are not being satisfied, such a model would hinder rather than facilitate the actual process of decision-taking.[12] In social reality decisions are necessarily based on a very limited "rationality". And here one sees the importance of social and cultural factors.

Historical genetic observation reveals in particular that the content of rationality is imparted only through its relation to the particular social structure. This is especially true of the analysis of peasant society in India today. M. Godelier criticises,[13] and rightly, the application of the western, economic concept of rationality on societies elsewhere:

> "The explicit content of the concept of economic rationality is thus identical with the question of the bases of the system of production and distribution in different societies. In this double sense the system of distribution (of produce and factors of production) plays a crucial strategic role.....Since, as we saw, the subject matter of the various forms of economic rationality can neither be deduced from nor reduccd to formal principles, the general theory too can neither be a formal theory nor result from one.
>
> Therefore one cannot project on to other societies the structure and the functional rules of the capitalist socie-

ties or even of any other social formation taken as an *absolute* point of reference. Such a general theory, which being neither formal or an extension of political economy is still at an embryonic stage, would in fact be a *theory of the functional rules of the economy in various types of possible social structures and their foundations*; this scientific recognition is tied up to a great extent with the very unevenly manifest theoretical recognition of the bases of other social structures such as the system of kinship, religion and politics; consequently, the correct method, which presupposes that the one and the same element can have different meanings in differently structured societies, is forgotten.

.....One uncritically holds the rationality of the western economy to be the only possible rationality... But that would imply that one *justifies* it and this alone is the characteristic of any ideological method."

By way of an example the following observation of R Firth may be cited:

"In case of many 'primitive' economic actions the 'profit-motive'* can be rendered as status-enhancing motive. I am not saying that such situations are not to be found in economic analysis. Primitive economic actions have a rational basis, but a *proper understanding of rationality must include the tangible as well as intangible benefits*."

Hence it is necessary to relate the concept of rationality to the specific character of the social structure in Indian villages.

One cannot, therefore, generalise that the peasants in stagnant agricultural economies would almost always be able to use the factors of production at their optimum applying the same criteria as in western industrial societies.[15] It can, however, be seen that these peasants calculate in economic terms as well as do their counter-parts in industrial societies. But they apply their own concepts of rationality and values. It is at such calculation that research is directed rather than at an abstract western model of maximization of profit.[16]

Value concepts, in their various forms are determinants in such a concept of comprehensive rationality. So we must take into consideration the non-existence of a clearly defined hierarchy of values, the fractional nature of the information available to the individual, and the impossibility to evaluate all options available to him. Where social conditions threaten the very economic existence, the individual will strive to secure the bare necessities of life rather than to take risks or to aim at profit.[17]

The value concepts as part of the experience of Indian peasants

Recent scientific theory has highlighted the fact that the presumptions of researchers bias their questionnaire and findings decisively. This is particularly true of the assumptions unconsciously held or those, one does not like to admit.[18] Particularly the tendency to impose value concepts of other cultures on the Indian situation should be firmly rejected.[19]

All too easily western prejudice infers that "traditional" elements hinder economic development. But it is now fairly widely recognised that traditional elements can promote behaviour singularly valuable for a "process of modernisation".[20] So what is required is to define the specific patterns of behaviour and forms of consciousness in their respective social context.

The problem of such presumptions is to be found in highly developed sociological research as well. Everett Rogers,[21] suggests the concept of a "Subculture of peasantry". This approach is meant to be particularly suitable for the Indian situation. He does not base his approach on a dichotomy of traditional and modern values that Inkeles[22] and J. Kahl[23] suggest. Certain weaknesses in it notwithstanding, the "subculture of peasantry" approach goes further than most of the far too technology-oriented theory of diffusion.[24]

Rogers characterises "peasants" as "farmers oriented largely (but not necessarily entirely) to subsistence production".[25] Basing himself on the empirical findings in many societies including India, he stresses a "worldwide"

existence of this subculture and analyses its particular character with the help of a number of elements to be discussed later. Rogers appropriately correlates the method of production, forms of consciousness and the "impulses of modernisation". To that extent his analysis is very directly relevant to our research.

Still this approach is open to criticism on the following counts. ;

1. First and foremost, Rogers completely ignores the existence of conflicts among different groups of the peasant subculture. Pointing this out, N. P. Mouzelis-- holds that Rogers "does not seriously try to put the value concepts in their social context". The various objections to Rogers' lack of theoretical awareness—and they continue even in his later writings-- point to certain harmonistic tendencies in his analysis of the vllage situation. His view of "peasants" does not explain the implications of the fact that rich peasants are better able to free themselves from the restrictions of a subsistence-economy.--

2. The stress on the role of communication in his approach leads him to concentrate extensively on examining the question of external stimuli.[29] Taking Daniel Lerner's ideas[30] further he ascribes exceptional significance to mass communication, even though such specific impact has not been proved satisfactorily by empirical evidence, many theoretical attempts not withstanding.[31] It has already been shown in the case of India that "mass communication" cannot be regarded as the most important of factors in the adoption of agricultural techniques.[32] The protagonists of such a view[33] seem to be easily satisfied with statistics on mass media use without paying due regard to content or socio-structural conditions.

Rogers, far too optimistically assumes that the Indian peasants turn to the media for modernisation stimuli.

3. He does not clarify value concepts sufficiently. He even equates motivations (like the achievement motivation of McClelland) with social values. This can possibly not be sustained as J Kahl[34] has already ably shown.

4. One must ask from which observable criteria Rogers derives his value concepts. He seems to base them on

a negative judgement stretching the "central elements" of his "Subculture of peasantry" from 'mutual distrust in inter-personal relations' through 'dependence and hostility toward governmental authority', 'lack of innovativeness', 'fatalism', 'limited (*sic*) aspirations' to 'limited view of the world'[35] and 'low empathy'. This definition of peasant subculture bears the imprint of ethno-centrism.

5. Methodologically, Rogers' analysis is not satisfactory in so far as he mixes up the various levels of social structure. For example, the classification of the variables as "antecedent, intervening and consequent" is, as Rogers himself admits, not only rather accidental,[36] but is also not maintained through the course of the investigation. As a result, the uncertain feeling arises that everything depends upon everything. Such results are typical of a methodology which defines its success from the large number of satistical correlations.

6. An uncritical handling of the methods of social research must be assumed when Rogers summarises the answers to a number of questions into a "total fatalism score"[37] while it has neither been shown that these answers are really on a *single* dimension nor has the crucial question been clarified what relative weight the different answers have in the socio-cultural context of the villages.

It follows from our criticism then that peasant subculture requires an analysis that is aware of the contradictions among the different groups of peasants.[38] Rogers does not seem to have been particularly successful in determining the particular content of these forms of consciousness. We in our research work try to make a critical contribution to this problem, and aim at arriving at a more proper understanding of the forms of consciousness in a peasant subculture.

What does "communication" exactly mean to the Indian peasants concerned? It is vital to consider here what messages are communicated, what significance they have for the respondents and what impact on their behaviour. In all these particular respects the prevalent communication-theory approaches make quite uncritical assumptions promoting the ideology of western "modernism". It

would appear that the Indian peasant receives 'innovatory impulses" from village opinion-makers,[39] who in turn get them from towns—places where relatively "modern" patterns of behaviour obtain—or from media with a "modern" outlook through cities and ports. The Third World societies are being penetrated by "modern" ideas. Such dependence ultimately leads to an orientation towards the industrial societies, capitalist or socialist. At the root of this communication-theory approach is the belief that appropriate solutions to the problems of the Third World are stored in the "advanced" societies of the west.[40] But such an approach glosses over the fact that the "remedies" from the "advanced" societies are not at all suited to the conditions in the countries of the Third World.

The fact that these offers of "modernisation" stem from certain dominant, central modes of production and corresponding thought structures should not be over-looked. The adequacy and transferability of the western "modernisation-stimuli", at any given time, requires concrete verification. Accordingly, the diffuse concept of communication has to be related to the central category of "experience".[41] By "experience" here is meant the outcome of the subject's confrontation with the social framework as produced in his consciousness. Here, individual collective elements fuse. Once the individual in an Indian village becomes aware of the impossibility of surmounting the prevailing restrictions, an "atmosphere of hopelessness" will arise. Such constraints certainly demand liberating action in the sense of Paolo Freire.[42] It is a fact that during the last years the under-privileged in Indian villages have more often than ever before given organised expression to their interests, have defended them legally and have even maintained them in some conflict situations with the dominating groups.

Without doubt, some concepts of action are not within the peasants' actual views. Some experiences are being denied them on socio-economic grounds. New behaviour cannot just be propagated through communication; it will have to be linked with the actual existing experiences.

In defining the categories of our study, the value concepts are not to be borrowed from the west, but as Paolo Freire suggests they have to be derived "generatively" from the particular environment of the Indian peasantry. A satisfactory application of Freire's methods has not been possible here though in the course of our research the advantages of such a method have become clearer. We would recommend that at the pre-testing stage importance be given to the statements of the persons interviewed, for we noticed that by their own spontaneous observations the situation structure became clearer.

The categories of the value orientations

The categories of the value concepts to be investigated shall be developed from the statements of the respondents and from relevant research. The peasants have gained experience from their confrontation with the environment; this covers questions of control of nature and of relations among the humans. The application of the available production tools enables them to ascertain that some goals can be attained, whereas in other aspects the mastery of nature is obstructed by obstacles.

1. "Respect for the power of the environment"

A characteristic remark by the peasants surveyed repeatedly was: "One cannot achieve anything", "the rains have not come", "the crop has been poor", "the government does not help".

Of course, the underdeveloped state of the tools of production in the villages is a major objective reason for these observations. In objective terms, as we know, there are technical means to make groundwater available or to have seeds that resist drought better.

The attitude of the villagers to the concept of "fatalism" that we have mentioned has been analysed by a number of scholars. E. Rogers defines "fatalism" as "the degree to which an individual recognizes a lack of ability to control his future".[43] In regard to the Indian society, J.B. Sinha believes that a complex of "Dependency proneness"

makes the people look for support, suggestions and protection from other quarters.[44] Consequently, many authors maintain, the concept of "fatalism" has led to the rejection of innovations.[45]

It tallies with the above discussion of socio-structurally produced rationality to work out the value concepts from the situation of the Indian peasants.[46] In our study they are taken in a positive sense as a contribution to problem solution.[47] Rogers, on the other hand, in his definition given above characterises "fatalism" as a lack of ability and at another place he describes it as "a sort of generalized sense of powerlessness".[48] I, in contrast regard as more appropriate the term "Respect for the power of nature". I see this value concept as internalisation of a rational experience in the face of obstructions posed by nature and by the social world. In my view, the concept of "fatalism" should not be deduced from philosophical systems, but rather it has to evolve from the actual mode of production.

From this basis we have to go into a brief discussion of the concept of "fatalism" elaborated by Niehof and Anderson.[49] They distinguish "Supernaturalism" ("Consists of traditional theological beliefs and magical notions") "Situational fatalism" ("an attitude of apathetic passiveness that stems from an accurate understanding of limited possibilities for improving life conditions") and "Project negativism" ("A type of fatalistic apathy towards innovations that is founded on their previous failures. This brand of fatalism is a product of the current age of development rather than stemming from a traditional culture of difficult conditions").

In our study we have not gone into concepts of the "supernatural". The life in the villages contains, indeed, religious rites and rituals in the strict sense, but they have not been seen as any notable hindrances to economic action. To this extent, a historical phase of a dissociation of religious beliefs and technical-economic utility has already set in the villages under consideration. Magic beliefs are not any more hindrance to the use of matchsticks, iron ploughs, threshers and the like[50] as they reportedly once were in Europe. Thus it could be observed

in a village under investigation, N2, that a medium went through the rituals of exorcism with women and their small children while most peasants of this as well as other villages generally preferred western medicine.[51]

Although Hinduism and Islam do not suppress economically advantageous action by their rules, they do affect the chances of different social groups. We have in our research in no way neglected such religious aspects as, for instance, have gone into the caste structure of the Indian society. In fact, they constitute the most important point of analysis. As a general starting point for closer analysis we have to test the assumption that for all castes and the Muslims, the knowledge of their ascriptive religious position strengthens "fatalistic" ideas.

The value concept of "Respect for the power of nature" is defined not from a postulated absence of capabilities of control but as a form of experience that under certain circumstances can present a rational solution of the problems of social action.[52]

In this context we may ask for possibilities of change in this value concept. In deciding upon the strategies of change, it is important to know which elements of continuity will endure in changed circumstances. O. Lewis holds that "resignation and fatalism may readily give way to individual aspiration or group confidence when there is a change in perceived opportunities".[53] Others, in contrast, believe that the concept of an "un-controlable life" constitutes a rather rigid factor.[54] In support of the first view one could argue that "fatalism" is only a "post-hoc-rationalisation" by the peasants in order to understand the assumed and real limits of their routine existence.[55] Thus "fatalism" would be a means to reduce cognitive dissonance and could disappear in a short time in the absence of such circumstances. "Thus (fatalism) serves principally as an explanatory device rather than a determinant of action".[56]

This kind of differentiation, however, is not very convincing, because a "post-hoc-rationalisation" also becomes a part of the experience and in turn provides the basis for future action. In our study we take the view that

such concepts do not just disappear with the change in circumstances. This is in conformity with the already discussed observations (supra pp. 20ff) that the processes of consciousness can separate from their economic base, and can exercise the restraining influence of a factor of stagnation in "cultural lag". The *reciprocal* dependence[57] of value concepts and processes of development can be summed up in the idea of the "totality of society".[58] The "Respect for the power of nature" as an element of experience constitutes a meaningful category in understanding the connection between social structure and social action.

In short, we may formulate the hypothesis that

i. the economically underprivileged groups, because of their meagre control over the means of production, exhibit "Respect for the power of nature" more markedly than other groups,

ii. persons of all the castes in the villages under study present a high level of "Respect for the power of nature".

These hypotheses, shall be defined more precisely later on and checked against the data from our field research.

2. "Ideal of harmony"

Barrington Moore in his seminal research of peasant societies[59] assumes that in India political "pliancy" arises from the caste system. As is known, status has a predominantly ascriptive origin in the caste system, is acquired by birth, and changes in the long run only through a relative rise or fall of the whole status group.[60]

The *Jajmani*-system,[61] as a system of distributing economic functions strengthens differences of social status in a way typical of traditional Indian society. Historically it has contributed to binding agricultural labour to the soil in the interest of landowning classes.[62] This concept, native to North India, shapes relations of production which are widespread in South India also.[63] The castes accordingly have rights and obligations to practise certain basic occupations and services. Even though the caste system has weakened in recent times,[64] it was nonetheless significant in the villages we studied.

For instance, the Madiga,[65] being "untouchables" earlier, have the task of skinning the corpses of cattle and disposing of them, processing leather, making leather containers for draw-wells, sandals, and sweeping the refuse in the village all these are religious taboo for other groups. Under a pure *Jajmani* system they would not be paid for the services rendered individually but would receive compensation mainly in the form of provisions after the harvest[66] from all those who have a right to their services. In return, they have always to be available for accepting orders and obeying commands of the former. In the event, one of their caste falls sick another from among them will take his place.[67] Competition and mobility among the caste groups are thus ruled out. They cannot even develop within the caste, because there are duties a certain family of the serving caste owes to specific families commanding service.[68] Sometimes, the peasant castes may "pay" the families rendering such service in return by unpaid work or by providing them with draught animals or other help.

This system is only part of the economic activity of those concerned. In the villages under consideration most of the Madigas work on the land and their income from there is higher than from their caste obligations.[69] The signs of change are also to be seen in the fact that an increasing amount of services are rendered against money payment, failing which these services are completely stopped.[70] On the other hand, the dimensions of the *Jajmani* system go beyond the economic sphere. They include ritual obligations, support in family affairs, and other things.[71] From the point of view of the peasants the *Jajmani* relations offer a yardstick of social order,[72] and can therefore be rightly looked upon as the social basis of the "Ideal of harmony".

In social-psychological terms the chances of change in the ascriptive forms of discrimination are so negligible that the social objective of "harmony" may promise an alleviation of the pressures. So far as the privileged groups in the caste hierarchy are concerned such value concepts have an obvious 'ideological' function to ensure domination, and to support socio-structural stagnation.[73] Gen-

erally, the effects of this system have been presented in too favourable a light in the past. Allegedly, it has afforded the dependent castes "protection from outside threats, awards in the local disputes, and advice and guidence in personal matters" (*sic*).[74] Such ideas, in fact, earlier gave some support to the underprivileged. But as the struggle for scarce resources increases in India these functions quickly fall away.[75]

Thus, the value concept of the "Ideal of harmony" corresponds to the interest of the privileged groups and to the repressively deformed consciousness of the underprivileged.

Such value concepts surface in responses of Indian peasants like, "in our village there are harmonious relations" which are clearly of an ideological mystifying character. Such expressions have, on the one hand, the function of parrying off the intruding interviewer and, on the other, the function of superficially reducing the cognitive dissonance in the respondents.

The linkage of this form of consciousness derived from pre-capitalist relations of production-with "fatalism" elaborated by E. Rogers and others can at once be seen. The "Respect for the power of nature" lends support to the idea of helplessness in regard to specific fossilised status ascriptions. These concepts spread out to suppress conflict in the socio-economic sector by restricting the right to complain against economic exploitation and usury.[76] But at the same time they also allow some relief from farm rent and interest at times when crops fail.

As in the previous chapter, we have formulated corresponding hypotheses. We must stress that the "Ideal of harmony" does not offer the economically underprivileged the possibility to alleviate their poor economic condition in any decisive manner. We expect that this concept is encountered more often and intensely among the powerful as a camouflaging ideology for it buttresses their position.

The hypotheses to emerge from the discussion above are (i) the "Ideal of harmony" is particularly held by the

economically privileged sections in the villages, and (ii) it is also noticeable among all the groups of the caste hierarchy.

3. "Concepts of Equality"

Values incorporating emancipatory interests are always pitted against forms of consciousness with mystifying character. This results from the conflicts inherent in the socio-structural processes.[77]

Concepts, in which equality of man is considered desirable, are not to be found in their purest form in Indian village society, of course, but are transformed by the prevailing caste and economic barriers. Thus if we turn to the phenomenon of the *Jajmani* system particularly, the question arises as to whether there is any sense at all in asking the peasants about opposing equalitarian concepts.[78] The stronger the social control the lesser the chances of authentically grasping variant value orientations.[79]

We have undertaken the task here, because on observation it becomes clear that such a potential for conflict does in fact exist in the villages in India that it is possible to discern even suppressed value concepts.

We start with the material things, and in that regard the need for clean and sufficient drinking water something that may appear quite trivial to the western reader—which is of utmost importance in the area under investigation,. In the dry areas of Andhra Pradesh, water has a decisive value for the maintenance of life. Through brutal repression by the caste system which dolls itself up with the "Ideal of harmony" and in the face of equality guaranteed under the law, the *Harijan* castes of all the villages under investigation[80] were kept away from the drinking wells of the dominant castes by ritual prohibition.

As in only 25% of the villages the government had put in separate wells for *Harijans*, they were generally kept away from the main wells of the village built with public funds. The Government's claim that all castes are equal, in fact, helps it to save money but it does not change things for the underprivileged *Harijans*.

Essentially two tangible consequences follow from this. Either these castes, constituting between 6 and 36 per cent of the village population[81] are in acute danger during the eight-month long dry spell with health dangers and with rising death-rate among the weak, the old and the children. Or they have to undergo time-consuming distances, which moreover are mostly dirty.

In addition repression and inequality in conjunction with the caste system are in evidence in the social division of labour, in access to the educational and religious institutions, in the right to live in the main part of the village, and in regard to many other things.

The problem of drinking water suffices to illustrate which needs lead to the evolution of value concepts based on equality. An incident that occurred in our presence in village H6 under investigation proves the point: incensed *Harijans* forced their way to the mayor's office to demand better drinking water wells; this insight into the conflict situation of the village blatantly contradicts the "Ideal of harmony".

According to our observation, until the period of investigation the more far-reaching "Concepts of equality", particularly the demand for economic equality have remained suppressed. The cause is the notion of fusing *unequal* functions in the prevailing system of caste service. It seems realistic therefore to confine the investigation of the "Concepts of equality" for the time being to the attempts at egalitarianism in the caste system.

We take it that the underprivileged groups in terms of caste consider "equality" to be more desirable than do the higher castes. It has to be tested therefore as to whether (i) the "Concepts of equality" as defined here appear independent of the economic situation, and (ii) and if the underprivileged castes more markedly desire "equality" than do the other castes.

4. "Readiness to co-operate"

Production in the Indian villages can be increased considerably through co-operative work, particularly in the interest of the poorer peasants.[82] It has to be borne in mind

that much of the labour force and the draught animals of the village remain idle for long periods and that they could be put to productive use on land elsewhere or in doing something for the community as a whole. The pressure of short-term peak demand for labour at harvest time could be eased. The supply of water crucial for certain types of cultivation comes, generally, from the wells constructed by the prosperous farmers. Transcending the rigid individualistic concepts of ownership, the water used with low marginal benefits in the fields of a few could be used more optimally on other fields under some kind of agreements.[83]

Thus conditions do exist which are conducive to the emergence of value concepts favourable for co-operation. But they often contradict the prevailing concepts of property and vested interests.

Exceptions exist, of course, when certain ritual prohibitions rule out co-operative activity among high and low-ranking castes. The *Jajmani* system, in the realm of consciousness, still supports value concepts as "Readiness to co-operate". Such a concept presupposes a minimum degree of trust.[84] About Shamirpet ,a village near our area of investigation, S Dube[85] recalls nostalgic memories of how in "earlier days" one could take the village barber into confidence, even in "delicate matters". The continuing traditional *Jajmani* system does foster some trust.

Summing up we may say that (I) "Readiness to co-operate" is to be found in a more marked degree among the economically underprivileged for reasons of economic necessity, and (II) the castes whose obligations have acquired institutionalised forms under the *Jajmani* system advocate "Readiness to co-operate" more distinctly.

5. "Propensity for innovations"

Unfavourable natural conditions and the increase in population exert pressure on the livelihood of the peasants in India today. The traditional methods of production, relatively well developed at a lower level, cannot do justice to these increased requirements. The technology of industrial societies offers partial solutions. This type of technology has a powerful impact on local production methods.[86]

Increased returns are impressive while the particular mix of conditions leading to them is easily forgotten. The "Propensity for innovations" is understood as the readiness to adopt changes in the fields of production and the life of the peasants.[87] It does exist, of course, before the industrial societies of the north came into being. This is borne out by the different technological revolutions that have repeatedly occurred in the entire history of mankind.[88] But the western impulses offer specific forms of change within the framework of the "civilising process". However, what the west offers also entails serious and negative consequences in varying degrees. This is summed up by the concept of "technical dilemma".[89] In order to be able to introduce these technical innovations, the peasants need an economic surplus that takes care of their survival during the trial period and a social status which enables them to adopt innovations.

The hypotheses to be tested at this stage are that (i) the "Propensity for innovations" is to be found more among the economically privileged groups, and (ii) it is more likely to be predominant among the leading groups in the caste hierarchy.

6. "Inclination to education"

The education of the younger generation calls for schools that are adapted to the orientational interests of members of society and aimed at increasing social opportunities. The main function of education in a society strongly shaped by a subsistence economy opportunities is to increase the capabilities for controlling nature and promoting social relations.[90] Existing forms of production and employment opportunities are passed on or new ones are learnt. Education intervenes in a specific, generative way in the forms of consciousness under study by imparting the prevailing value concepts and norms or by offering new orientations. Education at the same time reflects existing social contradictions releases the recurring as well as changing forces and goes much beyond merely reproducing existing society. While imparting qualifications and prestige,

education at the same time augments the opportunities for mobility.[91]

The school system institutionalises only a fraction of the social processes of learning. It must be measured against the vast job of raising the situational orientation of young people.

The drive for literacy is already useful, when it imparts simple reading knowledge that enables one to decipher instructions-for-use and such things.[92] However, it is not enough just to simplify the education tailored for an urban milieu and to proclaim it as "village-oriented". What is crucial is that adaptibility is encouraged, even when on considerations of economic optimisation such steps do not for the moment appear to be "useful". The problem is that the impulses for change that come from the Government in the field of education though reflecting "modern" tendencies, are far too remote from the peasant situation. As such they use up the resources of the state in an unproductive manner.

In the same way, I, Horowitz[93] limits the effect of education on social development. In contradistinction, optimistic views like those of S. Eisenstadt,[94] P. Forster,[95] E. Rogers,[96] and E Boesch[97] see education with a definite western preconception of "modernisation". This is particularly true of B. Struimpel,[98] who sums up in this regard as follows:

> "The rural school education, as it is practised today in most of the developing countries, is an important-perhaps the most effective-agent of social change. It intervenes powerfully in the social process of learning, which till now was the preserve of parents and the village community bearing the imprint of the traditional culture, and it modifies the traditional value structure (footnote by B Strumpel) by means of a massive transfer of the wealth of modern urban ideas.
>
> Thereby it creates the conditions, for the inner turning away from traditional modes of production to the in ones own capability to master such an adjustment."

But only where school education relevant to the situation is available, and is accepted by the Indian peasants, will it contribute to improvement.

It would be inappropriate—as it does often happen to view the rejection of certain school institutions altogether as hindering an orientation to learning. But before that, one must examine as to how far do educational institutions meet the requirements of the available methods of production and the resultant needs. I propose that the interest, of orientation lies in overcoming the existing social barriers. In contrast to this is the prestige aspect of the "inclination to education" which plays a stronger role for the privileged than for the underprivileged;[99] indeed it buttresses the existing social hierarchy.

We infer from the discussion then that (i) the economically privileged groups show a greater "inclination to education", and (ii) high ranking castes are more oriented towards education.

If in a contextual analysis one starts with the assumption that the experiences of particular processes of production shape the value concepts the underlying processes gain in relative importance. In the table in section 2. 3 and the discussion that followed it, I have begun with the major elements of the process of production, such as development of the forces of production, forms of cultivation, climatic conditions, social inequality, etc. If the value concepts are evolved authentically from these conditions of production, their relevance is necessarily implied. Even where this origin is open to debate, the investigation of the categories used here can be defended on grounds of its plausibility. For the sake of clarification in such a debate, it is pointed out that (i) the value concepts are more convincing in regard to the Indian peasants, because they are defined in terms of existing orientation, and not as is the case with Rogers; largely through a lack in orientation i.e., ethnocentrically,[100] and (ii) the list of categories compiled here satisfies the structural-functionalist demand of being concerned with problems, which serve the basic needs of man's social existence.[101] This concerns not only man's

conflict with nature but also the orientations that regulate his behaviour in regard to other fellow beings.

Value Orientations and social action

On the dividing line where the examination of the value concepts spills over into analysis of social action, a question arises: how do the examined value-orientations determine action in society?

Two contradictory answers[102] are being offered on this issue: (i) the "consistency theorem",[103] and (ii) that attitudes and value concepts have a limited applicability to predict social action. In fact, it follows from general theory that value concepts, as we have defined them, and action are at all inter-related. Also the position of action as a dependent variable, has already been accepted by authors representing diverse trends.[104] The issue becomes debatable only on the question as to how action is determined by value orientations. This issue is raised in all its sharpness when we try to evolve variables suitable for analysis from the socio-structural mesh-work.

Empirical investigations thus far do not make the proposition tenable that there is immediate co-variance of attitudes and value-orientations with action.[105] In the words of R Turner.[106] "Given opportunity, the absence of countervailing attitudes, and an appropriate situation, one predicts behaviour from attitude....". But a majority of social scientists do not accept this view.[107] Action never appears as the direct consequence of a form of consciousness alone, but it results from other co-determinants as well, as Turner implies by "opportunity", "an appropriate situation", etc.[108] An absolute covariance would presume, however, that action would result under all circumstances even when changes occur in the other determinants. H. Ehrlich[109] tries to solve this issue by stressing mainly the methodological aspect while assuming that the "consistency theorem" could be sustained once :hese problems have been taken eare of.

According to Ehrlich, it is an erroneous assumption that the answers from the situation of the interview could be transferred to the situation of action.[110] Besides, he

maintains the whole issue of the interpretation of the meanning of the answers remains unclarified. In our view, it is not enough, however, to ask for better methods of investigation. Rather, it is the socio-structurally rooted problem that appears to be more important here, which Ehrlich raises when he points out that the necessary means are a precondition for action.[111]

To open the issue of consistency, in our view, should occasion reflection on the basic structure of society. There is need to specify clearly the interrelation between value concepts and action which thus far has remained far too undifferentiated. Before getting into the problem of measurement let us be clear as to what is to be measured in the first place.

One has then to try out the various propositions of the social sciences from which a particular approach may be developed that would be applicable to the actual situation in the Indian villages. There are no basic obstacles that with certain modifications, these considerations may be applied to other societies.

Referring to K Lewin, Ehrlich himself insists on analysing the situation by using the role concept. U. Himmelstrand proposes a similar approach. Besides making suggestions about the methodology for differentiating and measuring the attitudes and behaviour better, he suggests (i) the "anchoring" in the personality of attitudes measured from statements of the persons concerned or in attitude components which are not verbally measured, and (ii) in "social roles, norms of the groups and other factors which relate to a relevant social context".[112] In regard to (i) Himmelstrand himself doubts that such factors can be recorded. An inquiry of a psychological nature such as this cannot be pursued here. We are in fact more interested in question of a socio-structural nature; how precisely, and in what form, can the social context be introduced in the relationship between value-orientations and action.

Finally what L G Warner and M L deFleur suggest in this regard has to be tested. Like Ehrilich and Himmelstrand they, too, emphasise that concepts of interaction

like roles, group memberships, co-operative groups, sub-cultures, etc., can indeed present intervening variables.[113] They derive their proposition from the observation that a consistency of attitudes and action became noticeable when "social constraint" (defined as the knowledge of the reference persons) and a reduction of "social distance" (meaning the distance between social positions) exercised a favourable effect on action. These categories do not seem very helpful when related to the point of departure. What should be decisive is, which reference persons know of the behaviour of the individual and what they except of him. "Social constraint" and "social distance" therefore, mean merely a bunching of the basic concepts of roles and of group norms rather than constituting an instrument of further analysis.

One can thus tie up the raised by Ehlich most closely with the position of U. Himmelstrand. Fundamentally acceptable is not a general proposition of consistency of value concepts and action, but rather the proposition of a situationally mitigated consistency.

Recently U Himmelstrand has reaffirmed this basic point: Sense and meaning in individual action can only be delineated if we grasp the socio-structural conditions.[114]

Value concepts become increasingly consistent with action when they already incorporate factors supporting a definite course of action. Thus one has to consider the economic opportunities and deprivations, protection through influence (or law) role-expectations and norms. These factors are differentiated for the various reference groups according to economic status, rank in the caste, religious group, and so on. The problem of "opportunity" already mentioned earlier by Turner becomes concretised here in regard to the group. The size of the concerned groups, their dominance[115] in the village enlarges the area of activity of the persons belonging to them. If one is a member of a group controlling the power structure and the mechanisms of distribution, the value concepts have more of a chance to be translated into action.[116] One has to take into account of course whether the person holds a marginal position in the group, in which case his chances would

be limited, or if status cristallisation buttresses his specific chances of action.

Neither of these factors should in isolation be made into an "intervening variable". Since the elements of the situation cannot be divided from one another as isolated components this might invite the charge of arbitrariness.

Value-orientations are defined here as value concepts which are socio-structurally evolved. This research stresses upon such a socio-structural derivation. Therefore, Indian peasant society and its basic processes of production with their social content must be fundamentally kept in view. The aspects of roles and norms examined here are then integrally incorporated in the concept of *experience*. The idea of "totality of society.-- enables us to include social structure as an element in developing certain categories like those of value-orientations. In this way the weaknesses of a procedure are eliminated that is composed of a mere enumeration of individual factors in isolation, and further refers to a clause of other things being equal. The effect of such a procedure would be a merely formal immunization against criticism. Instead, as we suggest here, if the forms of consciousness are developed from the social experience of the individuals, the "interfering variables" then are automatically incorporated in the value-orientations. The "anchoring" of which Himmelstrand rightly speaks is achieved in the derivation of value-orientation from the structure of Indian peasant society.

REFERENCES

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2. Habermas, *op. cit.*, pp. 132, 138.
3. Hartfiel, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff.
4. Weber, Max: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tubingen) 1956, 4th edition, pp. 1-30.
5. A Etzioni, *op. cit.*, pp. 261.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
7. Following K Lewin situations here are understood as "time-space units of action". J. Friedrichs, "Situation also soziologische Erhebungseinheit", *Zeitschrift fur Soziologie* 3 (1974) issue 1, p. 47.

8. *Ibid*,., p. 264.
   CF also Burghardt, A.: *Allgemeine Wirtschaftssoziologie* (Pullach) 1974, pp. 33ff.
9. J Friedrichs, *ZfS*, *op.cit.*, p. 267. *Cf* in this regard G Abel, "Probleme methodologischer Kritik von sozialwissenschaftlichen Theorien" in *Jahrbuch fur Sozialwissenschaft* 21 (1970), p. 371, and Gafgen, G: *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entscheidung* (Tubingen) 1968, 2nd edition, especially pp. 126-37.
10. Gunnar Myrdal has already shown this in his seminal essay, "Das Zweck-Mittel-Denken in der nationalen Okonomie", *Zeitschrift fur National-okonomie*, 4 (1933), pp. 315ff, in which he maintains: "The process of rationalisation is never able to form the evaluations into a logically closed system, which is to be proved by a study of general value concepts of an individual or of a social group". If one says that "value-concepts ought to represent such a hierarchy if only that individuals would correctly think on from their own innermost principles (criteria) of evaluation, then one is expressing only an unsubstantiated postulate....".
11. Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 304. G Hartfiel, *op. cit.*, p. 272, and R. Dahrendorf, "Homo sociologicus" in *Pfade aus Utopia* (Munchen) 1967, pp. 128-94, hold a different view in this regard which they revise partially later, see pp. 383ff.
13. *Rationalitat und Irrationalitat in der Okonomie* (Frankfurt am Main) 1966, pp. 341, 350ff.

*The single quotation marks here are by me.

14. "Orientatierungen im Wirtschaftsleben" in Firth, R, *et al: Institutionen in primitiven Gesellschaften* am Main) 1967, p. 18. (Emphasis provided by me).
15. A more convincing analysis in this regard sould have been made by Schultz, Th.: TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE (New Haven) 1964, p. 37, and by A. Saith and A Tankha, "Economic Decisionmaking of the Poor Peasant Household", *E P W* annual number (Feb 1972), p. 359.
16. The problem arises when, for example, the costs of the production factor 'work' have to be calculated in a society where a lot of family services are supplied. Wolf, E.: PEASANTS (Englewood Cliffs) 1966, pp. 16ff.
17. F. Cancian, "Stratification and Risk-taking", *American Sociological Review* 32 (1967) pp. 912-27, and in regard to India, Thorner, A & A: LAND AND LABOUR IN INDIA (Bombay) 1962, p. 140.
18. Gouldner, A.: *Die westliche Soziologie in der Krise*, vol. I (Reinbeck) 1974, pp. 47ff.
19. Mading, Dritte Welt, *op. cit.*
20. *Cf* in this regard the exhaustive criticism of Eisenstadt, S N : TRADITION, CHANGE AND MODERNITY (New York) 1973, pp. xxff, and Ralph Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 9 (1966/7) pp. 292-346.
21. In co-authorship with Lynne Svenning : MODERNIZATION AMONG PEASANTS (New York) 1969.

22. "The Modernization of Man" in Weiner, M (ed): MODERNIZATION (New York) 1966, pp. 138-50. "Industrial Man, The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value", *AJS* 66 (1960/61) pp. 1-31.
23. "Some Measurements of Achievement Orientation", *AJS* 70 (1964/65), pp. 669-81; THE MEASUREMENT OF MODERNISM, *A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico* (Austin) 1968.
24. Here it would be necessary to emphasize very clearly the material conditions of this subculture (as is done by J L Roach and O R Gursslin, "An Evaluation of the 'Culture of Poverty' ", *Social Forces*, 45, 1966/67, pp. 383-92 ff) and thus make a clear causal relation rather than a confused usage of this concept.
25. E Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
26. "Modernization, Development and the Peasant", *Development and Change*, 4 (1972/73) pp. 73-88.
27. With Shoemaker : COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS (New York) 1971.
28. E. Wolf distinguishes between "farmers", i.e., market-producers, and "peasants", who themselves do not control the means of production, which instead are controlled by dominant groups also disposing of the surplus value. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 4ff). S W Mintz's differentiation between "peasants" and "rural proletariat" goes a step further, but concerns specifically plantation labour. "The Rural Proletariat and the problem of Rural Proletarian Consciousness", *Journal of Peasant Studies*,, 1, 1974, pp. 300 ff).
29. *Cf op. cit.* (1969) p. 334.
30. THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (New York) 1958.
31. See, particularly the work of Karl Deutsch and Lucien Pye respectively in this regard.
32. H D Lakshminarayana, "Differential Communications and Process of Adoption of Farm Innovations in Intensive Agricultural District Programme Villages" *Indian Journal of Social Research*, 13 (1972) p. 211.
33. E Rogers quotes a number of surveys (*Op. cit.*, 1969) p . 324, where "communication capability" is regarded as most important factor in "individual modernization".
34. "Some Measurements of Achievement Orientation", *A J S* 70 (1964/65) pp 669-81. *Cf* the difference pp. 25, 27.
35. *Cf.* Daniel Lerner, *op. cit.*
36. *Op. cit.*, p. 59.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
38. "Peasant" here has been taken to mean as Wolf, *op. cit.*, defines on pages 4ff- both the 'farmers' who produce for the market, and the 'peasants' who in their production are controlled by the dominant groups.
39. E. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 334.
40. Far too self-righteously Rogers formulates his concept of external diffusion for social sciences: "The social sciences were founded in Europe, grew to methodological sophistication in North America, and were then transplanted to less developed countries". *Ibid.*, p. 364.

41. Negt, O. and Kluge, A : *Offentlichkeit und Erfahrung* (Frankfurt am Main) 1972, 2nd edition, pp. 20ff.
42. *Padagogik der Unterdruckten* (Reinbeck bein Hamburg) 1973 pp. 82ff.
43. *Op. cit.*, p. 32
44. DEVELOPMENT THROUGH BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION (Bombay) 1970, p. 69.
45. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 104ff.
46. Otherwise the bias in (permeating) the western ethnocentrism will have to be raised against such categories.
47. H Gans draws attention to the possibility that fatalism can alleviate the cruel blows of fate. The URBAN VILLAGERS (New York) 1962, pp. 248ff.
48. *Cf* M. Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", *A S R* 24 (1959) pp. 783-91, and Blauner, R: ALIENATION AND FREEDOM (Chicago) 1964, p. 16.
49. "Peasant Fatalism and Socio-economic Innovation", *Human Organization* 25 (1965) pp. 273-83 cited in Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 278ff.
50. K Dobrowolski mentioned this for Poland in the 19th century. "Peasant Traditional Culture" in Shanin, T (ed) : PEASANTS AND PEASANT SOCIETIES (Harmondsworth) 1971, p. 289.
51. Development of such loosening since 1930, *Cf* Wiser, W and C : BEHIND MUD WALLS (Berkeley) 1973, 2nd edition, p. 175.
52. Here, I entirely agree with Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 464.
53. Quoted in Valentine, C: CULTURE AND POVERTY (Chicago) 1968, pp. 134, 137, 140.
54. Walter Miller and Herbert Gans, in *ibid.*
55. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 277.
56. In the acceptance or rejection of innovation Niehoff and Anderson (*op cit.*) accordingly do not see "fatalism" as a very significant variable.
57. Rogers, on the contrary, sees "fatalism" primarily as a "dependent variable" in the "process of modernisation". *Op. cit.*, p. 278.
58. It would, however, be wrong to proceed from a onesided determination of consciousness from social existence alone, for in the final analysis it would lead us to a mechanistic view that cuts out the creative role of consciousness in conflict with the social conditions aimed at re-structuring them. *Cf* K.M. Tjaden, "Soziale Systeme und gesellschaftliche Totalitat" in Hulst, D., *et al*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
59. Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, *op. cit.*, pp. 388, 395.
60. This applies in our study specially to a caste group of five artisan castes, the *Panchbrahmin.*
61. According to L. Dumont, the *Jajmani* system can be viewed as the "basic form of division of labour in traditional India". *Op. cit.*, p. 106, *Cf*, in particular, also Beidelman, T O : A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE *JAJMANI* SYSTEM (Locust Valley, N.Y.) 1959, p. 6, where it is defined: "The *Jajmani* System is a feudalistic system of prescribed, hereditary obligations of payment and of occupational and ceremonial duties between two or more specific families of different castes in the same locality".

62. H. Alavi, Die Koloniale Transformation in Indien. ., in J. -H. Grevemeyer (ed). Traditionale gesellschaften und europaischer Kolonalismus (Frankfurt a.M.) 1980, pp. 158-208, *cf.* p. 175.
63. Detlef Kantowsky, *op. cit.*, p. 22. *Cf* the discussion of certain regional differences, D Bronger, "Jajmani System in Southern India ?" in Meyer-Dohm, P (ed): ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF INDIAN DEVELOPMENT (Tubingen) 1975, pp. 237, 230.
64. Mandelbaum, D: SOCIETY IN INDIA, vol. I (Berkeley) 1970, p. 174.
65. In Andhra Pradesh they number 2.6 million (1971) and constitute the largest caste from the former "untouchables".
66. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 169. *Cf* a competent calculation of the different incomes of a washerman in Bronger, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
67. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 179. However, Meyer, Adrian C: CASTE AND KINSHIP IN CENTRAL INDIA (London) 1960 found out (p. 77) in his exemplary study that of the 55 persons interviewed by him in 1954, 44.5% were engaged mainly in their caste profession. D. Kantowsky, in 1966, got a somewhat lesser figure of 40%. *Dorfentwicklung und Dorfdemokraties in Indien* (Bielefeld) 1970, p. 45.
70. What appears as regional (local) departure (Bronger, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 165) can at the same time show a dissolution of the traditional obligations.
71. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
72. *Ibid*, p. 179. Aptly do the Wisers (*Op. cit.*) stress the reciprocity of relations. This does not, of course, correspond to equality among the persons concerned.
73. *Cf.* in this regard the "wish" of the Brahmins "not to exploit their servants willingly" and their pride in "the mutual love between the master and the servant in the past". K Gough, "Caste in a Tanjore Village", in Leach, E. (ed): ASPECTS OF CASTE IN SOUTH INDIA, CEYLON AND NORTH-WEST PAKISTAN (Cambridge) 1969, p. 50. In the meantime, there have been complaints that the warmth and honesty in these relations are declining. "Landed and Landless in Surat District, Virtual Class War", *E P W*, 22 June 1974, p. 974.
74. Singh, K K, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
75. Free support by the privileged has, in the mean-time declined to a very large extent and its place has been taken by a cool and calculative thinking. "Landed and Landless in Surat District", *op. cit.*
76. According to M.N. Srinivas, cases o of dispute from among the serving castes may be taken to the "patron caste" for deciding.
"The Dominant Caste in Rampura", *American Anthropologist* 61 (1959) p. 13.
77. *Cf* this basic theme in another society in Asia : K. Mading, "Mass-circulated literature in a society characterised by high socio-psychological stress" (Hongkong 1964-68) Wiesbaden 1975.
78. S. Mehta takes the position that the traditional village structure only promoted inequality, and the concepts of equality were first brought to

the peasants by the Indian State. SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN A VILLAGE COMMUNITY (Delhi) 1971, p. 171.

79. Regarding the idea of "variant" in contrast to the "dominant value-orientation" compare the work of fundamental nature of F Kluckhohn and F Strodtbck, *Op. cit.* For example, in contrast to the investigation in India, I feel it would be of little use to explore and analyse variant value concepts in the mass media of the People's Republic of China. (K Mading and B Hellig, The value-orientation shaped by Mao Tse-tung after the declared "Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" of April 1969 (Hamburg) 1972.
80. In one of the villages there were no *Harijans*.
81. Census 1971.
82. Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
83. For the socio-economic benefit of co-operation, see, Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 500; P Moore, "Co-operative Labour in peasant Agriculture", *Journal of Peasant Studies* 2 (1974-75), pp. 270-91; Trappe, p. : *Warum Genossenschaften in Entwicklungslandern* (Neuwied) 1966, p. 26; Bergmann, Th. *Die Genossenschaftsbewegung in Indien* (Frankfurt am Main) 1971, particularly pp. 111ff.
84. *Cf* Kahl, *op. cit.;* and Gamson, W: POWER AND DISCONTENT (Homewood) 1968.
85. INDIAN VILLAGE (Ithaca) 1955, p. 61.
86. Communication, discussed earlier in the context of "subculture of peasants" is particularly significant in this regard.
87. By way of examples, improved seeds and medical care may be mentioned. "Willingness to accept innovations" is not taken as a general, basic disposition or tendency for any change as K. -W. Back does ("The Change-prone Person in Puerto Rico", *P O Q*, 22 (1958) pp. 330-40). And in case of India, S.N. Chattopadhyaya, "Psychological Correlates and Adotption of Innovations" in Chawdhari, T P S (ed): SELECTED READINGS ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Hyderabad) 1967, pp. 61ff. But such broad views were not concrete enough for the purposes of our research.
88. D. Ribeiro differentiates eight such revolutions till the present times. *Der Zivilisatorische Prozep* (Frankfurt am Main) 1967, pp. 36ff in particular.
89. R Clarke, "The Pressing Need for Alternative Technology", in Chung, T Z, and others: *Angepapte Technologie fur Lander der Dritten Welt* (Berlin) 1977, pp. 60-74.
90. L. Malassis, "Education rurale et agricole et development economique" *Tiers Monde* 14 (1973), pp. 261-79. For market-oriented agriculture, education, he says, has to address itself to complicated technical procedures and to innovatory thinking.
91. In case of India, see Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 433, 456, 472, and 484; Beteille, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
92. *Cf* Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 22; Boesch, E., and others: *Das Problem der Alphabetisierung in Entwicklungslandern* (stuttgart) 1965, p. 27.

According to UN standards four years of school is the minimum for literacy. And literacy is guaged in the capacity to read and write in a way that can be taken as appropriate competence in the relevant social system. ("Functional Literacy", E. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 73ff). Rogers, claims that in India "functional literacy" and four years of school correspond to each other rather accurately. (*ibid.*, p. 91).

93. *Op. cit.*, p. 469. Horowitz, in fact, sees that "ignorance" hinders appropriate action but he rightly turns to the question of the content of education and the practical possibilities of its application (p. 472).
94. MODERNIZATION, Protest and Change (Prentice-Hall) 1966, p. 121.
95. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (London) 1967, 2nd edition, p. 296.
96. *Op. cit.*, pp. 76ff.
97. *Op. cit.*, p. 32.
98. "Agrarische Stagnation und Bildungsstrategie in Entwicklungslandern", *Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatwissenschaft* 122 (1966), p. 285.
99. Findings in this respect apply equally to Western Societies as to the Indian villages. *Cf* Mizruchi, H: SUCCESS AND OPPORTUNITY (New York) 1964, p. 72; H. Hyman, "The Value System of Different Classes" in Bendix, R and Lipset, S (eds) : CLASS, STATUS AND POWER (New York) 1960, pp. 488-99.
100. *Cf Supra* section 3.2.
101. Kroeber, A L and Kluckhohn, C.: CULTURE, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass.) 1952, p. 176.
102. Ibid.
103. *Cf* Frey, *op. cit.*, and the literature cited there.
We may underline the recent work of M Rockeach here. He has devised an experimental procedure for value concepts which is based, essentially on the experience of discontent with themselves of the persons interviewed, he gets quite surprising results with this procedure.(*Op. cit.*, pp. 236ff). On the basis of his work he claims that values and va.ue change signifi :antly influence action (p. 158).
104. For instance, D. McClelland, E Rogers, and M Rockeach.
105. These conepts are used alongside each other, for the studies cited are based predominantly on attitudes; the results, however, include value concepts. *cf* section 2.3 above regarding limitation of the concepts.
106. Cited in Frey, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
107 *Cf* the overall view in *ibid.* And yet this view is widely held still (In regard to peasants, see, for example E Wilkening and S Guerrero, "Consensus in Aspirations for Farm Improvement and Adaption of Farm Practices", *Rural Sociology*" 34 (1969), pp. 182-96).
108. *Cf* "Intervening Variable model", Galtung, J. : THEORY AND METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (Oslo) 1967, p. 32.
109. "Attitudes, Behaviour and the Intervening Variables", *American Sociologist* 4 (1969), pp. 29-34.
110. *Cf* this basically sound criticism in Berger, H.: *Untersuchungsmethode und soziale Wirklichkeit* (Frankfurt a.M) 1974, p. 138.
111. *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

112. SOCIAL PRESSURES, ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES (Stockholm) 1960, pp. 39ff.
113. "Attitude as an Interactional Concept : Social Constraint and Social Distance as Intervening Variables between Attitudes and Action", *A S R* 34 (1969), p. 154.
114. On occasion of the Tenth World Conress of Sociology, Mexico 1982, reviewed in *KZfS* 34 (1982) pp. 811ff.
115. M N Srinivas, "The Dominant Caste in Rampura", *American Anthropologist* 61 (1959), 1-16; Sinha, *op. cit.*, p. 248; *Cf* the use of this concept by Fliegel, *op. cit.*
116. *Cf* the example of "Readiness to cooperate", pp. 171ff.
117. L K Sen, "Status Inconsistency and Modernisation in Four Indian Villages", in Chawdhari, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68, raises and then answers in the negative this question in regard to the villages he studied.
118. *Cf* Tjaden, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

Chapter III

Methodology of Field Research

Empirical data and social reality

Social, science research selects standards to measure social experience -as J. Habermas has shown[1] and thus channels the "imaginatory stream of creating hypotheses". It is not only a measurable test-situation that has a meaning for research, but there are also other relevant experiences to be tapped; as from life-histories, ways of perception, and so forth. The interviews conducted for our survey could include only parts of social reality. At the same time it is true that relations reflected in statistical data do not directly express the causality of social processes. In fact, there is always the risk that certain relations which emerge and can be substantiated statistically are superficial and conceal the actual reasons.

As a matter of fact, considerable dis-illusionment has occurred regarding what sociological surveys can really reveal or establish. The traditional methods of explorative and exact research techniques seem to be reversed these days. Earlier, observation served to evolve hypotheses about an unexplored area which could then be tested. But today, it is admitted that the usual statistical procedures indicate the relations among categories rather than proving their basic social dynamics. Differentiating between "superficial phenomena" and "basic deep structures" rightly raises the question of causality between the appearances observed.

In the light of such criticism it becomes more significant to record the substance of individual causal connections. Even a scrupulous explanation of a particular case (for example, based on an intensive interview) can give greater insight than can the statistical study of a sample. To be sure, strict criteria must be applied so as to be able to identify a case as representative.

On the experience of conducting survey in India

The research methods

We interviewed 348 peasants in two districts of a dry-region - Telangana in the south Indian Deccan highlands in the state of Andhra Pradesh during winter-spring of 1972-73 by administering them *standardised questionnaires*. The questionnaire was aimed at understanding fundamental features of their attitudinal consciousness; it does not claim to be all-embracing. The emphasis[1] place on the situational relation of the questions indicates that every researcher has to formulate his own questionnaire and consider chances of deepening his enquiry.

The questionnaire is given in appendix 6. It is based on the consideration that not more than 45 minutes are to be spent on each person interviewed.[2] It was to be complemented through selected intensive interviews.

The general experience with standardised questionnaires and their inherent schematic approach produced the conviction during the period of fieldwork in India that I also needed intensive interviewing and group discussions. In fact these yielded as much of the results as did the questionnaire.

The *intensive interviews*, to which 66 peasants agreed served to shed light on the forms of consciousness and value concepts derived from particular situation of the respondent and from his group membership.[3] Questions answered in the standard interviews inadequately or just scantily, for want of interest of the respondent or because the matter seemed too sensitive to him, could once again be posed as supplementaries, or indirectly. Of course, any generalization of such answers needs further evidence.

This meant constantly relating to such individual data of the Indian social structure in the questions which was carried out with the help of the Indian colleagues. In such cases the intensive interview followed a course that oriented itself to the standardised questionnaire. Exceptional anwers, in the form of "anecdotes" and not lending themselves to be generalised, had to be filtered out. Singly, an intensive interview could be reported only through its full text. The results of some individual interviews arranged thematically have been given in appendix 7 as examples. In short, we tried in the intensive interviews to assess the clash between the overall socio-structural barriers and the specific behaviour of the persons concerned.

Finally, *group discussions* on the themes of caste system were held. (Examples given in Appendices 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11).

The results of our study are drawn with such methodological specification from the various forms of interviewing from Indian statistics.

Role of interview in survey in India

Of course, there are advantages in sample surveys with standardised questionnaires. Data can be collected

i. in a comparable way
ii. for many people
iii. with precise reference to the hypotheses
iv. with possibilities of verification.

Certain assumptions are, in fact, implied in the method of standardised interviews. These can be listed below:[4]

i. One can find a more or less common vocabulary for the interviewer and the respondent.
ii. The object of investigation is generally known so that questions can be formulated that are intelligible to all the respondents.
iii. The interviewing context is identical in all the interviews.
iv. The final questionnaire is the result of careful pretesting.

These four conditions can hardly be satisfied in their entirety. The endeavour should, however, be to achieve this as far as possible so that comparable data emerges.

The inevitable criticism of applying the standardised questionnaire technique in countries of the Third World should not be used as a pretext to scotch all efforts implied in empirical studies. For every social scientist the basic issue is whether he wishes to do without framing a questionnaire, interviewing and evaluation because of theoretical or methodological considerations, or just because of the amount of labour involved. Our study is taken up in order to work on reality and to get away from the ivory-towerish world of "pure" social science theory. Practical work which constantly faces contradictory reality anew, is seen here in our study as an essential foundation of theoretical work. Without such a step, I think, the distance between the sociologist and what he talks about would grow enormously.

Applying the interview method in the countries of the Third World forms a possible part of such practical work. The following questions, in particular, have to be taken into account:

1. A particularly weighty argument is that it is not possible to transfer meanings properly into other cultures and overcome the problem of their correct linguistic formulation.

In general, a limited comparability between societies and cultures can be agreed upon.[5] The problem, however, remains in the sphere of language and in understanding the meanings as correctly as possible. For instance, in the present study we could not find an exact equivalent for "planning" in the Telugu dialect used in the interviews; so with the help of the Indian colleagues we had to resort to paraphrasing.[6]

Because of difficulties such as these, it is helpful if the researcher is familiar with a non-western language. In regard to the problem of equivalence of meaning one may follow Robert Marsh who states:[7] "But modern general linguistics shows that although national languages are unique, they can nevertheless be systematically compared".

According to S Ervin and R T Bower, one must take into consideration four factors:[8]

i. The lexical significance of words,
ii. the syntactical context of words,
iii. the availability of translated expressions, and
iv. the cultural context of the words.

Keeping these in view, a procedure of "translation equivalent instruments" was used in the questionnaire for our study.[9]

The questionnaire worked out after pre-testing was translated independently by several Indian colleagues into Telugu. The present author found it useful that he had studied a non-western language (Chinese) for about ten years and had already had experience of translating from that language as well as of living in the language region.

2 Against standardised and intensive interview methods being used in India, it may be held that in that country it is impossible to take the individual as a unit, while in the western industrial societies one can and does. In India it often happened, in fact, that groups of curious people formed round the interviewer and the respondent. Persons wanting to show off their social importance usurped the conversation. The research showed, however, that the pro blem could be overcome through proper training of the interviewer.[10]

3. The interviewer and the researcher are regarded as "important" and "powerful" persons since they come from big towns or even from far-off countries, they arrive in the village in some vehicle and are rather well dressed. One can even imagine that they are in league with persons of influence in the administration or the police. Under the circumstances, the prospective respondents figure out, it would not be proper to answer questions in any other way than expected, or to refuse to do so. The investigator and his team thus, appear as "figures of coercion or threat".

The interview has indeed far too often been abused for purposes of oppression. One cannot therefore take the problem of "domination in the interview" lightly.[11] The

more one-sided the conditions of the interview, the greater the distortion in the results of the interview.

The actual experiences prevent one from generalising the criticism of the "domination in the interview". First of all, there are ways of reducing such effects.[12] Secondly, our survey revealed that the under-privileged groups, who are particularly exposed to this mechanism, very rightly recognised that in their situation of need they could not lose anything even by refusing the "higher-placed" strangers.

Quite a few respondents declined to give us any information. We had to make very polite requests and in many cases stroll along with the respondent till he felt inclined to engage in conversation. Our Indian colleagues were called names and insulted. In one of the villages, for example, even the presence of the all-important *Patwari* (village notary) did not induce the respondents to be friendlier. There is a film-strip that shows somebody from the lower castes hotly disputing at some length the very usefulness of interviews to the obvious discomfiture of the interviewer.

Still, it is entirely possible to make the purpose of the exercise intelligible to the respondent without raising in him expectations of some development aid from Germany coming his way. The reluctance can by and large be overcome by means of considerate approach and by avoiding fraternalisation with the powerful of the village. Our experience has shown that it is in fact quite possible to establish positive contact rather than a "conflict of behaviour".[13]

4. Finally, one must firmly dismiss the view that the Indian interviewers are less reliable than those from the western societies. On account of the unusually high unemployment in India, specially qualified groups of individuals are available as the field staff having high ethical principles.

In fact, the conditions in India present difficulties of their own, but these are to some extent capable of solution. Rather, doubts arise from the general problems of the interview method itself. In our experience they can be summed up as follows:

1. Interviewing is no substitute for observation of the

real situation as it actually obtains. But observation is impossible for many problems and it consumes a great deal of time.

However, a controlled checking of hypotheses through field experiments is quite feasible in regard to Indian villages.[14] With a view to stimulating local emancipation, experiments can be conducted at places where they not only serve the purpose and objectives of research but in addition also initiate valuable material changes in the village situation; at the same time, they may sometimes give a clearer insight into the reality than the interviews do.

In any case, experiments were not contemplated in this project in the planning phase and they could not be introduced afterwards. They as well as a well-considered use of an "action-research" approach are to be recommended in this kind of research.

2. Another serious objection is that the respondents in many cases, try to conceal the conflicts that seem to them to be threatening.

Even when conflicts are being discussed, it is difficult to ensure that both sides been fairly represented. John Galtung[15] has these words of caution in this regard: "A social science based on surveys will tend, at present, to be a science where society is presented in a less discordant state than might be considered realistic. The method thus has its ideological implications in distorting the total image of society, because of the difficulties in doing research on both parties to a conflict. At times the topdog image is given, at times the underdog perception but the total picture is biased away from social conflict.. To summarise, the survey method favours a society with a slow rate of change and little internal conflict, highly individualistic inner-directed and mobile, and with a high degree of correspondence between thought, word, and deed. Even within such a society, the survey method is more applicable downwards than upwards, and for that reason better as an instrument of control of underdogs than of topdogs".

Nonetheless, let it be stated quite clearly that despite these four surmountable and two almost unsurmountable difficulties, the interview method can justly be used in

India. In the present study the interviews were conducted with the help of several Indian colleagues after pre-testing which regrettably had to be rather brief on account of financial and technical reasons.[16]

Telangana, the region of investigation

The particular features of the region of our study can only briefly be contrasted here with the rest of the Indian subcontinent. For details one should refer to the Indian statistics. In spite of some deficiencies they permit a relatively detailed comparison of individual states and districts.[17]

The state of Andhra Pradesh (A.P), geographically and culturally, belongs to south India. Geographically, it is divided into a dry highland, and a coastal area which receives greater rainfall. The former, known as Telangana, forms a part of the Deccan-highlands had its own distinct history in which Islam featured prominently. Coastal Andhra, on the other hand, was subjected to the British colonial rule considerably earlier. Of the 53.6 million people of Andhra Pradesh around 88% are Hindus, 8% Muslims (predominantly *Sunnis*) and 4% are Christians.[18] There is a small number of other religious groups also. Only a few Christians are to be found in the villages under our study. They are concentrated in the coastal region. As a result, for our study only the division into Hindus and Muslims, is pertinent which in fact is fundamental to the recent history of India.

Andhra Pradesh, with its area of 277,000 square kilometres[19] and its population of 53.6 million (1981), occupies the fifth position among the states of the Indian Union There are 193 persons per square kilometre, that is slightly below the Indian average (1981 : 208) and markedly below the density of the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu (1981 : 371).[21] The state is marked by unfavourable agricultural conditions in its highland region. Thus whereas in coastal Andhra the irrigated area of cultivation is 48.3%, in the highlands of Telangana it does not exceed 16.6%.[22] The total irrigated area of cultivation in the entire state is slightly above the whole country. The 1971 census puts the

number of the rural population in Andhra Pradesh at 80.65%.

Typical of the villages under study is a large number of Hindu castes as compared to North India. Comparison with research pertaining to south India seems more suitable, especially that relating to the Deccan highland of Maharashtra and Karnataka.

From the sociological point of view, it is of considerable advantage that both the districts under study are located in the highland of Telangana; as a result, the historically conditioned cultural and social differences of coastal Andhra do not introduce any additional variations into and sample. Originally, the inclusion in the study of a district from the coastal area was considered but had to be given up owing to the *Mulki*-disturbances at the time of our study. The cause of the disturbances was friction over the employment in administrative and teaching positions in the Telangana highlands of persons from the coastal areas of Andhra Pradesh. The conflict, simmering since 1956, finally erupted into agitation demanding the division of the state of Andhra Pradesh, but which eventually petered out. During the period of our study, however, there were weeklong clashes and stoppages of traffic particularly in the urban areas, though the impact of the agitation in the rural areas was slight and the villages covered by the study were not affected.

The sample

The number of peasants interviewed for the study in the two districts of Telangana in the Andhra Pradesh was 348 (Three hundred forty eight).

The study was conducted during the dry period of winter-spring 1972-73. The two years preceding this period had witnessed poor crops on account of insufficient monsoon rains. On the basis of economic criteria, two districts in the Telangana region were selected that had developed differently.[23] These were the relatively less developed districts of Hyderabad surrounding the capital town of Hyderabad, with just 10% of its cultivated area under irrigation and the district of Nizamabad marked by a huge water

reservior, Nizamsagar, as a relatively well developed district. This latter district has the largest area under irrigation in Telangana, *viz.*, 28% of the cultivated area, has the most intensive use of modern means of production and the highest average yield.[24]

Using a proportionally, stratified sample, 1% or 21 villages were selected in the two districts. In these villages, in turn, a sample was drawn in which peasants with various sizes of holdings were adequately represented. In this sample, the segment of the people not possessing land was not included.[25] This limitation is somewhat rectified, however, since the households with very little land in fact resemble to a very great extent the landless groups of the population.[26] It turned out to be useful for the sociological study to enlarge the sample in Hyderabad district. Selecting respondents according to the size of their land holdings had led to the exclusion of some significant castes from the sample; hence the extension of the sample. For purposes of analysis, the basic sample and this extended sample can be separated so as not to affect the random selection of the basic sample.

The data for both the districts have been analysed separately for reasons of comparison: 124 respondents of the questionnaire in the basic sample and 192 respondents in the extended sample in the district of Hyderabad, as well as 156 respondents in Nizamabad district. Intensive interviews were conducted with 18 persons in 7 villages in Hyderabad district, and 48 in 9 villages of Nizamabad district.

Question formulation

The standardised questionnaire developed for the study contains, essentially, three sets of questions:

i. those on the social status of the respondent,
ii. those concerning the forms of consciousness, and
iii. the questions regarding some experiences of the respondents having a bearing on these forms of consciousness.

A preliminary but fundamental question to be settled

was as to whether the socio-structural inequality should be enclosed in a single variable. U. Pareel and G. Trivedi[27] have evolved a scale of socio-economic status in rural India primarily in the context of North India that lists ten factors. Following American studies they string together "education", "social participation", "possessions", "Family type" and many other at the same level beside "caste" "occupation" and "land". One's immediate reaction to this is that the question of weightage is not adequately clarified and the scale is open to the criticisms directed at unweighted additive indices of status.[28]

If one examines value concepts as depended upon such a widely framed socio-economic status, the analysis is likely to end up in confusing what is condition and what consequence, because value concepts and elements of action are already included in the status. Eventually, that leads quite inappropriately to explaining value concepts as dependent variables from actions and not *vice versa*.[29]

Status has to be derived from an analysis of the Indian society and is being determined here by "caste" and "land ownership", with "occupation" intervening as a mediating factor.[30] This agrees with the central significance that has been given to the category of "work" in our analysis of social structure. The categories have not been put together in a single, unified concept of status.[31] In the absence of an accepted *model* of measurement such a procedure would have raised problems of construction. Moreover, this is in line with a tendency of the caste system to dissociate itself from the system of economic inequality.

The difficulties encountered in drawing up the questions on value concepts, forms of consciousness and experiences cannot all be detailed here. In the circumstances of the village we observed that questions in a "pure" form dealing with what would be "desirable" in the sense in which C Kluckhohn defines value concepts, all too often met with general, unrealistic agreement. This could even be so where other observations pointed to a rejection of the value in concrete action. In these instances, it was considered necessary to clarify the relevant constraints in the

situation. The action-oriented value concepts for the respective groups were to be recorded in light of these circumstances in the intensive interviews.

In pre-testing, in regard to the "Inclination to education" we asked, "Is education good for your children?". Almost all the peasants said they thought so. This corroborates the experience in other societies on questions concerning the general aspirations for education. The U S Department of Health, Education and Welfare survey[32] has revealed that the aspirations of black Americans are as high as those of the white Americans although the expectations, plans and, social behaviour of both groups are markedly different. Aspirations do embrace strongly unrealistic elements.

We have accordingly drawn the conclusion in our work that the value concept is to be analysed in regard to the expectations and experiences[33] of the people. The "anchoring" of the "Inclination to education" in the social situation required that note be taken of the often repeated argument of the persons interviewed: "Indeed, we want education for our children but it is not *possible* for us since we do not have money and/or the children have to help us with our work". We then had to use intensive interviews to determine for the various groups the precise manner in which education was desirable, and attainable.

A number of our questions, thus, had to be oriented to the decisive subjective assessment of "ability". This, incidentally, links the "Readiness to co-operate" with research on value concepts summarised in the work of J Kahl.[34]

Another tendency to surface in pre-testing was that of positive answers to the "Ideal of harmony" even in face of the known conflicts in the neighbourhood of the respondent. Here we choose a formulation that pointed to the past but allowed, inversely, conclusions to be drawn about the present.[35] Moreover, it seemed advisable to encourage a positive reaction to "conflict" with observations like, "some people were of the opinion....".

It was observed in pre-testing that the peasants by and large were inclined towards innovations despite prevailing

traditional methods. Accordingly, in the questionnaire our question as to whether innovations were desirable was oriented towards the practical issue of the relative merits and demerits of innovations, and that in the form of a denial.[36]

In formulating questions addressed to the situation of the Indian peasants, one is required to keep away from the concepts of the western societies. A question about the "Respect for the power of the environment" went like:

> "Some people say it is no use to make plans, because plans usually fail.
>
> Do you strongly agree/ agree/ not know/ disagree/ strongly disagree ?"

Failure of the plans here is linked not so much to one's own false or wrong calculations as stressed in modern western societies[37] but to a totality of social factors that cause failures in planning.

The analysis of interviews and statistics

Official statistics on the villages under study are available. But these data cannot be accepted in its entirety and must be checked in each case.[38] Mainly, our argument was based on the data collected in our project. The Economist Dr E El-Shagi, working on another aspect of our project, concentrated his enquiries on the same villages and the same respondents. In regard to the size of landholdings we used the data he collected. To keep the identity of the respondents confidential, villages were given code numbers and letters (H: Hyderabad District, N: District of Nizamabad); the name and the code numbers of the questionnaires, which are available in Germany and India, have been dropped for publication.

I do not claim to have adopted a procedure which represents a method of strict falsification of the hypotheses in all its exigencies. Of course, verifiable procedures have been used to collect and analyze the data. They serve the modest aim to present segments of reality which serve to

support or to reject arguments derived from social sciences. In the final analysis, the evidence inherent in the data relies on the meaning construed by the researcher. His aim is to incorporate the authenticity a certain society generates.

REFERENCES

1. Eine Polemik, "Gegen einen positivistisch halbierten Rationalismus" in *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main) 1970 p. 42.
2. It did not seem fair to take up more of the time of the respondents, the hard-working peasants, who were not paid for the interviews. For priority-inclusion of situative limits closely related to the value concepts formulated as questions, compare page 56.
3. Friedrichs, J.: *Methoden empirischer Sozialforschung* (Reinbeck) 1973, p. 224, and Bureau of Applied Social Research, "Das qualitative Interview", in Konig, R (ed): *Das Interview* (Koln) 1957, pp. 143-60. Concerning application, P Lazarsfeld (cited in Friedrichs, *op. cit.*, p. 226) mentions :
   i. To clarify the significance of an answer of the respondent.
   ii. To determine an important individual aspect of the respondent's opinion.
   iii. To find out the influences shaping the opinion of the respondent.
   iv. To analyse complex patterns of attitudes.
   v. To make motivational interpretations possible.
   vi. To interpret and refine statistical relations.
4. Richardson, St. and others: INTERVIEWING (New York) 1965. *Cf* the individual explanation of E. Noelle to the translation of questions into the sphere of thought and language of the respondent. *Umfragen in der Massengesellschaft* (Hamburg) 1963, pp. 55ff.
5. In the meantime, the extreme cultural-anthropological relativism is to be considered as outdated. *Cf* the summary by March, R: COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY (New York) 1967, which convincingly rejects the extreme Sapir-Whorg hypothesis (p. 275).
6. *Cf* for similar problems, J.W. Elder, "Caste and World View, The Application of Survey Research Methods", in singer, M. and Cohn, B.S. (eds): STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN INDIAN SOCIETY (Chicago) 1968, p. 178.
7. *Op. cit.*, p. 212.
8. "Translation Problems in International Surveys", *P O Q* 16 (1952) pp. 595-604.
9. *Cf* Ch. E. Osgood, "On the Strategy of Cross-National Research into Subjective Culture", *Social Science Information* 6 (1967) issue 1, pp. 5-37. Further questions of "language free instruments" (Cantril) and "language invariant instruments" (Osgood) can be left open here.

10. For mistakes in interview, see E Maccoby and N Maccoby, "Das Interview", in Konig, R (ed) : *Praktische Sozialforschung Das Interview* (Koln) 1966, pp. 37-85, especially pp. 73ff.
11. *CF* the instructive explanations of H Berger, *op. cit.*, pp. 68ff, who aptly points out the ambiguity of the Socratic "concept of dialogue". For distortions in answers of the blacks of lower classes see G Lenski and J Leggett, "Caste, Class and Deference in the Research Interview", *A J S* 65 (1959/60) pp. 463-67, *Cf* p. 464; Also Rogers, *op cit.* p. 367 for "courtesy bias".
12. E and N Maccoby, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
13. Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
14. After our experiences in the field we can say that in terms of expenditure the experiments are not any more costly than the other procedures since experimental effects can be achieved in Indian villages at comparatively low cost.
15. THEORY AND METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (Oslo) 1967, p. 159.
16. See foreword to this study.
17. For both the districts surveyed see the CENSUS OF INDIA 1961 and 1971, Andhra Pradesh District Census Handbook (Hyderabad and Nizamabad Disricts), Government of India.
18. CENSUS OF INDIA 1971, vol. II, Part IA (II), and same for 1981.
19. Thus it is somewhat larger in size than the Federal Republic of Germany.
20. CENSUS OF INDIA 1981.
21. Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbadan, Landerkurzbericht Indien 1982 (Stuttgart) 1982.
22. FIFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, Approach (Hyderabad, Government of Andhra Pradesh Department ot Planning and Co-operation) 1972, p. 17.
23. The actual selection of the sample, into the details of which one need not go here, was done by an economist, E. El-Shagi (*Op. cit.*, pp. 258ff. For socio-economic classification of districts in India, see *E P W* of 14 August 1971.. pp. 1763ff.
24. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
25. Of the 72.5 million rural *households* in India, 8.5 million, i.e., about 12% did not possess any land. B S Minhas, "Rural Poverty, Land Redistribution and Development Strategy", *Indian Economic Review* 5 (1970) p. 106. This corresponded to a *population* figure of 39.6 million.
26. Problems of landless peasants will be discussed when analysing the additional intensive interviews.
27. Quoted in Muthayya, B C : FARMERS AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS, Influence of Socio-economic Status and work Orientation (Hyderabad) 1971, pp. 13, 19ff.
28. Lippe, P. M von der : *Statistische Methoden zur Messung der sozialen Schichtung* (Goppingen) 1972, pp. 64, 77.
29. These critical considerations, unfortunately, preclude any use here of the otherwise valuable work of Muthayya, B C, *op. cit.*, especially p. 100 there.
30. "Sex" had to be left out, for in this cultural setting men are, in the main

responsible for the basic economic decisions. Only in a few cases were women interviewed who acted as the head of incomplete households.

31. L K Sen has shown the way to measure various dimensions of status separately, and comes to the conclusion that status inconsistence does not bear relation to the attitudes measured by him :

"1. In these four villages, the attitude dimensions of modernisation as indicated by scientific knowledge, optimism, self-reliance, orientation to the outside world, and secular orientation, are not related to statuts inconsistency.
2. Attitudes dimensions were found positively related to single status dimensions were found positvely related to single status dimensions of caste, education, occupation, outside contact and income.
3. The traditional status dimension cf caste is still a powerful determining factor and other status dimensions are dependent on it....
4. At the present time (at least at the time of field interview), there does not seem to be any real status dilemma in these villages, probably because caste is so closely related to other status dimensions. Even where there is a trace of status dilemma (education and caste....), people who experience this dilemma try to solve it, not through an increased secular orientation, but by being more tradition-oriented than others, showing the influence of caste. This absence of status dilemma is probably the most important reason why the hypotheses have not been verified".

"Status Inconsistency and Modernisation in Four Indian Villages", in Chawdhari, T P S (ed): SELECTED READINGS ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Hyderabad) 1967, pp. 66-68.
Differences from ba:kward villages were not noticed here.

32. Coleman, J. and others : EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Washington D C) 1966, p. 280.
33. Distinction between aspirations and expectations can be seen in the questions : Aspirations : "What class in school do you want to reach?"; Expectations: "Looking realistically at your situation how would you regard your chances of continuing your education after secondary school?" (Ph. Foster, *op. cit.*, 306 ff)
34. "Some Measurements of Achievement Orientation", *op. cit.*
35. Question 3.5.1., Appendix 6.
36. Question 5.1, Appendix 6.
37. F. Bailey, "The Peasant View of the Bad Life" in Shanin, T (ed) : PEASANTS AND PEASANT SOCIETIES (Harmondsworth) 1971, p. 314.
38. For a critical view that need not be repeated here see, Thorner, D & A : LAND AND LABOUR IN INDIA (Bombay) 1962, pp. 188ff, 198.

Chapter IV

Value-Orientations of Indian Peasants

In Indian agrarian society any socio-structural analysis must contend with land ownership and caste status as the decisive elements. The land is a means of production that neither expands at will nor is available in abundance. In the area of our study where the tools of production are of a low standard, the amount and the quality of land available acquires a crucial importance for the peasants.

The uneven availability of this factor of production and the corresponding form of exploitation determine the class structure in rural India. According to R K Sau[1], since the colonial period, it was characterised by the following economic elements:

"(a) The size of land holdings,
(b) the extent of tenancy and share-cropping,
(c) the degree of exploitation through high rent,
(d) the role of usurious money-lending,
(e) the pattern of utilisation of surplus,
(f) the process of agricultural proletarisation, and
(g) the magnitude of commodity production."

The class structure founded on economic determinants is tied to the historically inherited caste system. Caste represents a reason for the unequal distribution of land, but it does not completely coincide with the present class structure. To some extent, it has its own laws of evolution and

must be analysed in its own terms. Where extreme positions in class and caste systems reinforce each other, social polarisation takes place. The categories of "privileged" and the "under-privileged" groups are without doubt applicable to the Indian rural context.

On account of these economic and historical reasons it is just not possible to apply directly the class analysis of the developed capitalist societies. The pre-capitalist nature of the Indian agrarian society differs also from the feudalism of Europe.[2] Certain similarities do exist in the area of our study in the effects of the traditional patrimonial regime of the muslim ruling class in the former state of the Nizam of Hyderabad.[3] Until 1949, some of the villages under study had been left to supporters of the Nizam who collected taxes on their own.[4]

The capitalistic mode of production transforms such traditional structures. As regards the existing relations of production and dependence, Bettelheim points out:

> "These conditions are, of course, changing. The trend, as we shall see, is towards capitalism. Market production is going up, social division of labour is being practised, capital formation and wage payment are on the increase."

In the villages under study in Telangana most of the agriculture labour is paid in money.[5] Still, one cannot speak of full dominance of capitalist relations. Even though wage payment in money has been introduced, many lower caste persons are personally dependent upon the landlords of higher castes. There are caste obligations of rendering services and there is debt bondage.[6] Moreover, it is obvious that the landlords are interested not merely in high profits in capitalistic sense but are also keen to maintain their prestige and position of social dominance.[7] Inherent in this combination of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, we can name the following social classes, by way of a general summary:[8]

1. A group of persons who have so much land that they

do not have to work, but who confine themselves to supervising others.

To these belong the landlords of traditional type and peasants using a capitalist style of production.

2. Rich peasants, who work themselves, but who mainly produce through the exploitation of labourers, "sharecroppers" and tenants.

3. Middle peasants, who exist mainly from the proceeds of their labour on their fields.

4. Poor peasants who have so little land that they are compelled to search employment in addition, and

5. Agricultural labourers, who live mainly by selling their labour but who may also have a small bit of land.

These classes, are inter-related so that the labour of those who actually produce is used for the interests of others. The middle peasants are even subject to the mechanisms of exploitation. Although they and their families could well survive on their own they are subjected to the unequal market forces and the power of traders and banks.

In the first category above, the landlords, who live essentially on income from lease of land and from usury, differ from the landlords of commercial or capitalist type. The latter evince great interest in improving the methods of cultivation and of investing. Instead of leasing it to tenants they use agricultural labourers.

An example of such a landlord, who had taken up the capitalist methods of production, may be quoted from our pre-testing: M. R's property was 114 acres of land.[9] He comes from the dominating, land-owning caste of Reddis. He has employed eight labourers on a permanent basis; of these five live and eat in his house. In a whole year he engages five to six hundred labourers, especially for harvesting. He owns a Jeep, with a hanger-on, subscribes to a newspaper and has a pet monkey. From the newspaper he gets the information about prices of the most important items of agricultural produce and calculates the price differences quoted at the capital city Hyderabad, the district town Nizamabad and of the *tehsil* town Yellareddy. If

some profit seems probable, he hires a truck to transport his produce to the place quoting the most favourable rate. As the president of the Land Mortgage Bank all applications for government loans come to him from 120 villages after he publishes that they are available.

In the area under study, exploitation exists in the forms of tenancy, "share-cropping" and agricultural work. Between tenancy and "share-cropping" there are quite a few forms and stages; typical in case of tenancy is the payment to the owner of a precise remuneration and the use of his own tools and animals by the tenant.

It is well-known that respondents who are probed for the kind of arrangements they have under tenancy, are often reluctant to reveal much.[10] especially in regard to the disputes over the existing obligations. The law protecting the tenant under certain conditions exclude his being evicted after 6 years of tenancy (Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950) and by an amendment of the Act (1954) gives "protected tenant" the right of purchase. In view of this clear provision protecting the tenant, the landowners try to get around it legally or otherwise.[11] In our sample for the survey a total of 18% of the cultivated land was found to be lease-land tenancy and share-cropping.[12] The total for the whole of India in 1970 for such land was given as 11.6%.[13]

While the tenant himself decides what to grow, the share-cropper gets his instructions from the land-owner, since he has to surrender part of the crop to the latter. What the share-cropper can retain from the crop varies, and can even be below the subsistence level. The share-croppers do not generally have the animals or implements for the agricultural work, and are thus obliged to get them from the landowner. They run little risk in this, because the owner will either invest in these himself or lend the share-cropper the money. With his desperately low income, the share-cropper enjoys relative security in so far as he has to turn over to the land-owner only a portion of what he has actually produced.[14] In times of drought, like the one during our field-work, the tenants tend to change their relatively independent status to that of share-cropper

in order to survive. Then, the dependence of the share-cropper intensifies, and his plight worsens, for he cannot be too sure that he will be given the land again for cultivation after the harvest. In addition, they are more burdened by credits for production and consumption as are the tenants.

The agricultural labour constitutes 15.6% of the total population of Andhra Pradesh, the highest in the Union of India compared to the other states.[15] The rate of growth of population of this category is higher than that of the rest of the population. In socio-economic terms, there is hardly any difference between the owners of a small patch of land and the landless, for essentially both are compelled to market their labour for subsistence.[16] The only difference is that the agricultural labourer having a small patch of land can survive much longer with below subsistence wages and thus constitutes a stable factor in a system of extremely low wages.

Moreover, for agricultural labour in the villages under study there exists a distinction between "free" and "bonded" labour. The "bonded" labourer is prevented by social tradition, the origin of which could be traced back to slavery, or by indebtedness from offering his labour where he wishes. In the area under study, instances of life-long servitude were encountered where a person worked his entire life repaying his debt with his son taking over such repayment in the same fashion. According to D and A Thorner the figures of the "bonded" labour given by official sources are too low. Some landowners may demand only a limited amount of service from their "bonded" labourers.

For the "free" labour force, employed for long periods as domestic servants or for short periods as day labourers, market forces produce a certain uniformity in the wage structure but with a decisive dominance of the employers.[17] In contrast to landlords of the traditional type to farmers working on a capitalist basis and to rich peasants, we define middle peasants to be those who in the main earn their living by working on the land which they have.

While according to the official statistics for 1968-69, 51.5% of Andhra Pradesh's agricultural produce served to

meet subsistence needs, this figure for the villages under study rose in 1972-73 to 67%.[18] This points to the fall in production on account of drought.

Both middle and poor peasants are not cut off from the market but in effect are forced to turn to the market by their limited economic opportunities. For instance, they must buy seed, or take credit.[19] They are often obliged to accept unfavourable conditions.

According to El-Shagi's figures, about 80% of the produce from holdings ranging from 10.10 acre was consumed at source and as much as 95% from those of less than an acre.

The pressures operate particularly harshly on the small peasants. In a typical sense, they are not "subsistence farmers".[20] Although they consume more in order simply to survive than they produce, they do produce for sale. This is not the selling of "surplus production", but a widespread phenomenon that is better called "distress selling".[21] The market orientation of the poor and medium peasants is therefore prompted by different reasons to those of the capitalist farmers.

There is a good deal of overlapping between the five classes mentioned above as well in the area of our study as elsewhere in India.[22] Andre Beteille, however, oversimplifies when he infers from the overlap in control over land and in offering of labour that classes in the Indian village constitute "different categories only at a conceptual level" and "in reality they are not distinct groups".[23]

In the class structure of Indian villages one must trace the superficial forms in which routine and contractual relationships, appear and mingle,[24] back to the decisive, fundamental question of the control over land and its importance to the persons concerned.[25] "The absolute irreconcilability of differing interests arises from the differences in property relations".[26] For example, the landowners and rich peasants may appear as tenants of land whose cultivation they then leave to employed labour. Tenants cannot be ranked in the lower part of the class hierarchy from the outset.

Tenants, on the other hand, who are in no position to seek the protection of the tenancy law can be forced into what amounts to being agricultural labourers.[27]

Middle peasants may work not only on their own land but also as tenants, share croppers, agricultural labourers[28] or under caste obligation. The same is true of poor peasants with the difference that their labour is more extensively exploited.

Labourers cannot escape being exploited by having a tiny patch of land.[29] They are in any case seldom in a position to lease land because they cannot make the necessary investments in the means of production.

In order to take the overlapping among the five above-mentioned classes into account, we distinguish between three main classes, with exploitation as the criterion.[30]

1. The traditional landlors and the farmers with a capitalist style of production, who produce essentially through exploiting the labour of others.
2. Middle peasants[31] possessing sufficient land, who cultivate it largely themselves, and
3. Poor peasants and agricultural labourers compelled mainly to sell their labour.[32]

The level of subsistence in the class structure

In order to approach a description of class structure, the respondents have been ordered according to the size of land-holding. The basis of the classification is the land at their disposal at a given time; they own it or they cultivate it through tenancy or "share-cropping". Account is also taken of whether the land is irrigated or not. Many available studies ignore this, although it makes a decisive difference to the yield in the area we studied.[33]

Hyderabad district is less favoured in this respect. There the peasants who rely mainly on wells and in the second place on 'tanks', while in Nizamabad district the irrigation is by the canals from the Nizamsagar dam, and in the second place by 'tanks'.

The crucial importance of irrigation becomes clear when it is noted that the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling Act of

1961 laid down the maximum limit of landlholding between 27 and 324 acres depending upon the quality of the land. When it became evident that such a high limit brought about no reduction in the large landholdings, bill number 20 of 1972 restricted the size of landed property to 18 acres of irrigated, or 54 acres of dry land.[34]

Irrigated land can yield many times more produce than dry land. In case of India, if one does not take into account the part of land that is irrigated, it becomes futile to speculate about the "economic holding" size for an agricultural family. No wonder that for the size of an "economic holding" suggestions variously range from 5 to 20 acres.[35] The difference between the irrigated and unirrigated land is further increased by the application of technological innovations.[36] The decisive importance of irrigation became clearly evident during the period of drought which coincided with that of our investigation 1972-73. Under such conditions dry land often produced nothing.[37]

In our study, instead of working from some meaningless classification of landholding we have calculated a unified measure multiplying the yield figure from irrigated land by three in relation to dry land.[38] If not otherwise stated this measure is always the basis for comparison. Comparisons with the size of the landholdings in other studies can only be made when they also include a conversion of the irrigated portions. On an average, in the 21 villages studied 21% of the land was irrigated.[39] This is slightly below the all-India average of 22.7% of 1969-70.[40] Among the villages studied there were, of course, considerable variations ranging between 64.64% and 0.59%.

In our investigation we take the lowest figure, described variously by Indian and foreign scholars as "economic holding" that is 5 acres (approximately 2 hectares). In terms of the all-India average of irrigated land, with the irrigated area calculated at 1 : 3, these 5 acres correspond to a "converted holding" of about 7.5 acres.[41]

We assume that an agricultural family of 5 persons[42] with so much land can, under favourable conditions, support itself. 64.4% of the Indian peasants are to be found

below this minimum; they cultivate 20% of the arable area of the country.[43]

If there are more members of the family, a bigger area of land is necessary. One can take 7.5 to 15 (converted) acres to be the size required for a self-sufficient middle peasant holding.

More than 15 acres would involve exploiting the labour of others to a considerable extent. Peasants on such holdings fall into the category of rich peasants, capitalist farmers and traditional landlords. Big land-holding, money-lending and a much higher proportion of market production overlap here. This category in our random sample extends to one case of 243 acres of land, a figure that far exceeds the general limit of 54 dry acres permissible under the Land Reform Act. It is even possible that information on further land owned was withheld.

In both the districts under survey the respondents belonged to the three main classes as follows (basic sample):

Class	Hyderabad District N-106	Nizamabad District N-156	Total
1. Rich farmers and others	30	25	55
2. Middle peasants	26	35	61
3. Poor peasants and others	50	96	146

In comparison we cite the all-India figures on landholdings for this period, which have not been converted as in our study on the basis of the irrigated portion.[44]

Size of the holding in acres	Percentage of total holdings	Percentage of area
Over 10	18	61
Between 10 and 5	19	20
Below 5	62	19

From this as well as from the data gathered for our study it becomes clear that the peasants *below* a level of subsistence constitute more than half of the agricultural

sector. The middle peasants and the rich farmers/landlords account for approximately 1/5th of the total each.

Further, the all-India survey shows that the poor peasants are the largest group constituting more than 60%, of the agricultural sector but tilling only about 20% of the acreage. Almost exactly in reverse, the rich farmers (20% of the agricultural sector) hold more than 50% of the land area.

From the point of view of society as a whole the rich farmers have the function to channel a considerable amount of agricultural production away from being consumed by poor peasants.[45] A considerable number of the poor peasants are already below subsistence level. And yet their produce is sent to the market for the use of the urban population. The prevailing production relations provide the big farmers with such economic and legal mechanisms. From this, in fact, the poor peasants are excluded even though they are the ones whose labour has been largely instrumental in such production. It would therefore be wrong to assume that there are gradual transitions in economic and social behaviour between these three classes. Such a "gradualistic" view would lose sight of the pressures resulting from the need to survive as well as the distinctions between own production and the exploitation of others' labour.

The tense relationship between the exploiting and the exploited classes entails direct confrontation at a personal level between the rich farmers and landlords on the one hand and the poor peasants and agricultural labourers on the other. Indirectly, market prices and the credit system tie up the middle peasants in the mechanism of exploitation over which they ultimately have no control. What is special about this social situation in rural India is not this tension alone, but its link with survival needs. This sharpens class relations in India in contrast to those in the industrially advanced societies because in India a large segment of the rural population is pushed below the bare subsistence level.[46]

The pressures under which the poor peasants live increase unbearably when there is a poor harvest as was the case during the drought of the period of our study. The well-to-do peasants may well find their economic choices res-

tricted but for the poor peasants their very existence is threatened. To survive they are compelled to become yet more dependent on those who still have control over food and the means of production.

It becomes essential to link the class structure, to a minimum level required to sustain life in order to grasp its specific weight. By no means that growing pressure on the exploited class produces an equal quantity of countervailing forces.

New impulses in the class structure

Since 1965 there have been a good many agro-technical innovations in India under the optimistic label of "Green Revolution".

The increase in food grain production in India as a whole in the years 1966 to 1971 and since 1974 has certainly been partly the result of the new inputs of the so-called "Green Revolution", such as improved seeds, chemical fertiliser, pesticides, mechanisation, etc. The long-term effect of these innovations[47] are difficult to calculate since they have affected the natural cycle. But along with the measurable rise in production it seems certain that serious long-term damage has been done to the ecological system.[48]

In any case, in the context of class structure, it is now agreed that these innovations unquestionably benefit the well-to-do classes in the country. A number of parastic landlords who do not have the will or energy to employ the innovations have lost out, of course. The rich and to a smaller degree the middle peasants who could raise capital for such innovations, did eventually achieve higher output.[49]

It was seen that many more big land-owners terminated their agreements with tenants and share-croppers, and by using agricultural labour[50] and the innovations increased their production. The threat to the existence of the majority of the people, the poor peasants, was not diminished but actually increased. The amount of the rural households below the poverty line increased from 38%, in 1960-61 to 53%, in 1967-68.[51] The technical innovations therefore did not lead to an all-round improvement in the conditions of life. As a result, the class structure was neither done away

with nor altered in any basic way.[52] Rather, "polarisation" between the privileged and the under-previleged has increased, in economic as well as political terms.[53]

The technical innovations failed to topple the existing structure, rather—to employ the idea Clifford Geertz used for the Javanese situation—the social structure became "rigid".[54]

In the light of these experiences, an optimism entirely founded on technological progress is misplaced. Where the majority of the people cannot share in the new means of production, the force of such impulses is absorbed by the existing oppressive structures. Instead of the productive forces destroying the production relations, they only intensify the rigidity of inequality.

Caste Structure

Social hierarchy based on birth

Whereas in the economic field the power of the landowning peasants is constantly on the increase, status in the Indian caste system has up till now remained stubbornly inflexible. Here historical structures dictate in all their cruelty the destiny of individuals.

There is no need to refer now to the various theories and views on the historical origins of the structure and functions of caste.[55] The category of "labour" stressed by Marx is included in caste; that, however, should not mislead one into thinking that only economic inequality is being doubted.

The caste system is a hierarchic, rigid system of stratification which assigns different types of work to different people.[56] The *Jajmani* system already mentioned manifests, even in south India, this division of labour to the present day.[57] Suffice it to say that one main reasons for it lies in the subjugation of the original peoples of the Indian subcontinent by conquerors, a process which has been repeated several times. The caste system is a system of rule in religious form which embodies functions of labour. The ideas of "pure" and "impure" are essential to this concept.[58]

Aspects of life may under certain conditions imply impurity for the Hindu. This may be ritually removable and

transitory or may be permanent. Certain types of work pollute those who do them. Worship of the cow, for example leads to discrimination of those who dispose of the bodies of dead cows, and who perform the caste-obligations of processing the hides and producing shoes.[59] Their social functions places them as so-called "untouchables" on the lowest rung in hierarchical system.[60] Major castes among the former "untouchables" in the villages under study were the Madiga[61] (flayer, shoemaker) and above them the Mala who worked particularly as agricultural labourers and grave-diggers.

As the predominant occupation of the underprivileged *Harijans* is agricultural work,[62] the prevailing ideology bases such "impurity" on only one aspect of their actual social role.

Whereas the tabu of physical contact with the low castes has steadily diminished, it is still forbidden in principle to accept food from them, members cannot marry outside their caste, enter the houses of higher castes—particularly the kitchen and reside in the parts of the village where upper castes live.[63] In our study, however, we shall not concern ourselves with either the Theory of Re-birth fundamental to the Hindu religion of the ritual mechanism of purification.

The "purity" of the Brahmins and the "impurity" of the "untouchables" complement each other in the caste system. Thus "untouchability" will only disappear along with the concept of "purity".[64] Changes in eating habits, for instance, more vegetarianism among the lower castes, the whole process of "Sanskritisation",[65] may be explained by the social significance of these concepts of purity.

Traditionally, the basic structure of the Indian society is expressed in four *Varnas:* Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Sudra corresponding to their social functions as priests, warriors, traders and serving plus soil-tilling group.

However, the caste system actually exists underneath this classicial ranking order. It can be considered as a hierarchic system of endogamous groups having certain occupational obligations and ritualistic customs, to which an individual belongs by birth.

Sub-classification leads to sub-castes, clans and families. The sub-castes have to be viewed as endogamous entities within the castes, and clans as exagamous groups which trace themselves back to a common ancestor. Finally, at the end of the scale are the extended and nuclear families respectively.

In our study we place the social actors in their caste positions but do not concern ourselves with any sub-divisions. There is no need here to look into the question of what distinguishes castes from sub-castes.

We met with a relatively uniform hierarchic order at the level of the castes in the villages under study, though there were minor variations. This is not to dispute, however, that there can be considerable variations in the different regions of India.[66]

Our Indian colleagues prepared a caste ranking for every village under investigation. It was based on interviews with experienced residents of the village concerned. The basic yardstick was from which caste one can accept food and from which to refuse. The question of 'eating-together' is a crucial ritual criterion of the caste hierarchy.[67] We met with these concepts as social norms in clearly defined form in the villages we studied. On the other hand, these norms are as strictly observed outside the village; for instance, when these villagers meet in the market town. Economic and political status within the village has to be distinguished from 'eating-together'. For particular castes, slight variations in ranking may be observed from village to village, influenced among other things by prestige considerations.

The following 7 castes groups were evolved from the empirically determined hierarchy of the individual castes with the help of Dr. C. Lakshmanna, the Indian Sociologist on the project.

The term "caste group" is to be used with caution and qualifications, for the "minorities" (former Hill tribes, aborigines and Harijans) according to traditional views, remain outside the caste system and, strictly speaking, represent "Non-caste" groups.[68] They were put at the bottom of the scale of respondents. Moreover, the Muslims do not

represent a caste but a religious group. We have, however, put them behind the caste Hindus in our investigation, since in our area they enjoy a status similar to that of caste. The overwhelming majority of the people in our area, i.e., the Hindus, and a large number of Muslims there accept this status. It is an interesting phenomenon of cultural anthropology that the status of a minority is determined according to the criterion of the majority.[69]

The hierarchy of the 7 groups of castes coincides fully in the villages under enquiry. The ranking of the individual castes within the groups has been made alphabetically.[70]

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO CASTE AND DISTRICT

	Hyderabad District (*N*-192)	*Nizamabad District* (*N*-156)
1. *Upper Castes*		
Brahmin (Priests)	0	3
Komati (Traders)	3	4
Marwadi	0	1
Total	3	8
2. *Peasants castes*		
Reddi (Kapu)	34	10
Golla	15	5
Koli	0	2
Kurumba	9	1
Lingayat	4	8
Munnur	4	15
Mutrasi	27	25
Perika	0	10
Total	93	76
3. *Artisan castes*		
Avusala (Goldsmith)	0	3
Kammara (Blacksmith)	1	3
Vodla (Carpenter)	1	0
Total	2	6

4. *Service castes*		
Bhoi (Fisherman)	0	4
Chakali (Washerman)	3	5
Goundala(Toddy-tapper)	14	4
Katike	1	0
Kummari (Potter)	0	4
Mangala (Barber)	4	1
Pichagunta	1	0
Sali (Weaver)	1	7
Uppara	0	1
Vaddara	0	1
Total	24	27
5. *Muslims*	24	11
6. *Minorities*		
Lambadi	0	2
Yerukela	0	1
Total	0	3
7. *Harijans*		
Mala	14	14
Madiga	32	11
Total	46	25

We shall not go into the details of the differences in the life-styles and history of these castes. There is a good deal of anthropological and sociological literature available on these aspects. The differences between the north and the south of India and among the different regions of the country must be noted here. Among the source material, a reference book by Syed Siraj-ul-Hassan,[71] has particular value for the area of our enquiry, Telangana; the 7-volume work by E Thurston,[72] covering the entire south India, must also be mentioned. Not taking Siraj's work on Telangana into account, as happens in some studies seems most unwise.

The various sources are intrinsically ethnographic and lack basic information on the various sub-cultures norms and value concepts. For clarity's sake, though, a few words about important castes so far as they are relevant to this study.

The division of caste groups in the villages has been given in appendix 3. In the villages studied, the number of Brahmins was low, a remarkable difference to the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu.

The *Komati* are a trading caste and in numbers constitute a tiny part of the whole. Since the former warrior caste was totally lacking in the sample, the upper three *Varnas* of the traditional hierarchy contributed only a few persons to our survey. The overwhelming proportion of the population belonged either to the *Varna* of serving and soil-tilling or were outside the pale of the *Varnas*. It would not be sufficient to apply the traditional classification to the present population of Telangana. This distinction is losing importance since the people defined their status almost exclusively according to caste rather than according to the *Varna*.

The dominant agricultural caste in the area under study is the *Reddi*.[73] Although traditionally it is a sub-caste of the *Kapu*, we have retained the term *Reddi*. This sub-caste enjoys high prestige. In the history of the region the *Reddis* challenged the Hindu kings before the Muslim conquest. In our area, they owned immense landed property, enjoyed considerable power, and had a distinct style of living.

For this reason many of *Kapu* caste are eager to call themselves *Reddis* so making a strict differentiation between the two difficult. So while in our list generally no sub-caste names are to be found, we have made an exception in this case.

According to Siraj,[74] the *Kapu* divide up into the sub-castes *Panch Reddi*, *Kamma Reddi*, *Velma* snd many others. The *Motati Kapu*, *Gudati Kapu*, *Paknati Kapu*, *Ghittapu Kapu*, *Gone Kapu* mentioned in responses all belong to the *Panch* (five) Reddi. Although the *Munnur* also describe themselves as *Kapu* and even enjoy an equivalent status, following Siraj[75] they have been treated as a distinct group on the basis of sub-cultural differences.

The traditional chief occupation of the *Golla* (also called Yadava) is cattle breeding. The *Kurumba* are also traditionally herdsmen. However, they concentrate more on the breeding of sheep and goats.

The *Lingayat* (whose priests also call themselves *Jangam*) are strictly speaking a widespread sect of Shiva-devotees. They claim an especially high-ranking on account of their purist adherence to religious norms. In the meantime they have achieved a status similar to that of a caste in the group of the peasant castes.

The *Mutrasi* (also called *Tenugu*) are numerically the biggest peasant caste in the area of enquiry. They rank somewhat below the Reddi (Kapu).

The artisan castes differ from the service castes because of their limited number (only five castes), the high degree of special knowledge demanded by their jobs, their higher prestige and their efforts to rise as a caste group under the name of "Panch Brahma" to at least the equals of the peasant castes. Of these, the sample includes three *Auvusala* (goldsmiths), four *Kammara* (blacksmiths, who produce and repair farming tools and household goods made of iron); apart from this, four *Kummari* (potters) and a *Vodla* (a carpenter who makes doors, supports and chairs as well as producing and repairing wooden farm tools). The *Sali* are a weaving caste, whose importance diminished during the colonial period, because they were deprived of the material basis for their existence by the importing of British textiles and by increasing industrial production in India itself.

The *Bhoi* (with *Besta* as sub-caste) were originally fishermen. The *Goundala* represent the important caste of the palmwine tappers (toddy tappers). They rank relatively low in the hierarchy because of orthodox Hindu's rejection of intoxicating drink. The *Chakali* (known as *Dhobi* in other parts of India) follow thc traditional caste calling of washermen, according to the orthodox view an activity also involving ritual impurity. They also have ceremonial duties, e.g., as marriage mediators.

The *Mangala* do not only cut their customers' hair and beards as traditional barbers, they also play a central role in rites such as marriage and birth as well as in personal contracts and in the spreading of information in the villages. The wives of the barbers have an important function as

mid-wives. It is interesting to note how complex the connections between castes can be. For instance the *Pichagunta* (beggars and mat makers) are a "sattelite" caste of the Kapur and Golla and traditionally beg their livings from them only.[76]

The *Muslims* divide into the two groups of the Sunni and the Shiites with the Sunni predominant in the area of inquiry.[77]

In the villages studied it is not so much the distinction between the two sects which is important, but between Muslims, in the stricter sense, and *Dudekula*. Their name derives from their traditional calling: cotton (Dude) cleaning (Ekula). They are Muslims who did not come with the various historical conquests but were converted from among the native Hindus. The field studies showed that they have kept up Hindu customs, take part in Hindu rites and regard themselves as being equivalent to a caste within the hierachy. Where family planning is concerned the Dudekula display similar attitudes to those of Hindus. They are readier to limit the number of their children.[78] The blending of Hindu and Muslim rites may be observed in the villages in another form with Hindus helping to erect the insignia for the Muslim *Muharram* festival and taking part in it themselves. One of the Reddis with the most extensive landed property cites the *Koran* as the reason, why he tends a monument near his home to a Muslim buried in Mecca. He points out that previously his family spoke Urdu, the language of Muslims in India, and had many contacts with influential Muslims. The co-operation between the Reddis, who are not vegetarians, and the Muslims at the time of their political power in Telangana is of interest from a historical point of view (Islamisation). The bloody conflicts at the time of Indian independence are still the cause of a high level of conflict awareness and psychological insecurity among Muslims in the area of enquiry.

"Minorities" are ethnic groups (former hill tribes and aborigines) who have achieved a certain caste rank. The *Lambada*, a famous carrier caste, are noteworthy among the "Minorities". Until the construction of the railways they served various armies in India as load carriers, then lost

the basis of their existence and are primarily employed as carriers in building construction. The women of this independently-minded caste, who wear rich ornaments in their hair and on their arms and legs, are especially noted for their capacity for hard work.

The lowest group in the hierarchy is represented by the former "Untouchables", known as *Harijans*, the name Gandhi gave them. In Andhra Pradesh they make up 13.8% of the population.[79] Three quarters of them in the villages under survey belong to the *Mala* and *Madiga* groups.

Traditionally the *Mala* are agricultural labourers.[80] It is possible that they are descended from the original inhabitants or from slaves. Besides farming, they bury people and perform the functions of watchmen. Their economic security in the "*Jajmani*" system is lower than that of the group following as they compete with several castes for agricultural work.[81] The *Madiga*, besides working on the land,[82] perform the important caste function of dressing leather. They remove dead cattle, make shoes, sweep the village and beat drums at ceremonial occasions.

There are further small, still more under-privileged categories among these lowest groups, who strictly speaking are outside the caste hierarchy. Their conditions of life are restricted under the hereditary caste system in a manner unworthy of human beings.[83]

The caste structure as a constraint on social opportunities

The inequality of the caste system leads to attitudes to life which stress prestige and contempt. Religion, here undoubtedly an obstacle to liberating action, revolves in Indian villages around the categories "purity" and "impurity" already discussed. It is not essential from the point of view of emancipatory analysis that some groups are accorded esteem, but that others are held to be inferior. Their remaining in this degrading position is justified on ideological grounds. This is an oppressive function of the caste system.

At the same time the caste system places economic limit on peoples' positions.[84] In a double sense historical forces are active here.

1. Historically, under the traditional system of the division of labour landed property in an Indian village was in the hands of certain castes with others excluded.[85] Social services were provided by specific castes with other castes obliged to perform work on the land.[86] The empirical enquiry has established without any doubt that exclusion from ownership of land and from agricultural work, if it ever prevailed, no longer exists. All castes, irrespective of their traditional function, can engage in agriculture and mostly it is the predominant form of production.

Historical developments nevertheless worked for a concentration of landed property in the hands of certain castes. Naturally there are poor Reddis but members of this caste on the whole own a relatively large amount of land.[87] This may be explained as resulting from their previous social privileges as a peasant caste. This is also true of other traditional peasant castes such the Golla and Mutrasi.

On the other hand one can point to the relatively small amount of land owned by castes which usually performed the function of agricultural labourers.[88] It cannot, however, be confirmed that the *Mala* and the *Madiga* only possess amounts of land below the seven acres (converted measure) which are here considered necessary for subsistence. In the sample, 10 out of 71 were above this line.

The data available shows that in the caste of both "polar groups", the peasant castes and the Harijans, caste affiliation influences land ownership. This cannot be shown to the same extent for other caste groups. The relatively large amount of land owned by the service caste of toddy tappers does not derive from their historically being a caste mainly cultivating land but from their relative prosperity produced by their regular income from toddy.

The caste system is therefore not only an ideological structure which justifies low esteem for some groups. At the same time it provides certain caste groups with the necessary economic lever in the form of land.

2. Caste determination of certain occupations continues to exercise great influence. Field research showed that no traditional occupation of a Hindu caste is practiced by members of other castes.[89] Muslims too do not go in for

these occupations but only for those traditionally practiced by their population group.

Of the 348 persons interviewed, 23 mentioned traditional caste occupations as their main ones. These comprised for Hindus: village notary (*Patwari*, a hereditary position)[90], trader, goldsmith, blacksmith, toddy-tapper, barber, washerman, village bailiff,[91] for Muslims: religious functionary, chief of village police (a hereditary position), trader, tailor and village crier.::[92]

However, since all those asked were engaged in agriculture[93] the traditional occupations were more usually secondary jobs. In the meantime their importance has declined. In the villages involved in the enquiry, Hindus of higher eastes were also prepared to do agricultural work for the lower castes.[94] Besides the occupations already mentioned Hindus also pursued traditional occupations on a part-time basis for instance as:

Mali Patel (hereditary, previously tax collector and village land surveyor,[95] cattle drover, fisherman, basket maker, ceremonial drummer, shoemaker, village sweeper.

While a small number of these caste occupations, mostly the highly ranked, bring with them considerable economic advantages (especially village notary and Mali Patel,[96] this cannot be said of all. The Madiga receive only slight payment for making shoes and disposing of animal carcasses. Their caste occupation is only really economically advantageous in irrigated areas, where traditional leather bags are used for drawing water. However, this source of income is disappearing with the use of motor pumps. The Yerukela and the Harijans benefit economically from there being no ritual bar to their breeding pigs, whereas this is tabu for other Hindus and for Muslims. On the other hand, poultry keeping in the villages surveyed is not limited only to lower ranking castes and groups (contrary to the findings of N. Patnaik investigating villages about 20 years ago).[97]

The caste system in Andhra Pradesh has a limiting effect on peasant co-operation too. Only in a tiny number of co-operative societies has the barrier of a single caste been broken through and even then caste limits are retained in

the working groups.[98] Even where occupational caste privileges disintegrate the functions concerned are still considered "degrading" for higher castes. As a result they generally continue to be carried out by the castes which were traditionally responsible.

Disintegrating tendencies in the caste structure

Birth as determining social position is the most rigid limitation on human opportunities. Today it is beginning to be challenged by potentially highly flexible forces, though these have yet to develop fully. Here we refer to the new occupational openings. The social differentiation which goes hand in hand with industrialisation is gradually extending to the rural areas and bringing them into the social development process as a whole. Thereby it is noteworthy that in principle most of the "modern"[99] profitable occupations are caste-neutral. Activities linked with new developments do not carry the old ritual restrictions. To this extent immediate caste limits end where 'modern" opportunities of earning begin, and where economic factors play a full role.

One must distinguish between:

(a) activities which are open to all who are ready to offer their labour, e.g. sugar cane processing in the Nizamabad district or the rolling of *Bidi* cigarettes,[100] road building, weed clearing, bird scaring in the vineyards (child work) or night watch work (frequently by old people). With the exception of sugar processing, less is paid than the regular rate for men working in agriculture;

(b) work which requires certain skills and partly one's own means of production such as the milk trade,[101] dealing in cattle feed, transport of goods by bullock cart owned by a third person, construction work on wells and houses,[102] but also jobs such as teacher, chairman or employee of a co-operative, manager or employee of land mortgage bank, postal worker, shop assistant;

(c) those occupations which call for personal capital such as growing grapes, fruits or flowers on irrigated land, running a small business (for example, cycle shops), transport of goods by one's own bullock cart.

Today jobs are offered not only through the caste system. For the time being, few non-agricultural occupations are available and then only for short periods. This leads to the chronic under-employment in both districts.[103]

A labour market in which there is demand for labour and which is effective for the majority of workers, only develops in the villages at busy times, such as during the harvest.

Upto 20% of the workers are employed on a seasonal basis outside their own villages. A large number of non-agricultural jobs were found in village H4 which is ncar a town; nothing of the kind was found in small "backward"[104] villages such as H2 and H10. As job opportunities of this kind increase, a force will develop which will break down rigid caste barriers. In the last few decades higher incomes have already contributed to the emancipation of under-privileged castes. However, where the increasing jobs already occupied an entrenched position in the mode of production, it is likely that they will be filled in accordance with traditional caste functions. This applies when irrigation is introduced. Our observations also show that the larger part of the work force continues to possess personal links with the employer.[105] That means the workers are not selected basically by market forces but find employment in a situation of over-supply on the basis of dependency dictated by family and caste traditions. Neither Karl Marx's concept of a "reserve industrial army" nor "marginality"[106] adequately describe this. It is true that a good part of this labour may appear to be socially superfluous, nevertheless it forms part of the mode of production and is considered so by the society. It remains within the production process although by economic standards it is thoroughly under-employed.

When men who are subject to such obligations leave the village to work, the women often stay behind to con-

tinue to provide the prescribed services and to profit from the limited returns provided by the masters.

Credit obligations effectively bind the debtors to the creditors, decisively influencing the lives of the peasants below the subsistence minimum. In the consciousness of a society accustomed to caste services, high debts lead to debt slavery. The debtor must hold himself ready to discharge his obligations even when this is not really required at that particular moment. For the time being, labour continues to be bound to the performing of traditional services or of services resulting from new obligations. However, it is not to be doubted that new forces are challenging the rigidity of the caste position. In the long run caste structures and class structures undoubtedly draw apart.[107] This process has not progressed much in the villages investigated.

Underprivilege

Indian agrarian society is based not only on massive structures of economic inequality, but also on constraints by birth which reinforce these economic barriers. The way that the restrictions are interlinked resembles what one finds in societies with racial minorities. The two basic needs, the preservation of existence (dimension: class structure) and social esteem (dimension: caste structure) are fundamental. At this stage in India's development on account of the still prevailing economic want "underprivilege"* is continuously expressed in terms of preserving one's physical existence. A lack of available means of production is stressed, especially lack of land. In this investigation we use as the indicator if landed property falls short of a "converted holding" of at least 7.5 acres per household. "Underprivilege", however, only makes itself felt in its entirety when low caste rank is added to economic want. The term is used in such a sense in the following discussion of results. Low caste position alone-with sufficient landed property—is not enough to deserve the description "underprivilege" as understood here.

Caste status is regarded as "low" from the service castes downwards as it decreases to the minorities and the Harijans. The artisan castes, on account of their being so few in

the sample, are excluded from this assessment. Anyway, in view of their claims to equality of rank with the peasant castes their recognition as being of "low rank" is doubtful.[108] The Muslims are a special case and are treated separately in the question of underprivilege. Though they are of low status in the eyes of the caste Hindus they compensate for this in their own view by their religious identity, their considerable numbers and their earlier historical importance as the ruling class in Telangana. They cannot be easily ranked as "underprivileged" in between the service castes and the minorities. This is something to be decided in each individual case.

Summarising, one can say that on the one hand the potentially dynamic elements in the class structure resulting from the so-called "Green Revolution" are until now absorbed by the existing mechanisms of inequality. On the other hand, the structures of the caste system, rigid by definition, cannot entirely retain their oppressive function because they are unable to bind new professions completely. Eventually in cases of conflict, the economic forces which are dominant in the present mode of production break through traditional caste ranking.

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1. "Indian Economic Growth", *E P W*, Annual number, February 1972, p. 362.
2. *Supra* pp. 16ff. Also, P C Joshi, "Agrarian Social Structure and Social Change", *Sankhya* 31 (1969), p. 482.
3. C M Elliott, "Decline of a Patrimonial Regime, The Telengana Rebellion 1946-51", *J A S* 34 (1974/5) pp. 37-47. Also, Khusro, A M: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF JAGIRDARI ABOLITION AND LAND REFORMS IN HYDERABAD (Hyderabad) 1958, p. 1.
4. *Infra* Chapter VI, Grouping inside the village.
5. Already by about 1954, in the wages of the agriculture labour the ratio of money was higher than that of kind. Khusro *op. cit.*, p.98. For taxation, 2/3rds of the agricultural sector is taken as monetary. P B Medhora, "Approach to the Fifth Plan", *E P W*, 8 July 1972, pp. 1319-29.
6. A peasant or one of his family is always there to serve till the debt has been paid off. The usual wages are not applicable in these circumstances nor has this labourer any right to refuse the work he is called upon to do.
7. Similarly, Djurfeldt and Lindberg, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

8. Fundamental studies of the Indian agararian structure, especially by Bettelheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 22ff, and J Mencher, "Problems in Analysing Rural Class Structure", *E P W* 31 Aug 1974, pp. 1495-1503 converge with the rural class system developed by Mao tse-tung, "Wie man die Klassen im Dorf unterscheidet" in *Werke*, vol. I, (Peking) 1968, pp. 157-60.
9. One acre is about 4,000 sq. metres.
10. Sau, *op. cit.*, p. 362. Mencher, *op. cit.*, p. 1501
11. Khusro, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
12. Provided by E El-Shagi.
13. A REFERENCE ANNUAL (New Delhi, Government of India) 1970, p. 173.
14. It may vary from 1 part for the share-cropper to 6 for the landowner (Mencher, *op. cit.*, p. 1495) and 75:25 for the registered share-cropper. P H Prasad, "Production Relations, Achilles Heel of Indian Planning", *EPW*, 12 May 1973, p. 871. Further examples in A Rudra, "Semi-Feudalism, Usury Capital", *EPW*, 30 November 1974, pp. 1996ff.
15. SCHEME FOR THE PROVISION OF HOUSE SITES TO LANDLESS WORKERS IN RURAL AREAS (Hyderabad, Government of Andhra Pradesh), 1972, p. 1.
16. K Bharadwaj, "Note on Farm Size and Productivity" *E P W*, 30 March 1974, p. A20; A N Bagchi, "Some Implications of Unemployment in Rural Areas", *ibid*, 8 (1973), p. 1503.
17. For socio-structurally relevant sub-groups see Thorner, *op. cit.*, pp. 27ff, and Bagchi, p. 1509. For wage level see C Chattopadhyay. "Wage Rates of Two Groups of Agricultural Labourers", *E P W* 12 (1977) pp. A20-22.
18. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 193, on the basis of his interviewing 295 agriculturists.
19. For examples, see, Blenck, J., Bronger, D., and Uhlig, H. : SUDASIEN (Frankfurt am Main) 1977, pp. 342, 346.
20. Definition according to K Ringer, "Produces whose production completely serves their own consumption", in Besters, H and Boesch, E (eds) : *Entwicklungspolitik* (Berlin) 1966, p. 1584.
21. J Heidrich, "Zur Rolle des Kleinburgertums und der Mittelschichten", in Hafner, A. and others, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
22. P C Joshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 482ff, also Moore, *op.cit.*, p. 420. Mencher (*op. cit.*, p. 317) maintains : "Apart from the shifts between the landless and share-cropper category, we found tenants who were also landowners. Though a clear distinction can usually be made between the well-to-do landowner who leases in some land to further increase his holding, and the poor man with say one-and-a-half acres (or even up to three acres) who leases in another acre or two, it is also true that this does serve the function of slightly blurring class lines".
23. *op. cit.*, p. 187.
24. D and A Thorner are right in maintaining : "No where in the world are agrarian relationships more complex than in India", *op. cit.*, p. 151.
25. This can be explicitly seen in the two descriptions of respondents in Appendix 7.

26. M Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Moral", *Zeitschrift fur Sozial*-forschung, 2 (1933), p. 175.
27. In a striking study it was found in Gujarat that 49, 353 tenancy contracts had not been revealed. "Though these farmers are tilling the land, the records show the landlords as the tillers. As a result, the real tiller is forced to part with as much as half his crop or, worse still, is treated as an ordinary agricultural labourer. The village level officials have been assigned a crucial role in the implementation to tenancy legislation. Repeated experience has, however, shown that as a rule these functionaries openly collude with landlords to deprive the tenants of the benefits of the laws enacted for their protection". *EPW* 26 Oct 1974 p. 1807, and 1 March 1975, p. 377/8.
28. For an instructive example of peasants who permanently employ a farm hand but sell their own labour to others on occasions, K. Bharadwaj, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
29. Dandekar and Rath, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 121.
30. Djurfeldt and Lindberg have shown that for a south Indian village, the class which is included below in category 1 takes away half of the income from rice production, though they put in only 9% of the productive labour. *Op. cit.*, p. 166.
31. Hereafter called "rich farmers".
32. Hereafter referred to as "poor peasants".
33. Eastern Deccan highland is predominantly "red soil" area. Blenck, Bronger and Uhlig, *op. cit.*, p. 315.
34. A.P. LAND REFORMS ACT 1972 (Hyderabad, Government of Andhra Pradesh) 1972, p. vi.
35. P Chattopadhyaya, "Some Trends in India's Economic Development" in Gough, K and Sharma, H: IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION IN AISA (New York) 1973, p. 111ff; Blenck, Bronger, Uhlig, *op. cit.*, p. 122, Indian Society of Agricultural Economists (ed): SEMINAR ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT FOR WEAKER SECTIONS (Bombay) 1974; Sau, *op. cit.*, p. 365.
36. Dandekar and Rath, "Poverty in India -I and II" *EPW*, 2 and 7 January 1971, pp. 25-48 and 106-46 respectively.
37. See a remarkable analysis in this regard by Ladejinsky, W., "Drought in Maharashtra -Not in a Hundred Years", *ibid.*, 17 Feb 1973, p. 385, fully applicable to Telangana also.
38. "Irrigated area" is taken to mean here as the area watered in normal years and not the area actually irrigated at the time of our study, which was less because of weather conditions. The conversion ratio of 1:3 between the dry and the irrigated land is based on the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act of 1972. There the ratio is generally taken as 1:2.5 (*ibid.*, p. 42) and in fact a higher ratio for irrigated land yielding two crops (p. 24). Since the climatic conditions in Telangana make two crops by irrigation quite often possible, a general ratio of 1:3 thus seems appropriate.
39. See Appendix I.
40. "Net irrigated area as per cent of net sown area 1969-70", in INDIAN

AGRICULTURE IN BRIEF (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry, of Agriculture) 12th edition, 1973, Table 5.2ff.

41. "Self-sufficient middle peasants" are said to require a "converted" area of about 9 acres. See, Mencher, *op. cit.*, p. 1499; and B H Michie, "Variations in Economic Behaviour and the Green Revolution", *EPW* Review of Agriculture, June 1973, p. A73; as also Dandekar & Rath's suggestion pegged to a minimum size of 5 acres, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
42. A P LAND REFORMS ACT of 1972 takes this size of the family as the base, p. vi.
43. NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY, 17th Round, Report no. 176 (Government of India) 1967, p. 49.
44. INDIA, A Reference Annual (New Delhi, Government of India) 1970, p. 178.
45. Djurfeldt and Lindberg have shown this in their study of the villages in Tamil Nadu. *Op. cit.*, pp. 166, 168. There 270 kg of rice are produced per consumer while only 220 kg is required for existence. And yet, in reality, on an average a consumer only has 200 kg available to him, and the poor classes substantially less. The rich farmer class creams off the considerable amount of 70 kg per consumer for sale outside though according to these Swedish scholars, their share of labour in the production is only 9%.
46. Dandekar and Bath (*op. cit*). maintain that 40% of the rural population live below a level at which they would even get enough calories for survival. Similar figures for Andhra Pradesh have been given by the Indian Society of Agricultural Economics. *Op. cit.*, p. 39.
47. Alongwith Frankel, F: INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION (Princeton) 1971, see, K Egger and R Glaser, "Ideologiekritik der Grunen Revolution: Weg zur technologischen Alternative" in Duve, F. (ed): *Technologie und Politik* 1 (Reinbeck) 1975, pp. 135-55; Griffen, K: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE (Cambridge, Mass.) 1974.
48. Centre for Science and Environment : *The State of India's Environment*, 1982, New Delhi 1982.
49. H Sharma, "The Green Revolution in India—Prelude to a Red One ?" in Gough and Sharma, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-102.
50. The size of the agricultural labour increased during 1961 and 1971. C. Sigrist, "Agrarreform und Agrarrevolution in Indien" in Sigrist, C and others : *Indien* (Berlin) 1976, p. 42.
51. P Bardhan, " 'Green Revolution' and Agricultural Labourers" ' *E P W* Special number, July 1970, pp. 1239-46.
52. "The real flaw in this flurry of technocratic optimism lies mostly in the fact that the availability of the newer kinds of seeds has merely hastened the flight from the need for comprehensive reforms in the ownership of land and the tenancy system". Myrdal, Gunnar: *Politisches Manifest uber die Armut in der Welt* (Frankfurt am Main) 1974, 2nd edition, p. 77.
53. Frankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 194ff.
54. It is worth quoting him at length in view of the pertinence of the views to the Indian villages under our study :

"It is, thus, an ironic and melancholic fact that so far as fertiliser application is, in truth, Java's last trump in peasant agriculture, it is being played at a time when the general political and cultural atmosphere is such that it almost certainly is being wasted, in much the same way as all her earlier trumps were wasted....
This is not an argument against the technical improvement of peasant farming. It is not an argument against the openness of human history. It is an argument against a myopic pragmatic optimism which allows short run gains to obscure the general trend of events, which isolates purely technical improvements from the historically created cultural, social, and psychological context in which they are set, and which, because of these failings, exacerbates the ailments it sets out to cure".
AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION (Berkeley) 6th edition, 1974, p. 146.

55. Discussed in Ghurye, G: CASTE, CLASS AND OCCUPATION (Bombay) 1961; Dumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 21ff; Subudhi, P.C.: FATALISM AND THE CASTE SYSTEM OF INDIA (Detroit) 1966, p. 46.
56. "In Indian village society the hierarchical assumption is applied particularly widely, stringently, and intensively", Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 624.
57. Bronger, "Jajmani System in Southern India ?", *op. cit.*; Kantowsky, D: *Dorfentwicklung und Dorfdemokraties in Indien* (Bielefeld) 1970p. 22.
58. Dumont, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 46ff.
59. With the intent to emancipate them Gandhi called them *Harijans* (Children of God').
60. Dumont, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Mayer, A., *op. cit.*, p. 74.
61. See particularly, Singh, T R : THE MADIGA, A Study in Social Structure and Change (Lucknow) 1969.
62. Djurfeldt and Lindberg, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
63. See the representative list of these norms in *infra* 5.2.3.1. Also, Atal, Yogesh: THE CHANGING FRONTIERS OF CASTE (New Delhi) 1968, p. 247
64. Dumont, *op. cit.*, p. 54
65. M N Srinivas, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization" in Bendix and Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 552-60: "....The process by which a 'low' Hindu caste or tribal or other group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently 'twice-born' caste".
66. *Cf* the lower position of the weavers and washermen's caste in our area of study, and Mayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 40.
67. *Ibid.* p. 59; Subudhi, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
68. M N Srinivas concurs. See, "The Dominant Caste in Rampura", *op. cit.*, p. 4.
69. It can be ascertained that Christians—not included in the sample—themselves felt as belonging to their former caste. CENSUS OF INDIA, vol. II, A.P. Part VI, Village Survey Monographs, Pocharam, New Delhi, 1964, p. 11.
70. Among the farming castes only the Reddi (Kapu) have been placed at the first position because of their predominance in the area of our study.

71. The CASTES AND TRIBES OF H E H The NIZAM'S DOMINIONS, Vol. I (Bombay) 1920.
72. CASTES AND TRIBES OF SOUTHERN INDIA, 7 vols. (Madras) 1909.
73. The Reddi are non-vegetarian. Their conservatism arises from their economic and social power, and has been largely adopted by the young among them. They are described as hard-working, enthusiastic for trade and commerce, active, not very artistic, direct and impulsive. A S Raman, "Reddis", *The Illustrated Weekly of India* 14 Jan 1973, p. 14.
74. *Op. cit.*, pp. 306-19.
75. *Op. cit.*, pp. 518-24.
76. Siraj, *Op. cit.*, pp. 568-572.
77. See the important history of the Muslims in former Hyderabad state Carolyn M. Elliot *op. cit.*, despite some superficiality with regard to rural areas.
78. Results of studies by our Indian partners C. Lakshmanna and N. Rao.
79. U. Ramaswamy, "Scheduled Castes in Andhra", in *EPW* 20 July 1974, pp. 1153-1158.
80. According to the 1902 census three quarters of this caste worked as agricultural labourers. (U. Ramaswamy, *op. cit.*, p. 1154).
81. *Ibid.*, p. 1158.
82. 60% were agricultural workers in 1901. *Ibid.*
83. On this an illuminating instance from the area investigated (T.R. Singh: *The Madiga*, A Study in Social Structure and Change, Lucknow, 1969, p. 35ff.): "The Dakkali is considered to be the lowest among the low in Telangana. The Dakkali sets up his temporary camp on the outskirts of the Madiga colony . After fixing his little hut outside the Madiga colony, he informs the headman about his arrival so that arrangements for food to be supplied to him and payment to be made to him are taken in hand. In the evening he goes to the Madiga colony and standing at a distance from Madiga houses announces loudly, 'I am Dakkali. Bring food for me'. Food is thrown into his garment and water is poured into his vessel from a distance. It is obligatory for the Madiga households to feed the Dakkali. They feed him either collectively or family by family during his entire stay.

Custom enjoins a number of restrictions on a Dakkali. He must not use a cot. He must not use a blanket or chappals. He should not sit down in the presence of a Madiga. He should also not go out in public places in the early hours of the morning or in the evening. He must not draw water from any well or at least from the well from which the Madiga draw water for their domestic use". In the dry conditions of the Telangana highlands not being allowed to use a blanket or drink from a well represents a profound deterioration in the conditions of life (Ponds and other sources of water are generally dirty).
84. This is also stressed by K. Gough, Caste in a Tanjore village, in E. Leach (ed): Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-West Pakistan (Cambridge, 1969). p. 32.

85. These were not the highest ranking castes but the peasant castes. (A Beteille, "Closed and Open Stratafication" in *Archieves Europe ennes de Sociologie* 7 (1966) p. 227. Compare also L. Dumont *op. cit.*, and G. Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 1369.
86. A. Beteille, *op. cit.*, 1971 p. 195; K. Gough, *op. cit.*, 1969. p. 32.
87. Clear examples of this among the villages investigated are H 6 in Hyderabad district, N 1 in Nizamabad district. D. Bronger found that in six communities of the Deccan Highland, the Reddis (Kapu) had concentrated an extraordinary amount of land in their hands. Although they made up only 7% of the population, they accounted for 68% of the owners of more than fifty acres. (*op. cit.* 1974, table 50, p. 351 a).
88. According to the 1965 census in Telangana 77%, of the Mala and Madiga possess less than 5 acres (absolute size). See further, U. Ramaswamy, *op. cit.*
89. See similar result, K Gough, *op. cit.*, p. 33. An exception I heard of indicated that a blacksmith may now take as an apprentice some one of another caste.
90. No narrow barriers, admissible for upper and peasant castes.
91. This position which carries a relatively good income, in earlier days apparently used to be restricted to Mala. At the time of the investigation there were no such strict barriers. On the contrary, the function was also open to the peasant castes. This point to the way the traditional rights of the oppressed castes are eroded in the interest of the powerful. A young self-assured village bailiff equipped with a spear described his duties as follows :—
    — guarding irrigation ponds, so that no water is stolen,
    — summoning of accused to the village officials,
    — collecting taxes.
92. All functions, except those of the Islamic religious functionary, may also be practiced by Hindus.
93. The low figures for "agriculture as the main occupation" in the official census create a misleading impression (see appendix 2, note 1).
94. K Gough, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 34, believes that her sample shows that this was rejected.
95. No strict caste barriers, open to upper and peasant castes.
96. But for instance also washermen, see D. Bronger, *op. cit.*, 1975b, p. 228.
97. Adoption of Agricultural Practices in a Peasant Community in Orissa, in : T.P.S. Mawdhari, *op. cit.*, p. 100,
98. D. Bronger, Caste System and Co-operative Farming in India in: P. Meyer-Dohm *et al.* (ed), *op. cit.*, pp. 279, 282.
99. The quotation marks signal here that such developments are all too frequently copies of what is considered "modern" in Western industrial societies. No claim is made that these may be considered modern in terms of the future in an Indian situation. See K. Mading: *Dritte Welt, Handlungsanleitungen* (Bonn) 1978.
100. These simple workshops are common in the villages of the Armur Block in Nizamabad district; mostly women are employed.

101. Harijans not thought suitable.
102. Caste neutral in spite of small castes of stonemasons, quarry and well workers present in the area of inquiry.
103. Sugar factories operate sometimes only 2 to 3 months a year.
104. As the usual scientific criteria for evaluating "backwardness' are not developed properly the term is used in inverted commas.
105. The concept of "attached labourer" in India: "Attached labourers are those who, whenever required by their master, have to work for him and are not ordinarily free to seek employment elsewhere". Government of India, *Agricultural Labour Enquiry, Agricultural Wages in India*, Vol. I (New Delhi) 1952, p. 400. D. and A. Thorner comment that this Agricultural Labour Enquiry seriously underestimates the number of "attached labourers". *op. cit.*, p. 179 f.
106. See on marginality S. Amin, Zur Theorie von Akkumulation and Entwicklung in der gegenwartigen Weltgesellschaft, in. D. Senghaas (ed): *Peripherer Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt a. M) 1974, pp. 79, but also Th. Dams: "*Marginalitat*" *Motivie-rung und Mobilisierung von Selbst hilfegruppen als Aufgabe der Entwicklungspolitik* (Bensheim) 1970.
107. A Beteille, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 191.
This expression is retained here despite reservations because it is widespread in the English speaking world. It may be added that the concept is regarded as being the opposite of the undeniable useful one: "privilege".
108. They represent an instance of upward mobility on the part of a caste group as a whole.

CHAPTER V

Forms of Consciousness

The central question in this investigation is how people orient themselves in a system of constraints and deprivations and try to lend purpose to their long term actions. On the basis of fundamental value orientations, shaped by the social structure, we have to ask what opportunities this society provides for human action. The origin of these value concepts can be understood only in connection with the structural conditions on which they are based.

"Respect for the power of the environment"

Constraints of productive forces

The productive forces in the villages investigated are still not sufficiently developed for the majority of the peasants to make technically and socially optimal use of resources. Indian data for Andhra Pradesh[1] in 1968 showed the sickle to be the only agricultural implement available in sufficient numbers to all peasant classes. Only 11.84% of the middle peasants (from an absolute land-size of 7.5 acres upwards) had iron ploughs. Electric pumps were limited to the class of rich farmers, while tractors were almost unknown.[2] Now, in addition, drilling machines, irrigation equipment and resistant strains of grain are known in thc area of investigation. But still it is only a minority who employs them. At times of drought such equipment provides a certain, though restricted room for mano-

euvre.[3] In a number of the villages surveyed, the groundwater can only be tapped at a depth of 10 metres beneath a layer of rock. This means that the majority do not possess the tools and the money needed to sink a well. An agricultural labourer was only referring to a widespread experience when he simply stated that it was impossible for him to produce anything on his land during the drought prevailing at the time of the investigation. It is perfectly rational in view of the bad health conditions of the underprivileged that they sometimes refuse to undertake heavy earthwork (e.g., under government programmes) on account of a lack of physical strength.[4] To claim that this is "laziness" as many western researchers do, is to say the least, arrogant. Anyway, official statistics point in an opposite direction. They show that 71% of the people who work 57 or more hours per week in rural India did this for less than 10 rupees a week.[5]

Room for purposeful action is also provided by financial means. When they can get no credit because they do not seem to be credit-worthy, then peasants are faced by the superior power of the outside world in the form of class society. The role of the banks in Indian villages is considerably smaller than that of the money-lenders,[6] so that credit is to a great extent restricted to private loans which carry very high interest rates.[7] The poor peasant must often agree to deliver his produce regularly to the village usuror at a low price. He may be compelled to do so because in place of a fixed repayment date as in the case of state credits, he may pay back the credit in three years instead of one. He can also obtain further credit as he goes. Thus he may get entangled in a lifelong debt bondage which his sons may have to pay off by their work.

Forms of consciousness

Far-reaching social constraints create "fatalistic" attitudes which we already defined as "Respect for the power of the environment."[8] In as far as they stem from natural ecological conditions they affect all peasants in the area. But where social deprivation is added, the constraints acquire undue weight.

In Hyderabad District respondents with little land at their disposal expressed more "Respect of the power of the environment". There, the number of poor peasants[9] and middle peasants oriented to this "fatalistic" attitude is twice as much as that of rich farmers with this orientation.[10] In Nizamabad District the averages are not clearly differentiated.

Quantative data for the caste groups show that in both districts the peasant castes demonstrate less "Respect for the power of the environment" than the Harijans. Such fatalistic attitudes are least evident among Muslims.[11]

Caste membership also exercises influence to the extent that higher castes tend more to believe they will be able to find work.[12]

To this one must add that certain middle castes derive constant incomes from their caste activities.

A toddy tapper[13] demonstrates an attitude towards the "power of the environment" which is quite adequate to reality. On the one hand he accepts drought as force which lowers the income from his caste function. On the other hand he is prepared to face up to the inclemency of the weather and to invest his slight income in agriculture.

"Fatalistic attitudes" dependent on caste can ultimately be overcome when sufficient economic possessions have been accumulated as the following case shows. Then, it is even enough for the peasant to be only a tenant, albeit a protected tenant and not an owner. A Harijan (Madiga)[14] has for a long time been the tenant of 15 acres (converted size) belonging to an owner who lives in the town. He may therefore be regarded as a middle peasant. He plans his agricultural production systematically and is open to innovations. He also applies for fodder aid from the government (drought relief) although the application form costs eight paisa.[15] He does not attribute the rejection of his application to the "power of the environment" but to the lack of support such applications receive from the village Mayor. He has obtained a credit for draught oxen and bought the oxen. He sees that this will be to his benefit for he pays his fixed rent in produce and so can keep any higher yield for himself. In doing so he demonstrates a relatively

low degree of "fatalistic attitudes", although he is low caste.

The greater social dependency of a share-cropper belonging to the same caste[16] means that he does not use the possibilities of obtaining additional means of production and credit that may be available to him. It is also in accordance with economic determination that a member of a high ranking peasant caste, who possesses far too little land, demonstrates one of the most pronounced attitudes of "Respect for the power of the environment".

"Respect for the power of the environment" is economically positive when it leads to a careful and thrifty use of resources. The negative effects of "fatalism" generally described in Research therefore only apply to the narrow field of activity where it would be more advantageous to peasants with adequate economic means to accept risks,[17] and introduce innovations. The opposite is true of peasants who live at subsistence level and for whom rejection of risk helps to preserve their existence.

Since in this respect quantative tendencies are consistently and plausibly supported by qualitative results, it may be stated that economically under-privileged groups are guided to a higher degree by "Respect for the power of the environment". The question of how "Respect for the power of the environment" is determined by membership of caste and religious groupings cannot finally be answered, because according to the data on this question, the caste aspect takes second place to the economic one.

Comparison of the two districts also points to this economic dctermination. The very much lower degree of "Respect for the power of the environment" quantitatively observable among those asked in the Nizamabad district should be seen in connection with the more favourable production conditions in that district. These are evident in more irrigation, more planting of cash crops and the greater number of agricultural jobs existing in consequence.

"Ideal of harmony"

Conditions of Production under the "Jajmani" system and conflict potential

There are two contrasting views of present day south

Indian villages. On the one hand the continued existence of the old service system in scarcely modified form is observed[18], on the other hand it is said that such obligations have been virtually eliminated.[19] Such judgments are only useful when made on the basis of specific observations. Some material from our research is to be found in Appendix 5.1.

We have found that the basic service system continues to exist for the artisan and service castes in both the districts examined. Changes that are especially marginal have been found in the case of blacksmiths, washermen and barbers (Exceptions apply in the immediate vicinity of towns). The caste privilege of the toddy tapper enables him to go in for small trading, despite state control and taxation which has been introduced in the meantime.

These observations may be characterised as the continuation of the "Jajmani" System with certain economically-dictated modifications. Economic need in times of drought, as was the case when this research was conducted, forces further departure from these rights and duties for survival reasons. It may be supposed, though, that following the reduced service rendered at the time of the drought, more will be given to the serving castes in the next year with improved harvest.

Where agriculture is concerned, the workers in the villages examined are generally paid in money and no longer in kind as formerly. The historical duty of the Harijans to do agricultural work could no longer be verified in the traditional form in the villages studied. But there still exist relationships between agricultural workers and certain land owners which offer a chance of preferential employment on an over-provided labour market. Peasants who possess a good deal of land act as the following Reddy does:[20] when workers are required his foreman employs up to fifteen workers so that they make themselves available. If these workers are not to be had in the village, then they are employed from other villages. Quarrels and the realisation that conflicts exist, are naturally not ruled out where the traditional service system continues to exist. A big farmer (Reddy), although recognising the "Ideal of harmony", nevertheless

stresses a decrease of conflict when he says that "ten years before feelings were stronger, people fought to the bitter end....there were more disputes, people took their cases to the courts until they were bankrupt".[21]

Most of those asked, however, maintain that conflicts have tended to increase. In addition to family conflicts these are mainly connected with land ownership, credit and agricultural questions in the narrower sense.[22] Another big peasant (Kurumba) says in accordance with this general tendency:[23] "There used not to be as many disputes because the social system was more rigid. Simple people feared the rich. These days everyone is attempting to be the equal of the other....A year ago grain was stolen in the case of a Kapu. One can only make fate responsible." It seems likely that conflicts were suppressed as long as the traditional system was in the ascendancy.

It is reported that one of the villages examined[24] was completely in the power of a Raja some decades ago. He owned over three hundred acres and other landowners only held small property. He could decide whether someone in the village got employment and he sanctioned corporal punishment. The traditional "Ideal of harmony" was expressed in such forms.

Today it also happens that land which has been registered for Harijans is occupied by the privileged castes.[25] Sometimes, with the help of the courts such disputed land passes back to the Harijans.[26] Definitely the arbitration system at the village level[27] which reposes with the village council (*Panchayat*) and the hereditary police Patel who has no clearly defined responsibility is inadequate. Decisive political support should be given to the groups in the village with only slight power. This is the lesson taught by the study of the structures supporting the "Ideal of harmony".

Forms of consciousness

For different individuals the advantages of the traditional service system vary greatly. Under certain conditions this system prompts economically unsound decisions. A blacksmith[28] said that he could not take up other gainful

work as he had to keep ready for his obligations as a blacksmith for the villagers. At harvest time especially he was unable to spare enough time to work in his fields himself, but had to see that other villagers' tools were in order. Yet, from his point of view his losses were slight. He would continuously receive income from his smithy work. Therefore, he had to carry out his work to the satisfaction of the villagers, "otherwise they would get someone in from outside".

The "Ideal of harmony" does not exclude the idea of conflict, yet there can be different views as to what that involves.[29] One group consulted puts it like this: Conflicts are God-given, unavoidable phenomena in social relationships which are otherwise just.[30] Those interviewed who take this view, underline that conflict results from "small-minded, egoistical wishes". The group of rich peasants is in a position to solve such contradictions: They give "help" "when needed" to "those who require it" or to "their friends".

Although the "Ideal of harmony" is statistically widely spread in the dimensions of landownership and caste position which does not permit any clear group formation, the following tendencies emerge from a qualitative analysis.

The majority of those who consider help for others to be a possibility, come from the group of the economically privileged. The help mentioned is intended to alleviate inequalities in the existing system and thus preserve these structures,[31] yet at the same time it reveals itself to be very limited and again unjust. It underlines the role of the "Ideal of harmony" as an ideology bolstering power when it is stated "People used to be good, and so there were fewer conflicts. Today everyone thinks as he pleases".[32] "In the case of drought, people must leave the village to seek a livelihood, no-one helps them" then, social relationships collapse. "People with money fear those who have nothing to eat".[33] It is also said: "The rich fear that they will be asked for money and food".[34]

"When the drought hardens, thefts and quarrels increase. Social relationships remain the same '(*sic*! "Ideal of harmony"). But the rich are responsible for these conflicts".[35]

This statement by a rich farmer (peasant caste Mutrasi) points to a conflict with the more privileged groups, in his view the "rich"[36]. Middle peasants accuse the "rich" of not helping. A man, underprivileged both economically and in respect of caste, explains the situation as he sees it[37]: "In the last ten years there were no quarrels in the village (*sic*! "Ideal of harmony") harmony reigned in the village. Now we are suffering greatly because of lack of rain and food ....The Kapu and the rich are not helping us in the slightest. Therefore we hate them greatly in our hearts".

This is how an underprivileged Harijan sees it: "If we protest against the Reddys, we get beaten".[38] The "Ideal of harmony" can be bent in the extreme in the interest of the powerful: "An eighteen year old Madiga was murdered in the village a month ago. There is no justice."[39]

It is then by no means convincing when a rich farmer owning an especially large amount of land claims that the Harijans are "becoming less polite", indeed, that they are communist-influenced.[40] It is also not surprising that quite a few of the specially privileged rich farmers[41] bring the "Ideal of harmony" into play against the village councils (*Panchayats*) with their democratic tendencies by critically remarking that conflicts in the village began with the establishment of the councils.

The following incident involving the research team in a village dominated by the Reddy caste is instructive.[42] It casts light on the economic and caste interests which are entwined with the "Ideal of harmony". After the team had visited the area inhabited by the Harijans, they appeared in a group at the office of the village mayor, a member of the dominant Reddy caste, and emphatically demanded an adequate supply of drinking water. The tension caused by this incident found expression in the village mayor's annoyed accusation that the nonplussed researchers were stirring up trouble against him. It was with great difficulty that this charge was laid to rest and further visits became possible after a decent lapse of time. In this case it was not possible to renew the contact with the Harijans.

The same village mayor commenting on the "Ideal of

harmony" said: "The harmony in the village has not changed in the past ten years. There are no quarrels now, there were none in the past. There have only been small incidents of theft and passing disagreements which did not harm social relationships. People (The under-privileged: K.M.). are managing to overcome the shortage of food by working in the government programme ("Relief Work") and in tending the fields and building wells for the rich".

At the same time this member of the dominant group of landowners does his best to exploit his better information level by telling the agricultural workers that moving to the town would be the worst thing they could do. An agricultural worker present at this conversation agrees when the Reddy incorrectly maintains: "Even if they were to leave, I would lose nothing, they would lose!" The agricultural worker assents: "I cannot afford to take the risk of seeking work outside the village. I cannot leave my family alone. I never tried to obtain work elsewhere". Since the "Ideal of harmony" does not require anyone to provide support, only amounting to a recommendation to help if need be, it is actually to the rich farmers' advantage that there are plenty of workers around seeking work.

The function of the "Ideal of harmony" in bolstering up those in power becomes even clearer when one also knows that the dominant Reddys in this village have seized Harijan land.

Protests against this "Ideal of harmony" are strengthened in villages where there is only one landowner in power.[43]

Nevertheless, this mystifying value is adopted by poor peasants and lower castes who accept their unequal and oppressed role because of partial interest, out of fear or lack of insight.[44] A general dissatisfaction with the "Jajmani" system which is at the bottom of these forms of consciousness, is not to be observed despite the drop in income from services because of the drought.

The economic basis of this system is, one can say, "drained" in drought years. Related consciousness weakens to the same extent. This is especially true of the Magidas, since their products such as sandals and leather buckets

for wells are replaced by other products. The effects of such change shift from the limited service relationship to central ideas of social order and prompt expressions of opinion which would otherwise have seemed quite impossible. Behaviour on the part of the under-privileged as in the case described, remain an exception for the time being at any rate. Recently, social service groups of a grassroot level, comprising social workers and lawyers from outside started a most promising work of lending practical assistance to such oppressed people. The hypotheses theoretically formulated in Section 3.3 Fig. 2 cannot definitely be verified for the three classes and the five caste groups referred to here. All the groups advocate such values to some extent. Intensive questioning of a much limited group of people, who own a considerable amount of land but do not belong to a high caste elicited especially clear-cut support of the "Ideal of harmony". This is interpreted as not concerning the safeguarding of the rights of all the village dwellers but of onesidedly supporting the status quo of existing domination.

Concepts of Equality

Norms of Inequality

The norm of separating the "clean" from the "unclean" castes in the use of drinking water wells which is a very relevant question in the dry area of Telangana, applies in all the villages examined.[45] This is only one part albiet an important one, of the total system of caste inequality in an Indian village. Ritual caste divisions which rule out the common eating of food continue to exist. On the other hand, there are clear signs that ritual discrimination is partly breaking down, especially where physical contact between the castes is concerned. An "Index of Social Discrimination" (ISD) was drawn up with the aim of laying bare intertwined social norms which run counter to the "Concepts of equality". It was compiled by our Indian collaborators on the basis of their understanding of the culture and adapted by the author for his purposes.[46]

The index in its modified form consists of nine questions with different ordinal numbers. The numbers (from one to nine) are attributed in accordance with the importance each question has socially and economically to Harijan equality in the villages.

9: May Harijans draw water from the well or wells of the caste Hindus?
8: May Harijan children sit next to the children of caste Hindus in school?
7: Are Harijans permitted to build their houses in the area of the caste Hindus?
6: May Harijans enter the village temple?
5: Are Harijans served by the barbers and washermen of the village?
4: Do Harijans receive the assistance of the midwife?
3: May Harijans enter the houses of the caste Hindus?
2: May Harijans carry water for caste Hindus?
1: Must Harijans use a respectful form of address to caste Hindus?

Our research reveals that in striking contrast to the political, constitutional and legal provisions in India, all the questions drew an almost 100% negative response in the villages. The exception was the question about school. The under-privileged castes are simply denied equal treatment on these socially relevant points. There were a few exceptions (3 to 1 positive replies in the 20 villages concerned) in the questions of house access, midwife, barber and washerman's services.

In the question of seating arrangements in schools, equal treatment was found in thirteen of the twenty villages. This points to the importance of a state school system in promoting some minimal forms of emancipation. It is true here, that the state insists on equal treatment. Any teacher not observing this risks disciplinary action and possible dismissal. Nevertheless, the author observed and took photographs of Harijan children sitting distinctly away from the other children generally in the back row. This was true, too, of the only foreign development aid project in

the villages examined, the Indo-Dutch Child Food Programme.[47] This observed behaviour is only a superficial phenomenon, which is connected with discrimination as a whole, deprival of services and the degrading view on lower eastes. This gives some idea of how the problem of staying alive in an Indian village is permeated by ritual norms. These are the social obstacles which stand in the way of realising equalitarian values.

The "Index of Social Discrimination" shows that the villages may be divided into three groups in accordance with the varying degree of discrimination.[48]

1. A group of seven villages from both districts with a maximum discrimination of "45".
2. A widely scattered group of twelve villages between the values "38" and "34". Here, too, there is no difference between the districts.
3. Finally a village (H4) with the low discrimination rating of "30".

It is not entirely convincing to explain this last result by pointing to the predominance of Muslims in Village H4. A more remote village (N9), also dominated by Muslims, exhibited significant discrimination. The decisive factor is rather that Village H4 is open to change because it is near the capital, Hyderabad. This contact does not lead diretly to "Concepts of equality" as one might optimistically assume. It presupposes far-reaching changes in employment structure and economic dependence. Influences from the modern economic sector do not directly prompt "egalitarian" thinking, they further it indirectly.

It is notable that four of the villages with an especially high degree of discrimination (all Hyderabad district) are at the same time economically least developed. One village in this group in each of the Hyderabad and Nizamabad districts is marked by the predominance of one or more landlords. For the time being it would be questionable to equate the predominance of one landlord and a low level of development. Further case studies would be needed to pursue this question.

In rare cases in the area examined land had been distributed to the Harijans, but this was not substantial enough to affect the unequal property structure.[49]

Indian planners possess great experience and well founded knowledge of the specific conditions of Indian society. Despite this, and despite certain emancipatory tendencies, state development measures are frighteningly isolated, often short-sighted and even dangerous. Take for instance housing for Harijans.[50] This programme is intended to serve egalitarian aims. Officials admit the unacceptable delays[51] in the programme and are critical both of this and of corruption.[52]

In addition, the Government of A.P. treats the money which it gives to the local self-administrative bodies (*Zila Parishads*) as having "actually been spent", although it has often not been. I feel, however, that criticism must go further in order to explain also the lack of interest of those for whom the houses are intended.

1. These houses in A.P. are built on a credit basis in accordance with the capitalist principles which largely determine Indian economic policy despite official statements. For the very poor "users", the monthly payment of seven rupees (towards the total value of the tiny house for four families of 1,800 rupees) is an intolerable burden. One should remember that before they lived free in their huts which were often larger and more accepted. This means that the project is condemned to fail in my view if it is not linked systematically to job creation programmes. These should offer those involved a continuous source of income which enables them to make the repayments. The officially recommended activity[53] to earn supplementary income from chickens and animals is not practical because of financial and caste obstacles.

2. The declared aim of equality is not achieved, if the under-privileged are shut away in "Colonies" and in permanent stone buildings. Instead of being integrated into society their separation from the caste Hindus is only "cemented".

It was not observed in the area examined that the future aims of apportioning up to a quarter of the houses to other

castes[54] was being fulfilled. Such inconsistent state "development programmes" are not suited to promoting the elimination of social inequalities[55] and even less to supporting egalitarian ideas with the village dwellers.[56]

Forms of consciousness

All groups in economic and caste dimension express values that run counter to the inequality which is rooted in the caste structure. The Muslims are most "equality-oriented" on the basis of their religious views. In both districts quantative data revealed the tendency for the economically and caste-wise most highly placed groups and at the same time for the lowest groups to be more strongly oriented towards "Concepts of equality".

This contradiction may be examined by using qualitative data. One can well imagine that the privileged groups are more able, on account of their higher educational status and their better understanding of the social aims accepted in India, to manipulate their answers in the direction of the values they imagine the researcher expects.[57] The respondents will therefore slant their answers towards "equality" in order to be considered "modern".

Here one comes up against a problem which has already been touched upon. Questions concerning exploitation and oppression are rarely answered positively. Intensive interviewing is required to correct the apparently equalitarian responses on the basis of the respondent's overall situation, his economic interests and the answers he gives to related themes. Such corrections however point to the possibly divergent results produced by quantitative and qualitative methods and shake the foundations of standardised interviewing. For instance, when a palm wine tapper,[58] who derives considerable economic advantages from his caste privilege, comes out in support of equality, this should be regarded as a generally uncommitted statement in as far as his actions are concerned. Where privileged castes express no discrimination against lower castes, a qualitative analysis reveals that they could forgo this without any disadvantage. Their unchallenged economic supremacy maintains their prestige which is also backed by ritual. A farmer

who works on a capitalist basis and who usually employs labourers, need not stress the "Jajmani" relationships and the symbiotic inequality of the castes. It is significant that such a person is critical of Harijans who own land and are "more independent minded", that is, less available as workers.

A rich farmer[59] (at the same time president of a co-operative) typically calls on the middle castes to change their way of life and thus qualify for "equality". On the other hand, he regards the lower castes as excluded from such upward mobility because of their "impure" social functions (handling dead animals etc.) In doing so, he is in fact defending ritual inequality. It is consistent that the rich farmer (who is also the village mayor) mentioned in connection with the drinking water incident thinks that it is justified for women from castes below that of Reddy to stand up when he passes. They are only "showing their respect".

When members of privileged groups come out in support of "equality" this is of another order than when members of under-privileged castes do the same, as show the case studies of persons who are both economically powerful and belong to higher castes. If one possesses a position which is unchallenged economically or ritually one is inclined to speak favourably in roundabout terms of the equality of the castes. It is then not a contradiction but a revelation of the real but unexpressed interests[60] when those who are regarded as advocates of a supposed "modernisation" at the same time most strongly insist on the "purity" of the castes.[61] It is therefore to be concluded that a consistent "concept of equality" is more regularly to be encountered among poor peasants and members of lower castes.[62] Criticism of ideological standpoints thus plays a necessary part in examining quantative data.

It is in line with this conclusion when Harijans say to members of other castes: "We have the same red blood as you!"[63] Nor do religious ideas nullify the desire of lower castes for "equality". "Sweepers" in Uttar Pradesh (equivalent to the Madiga caste in A.P.) do not regard their lowly standing as the result of past failings, as the official *Karma* theory lays down. They express views as:[64] "We

were deprived of our high Ranking....The others refuse to recognise our demands for high status".

"Readiness to co-operate"

Hierarchical or co-operative social relations?

The "Asiatic Mode of production", under which the village community is the co-operative base of economic activity, was an ideal type which may have approached earlier historical periods in India. It goes without saying that it is not to be found in any of the villages examined.[65] M.K. Gandhi drew a somewhat similar picture of the "Indian village republics", and this has been repeated in innumerable western works, mostly without social historical support.

A village community which genuinely engages in economic activity in the common interest is so rare in societies with some differentiation of social functions that precise evidence is called for. The Indian caste system fragments overlapping forms of co-operation in the village and replaces them by a vertical hierarchy.

Co-operation in the form of *Shramdan* (gift of voluntary labour) is an aspect of common activity on the part of the villagers. These days this is performed when connecting roads to the village[66] are being built, more seldom in the case of temples or mosques, drinking water wells or irrigation channels. It is performed generally at the suggestion of the government within the framework of the village development programme. Each villager provides a certain amount of his time; the rich can give money instead. This custom has a long tradition, especially in the construction of temples and village assembly places in earlier times. It is found that in recent years such a *Shramdan* had taken place on rare occasions in some of the villages examined. Those asked nevertheless emphasised that these days it is unnecessary. The government is to carry out such work. When one appreciates how little the Indian government can do in this sphere then this disappearance of local activities certainly does not promote development. The reason for the majority's lack of interest lies in the one-sided burden placed

on the poorer groups of the village by such work programmes.

Co-operatives represent another more "modern" form of co-operation. In the survey area they rarely exist as production co-operatives but mostly as credit co-operatives.[67] Apart from co-operatives for general agricultural purposes there were co-operatives in the villages examined for toddy-tappers,[68] weavers[69] or fishermen. This is true of 16 out of 21 villages. Roughly half had ceased to function because of indebtedness and lack of credits repaid.[70]

The co-operative movement which is in principle supported by the Indian government has not succeeded in changing the forms of production or of consciousness in the villages.[71]

As might be expected, the dominant social contradictions are reflected in the co-operatives. Often they are only formed for the temporary purpose of obtaining money from the government. Or they are set up on the initiative of a single rich farmer or landlord. Generally, their advantages accrue mainly to the prosperous peasants.[72] Shortcomings such as embezzlement and existence of cooperatives only on paper[73] are widely to be found in the area examined.

It must be asked whether in addition to such institutionalised co-operation, the peasants have developed noteable forms of co-operation for the purpose of solving economic problems. Co-operation in this sense would involve doing unremunerative work on an equal and voluntary basis. It is generally the custom to lend tools without payment, mostly in return for services on the part of the borrower.[74] To a lesser degree, with more emphasis on exchange this is also true of draught oxen. When in times of drought the rising cost of fodder becomes the most pressing problem in keeping animals,[75] the peasants rightly say: "we must feed the animals, how can we lend them out without payment?"[76] Under the "Jajmani" system services can be repayed by lending out draught animals.

Workers who bring along draught animals of their own receive work on a preferential basis. Still in general, it is usual to hire out animals for money.

The importance of these means of production is underlined by the way the poor peasants who do not possess them and cannot receive co-operative help, must rent their land to prosperous peasants who in their turn provide the necessary tools and the draught animals.[77] "Share-croppers" and agricultural workers receive much more for their work, often double, where they provide their own draught animals. One form of co-operation consists in members of service castes (for instance, washermen) getting another caste member to stand in for them when they have no time.[78] Other agreements on mutual help are also reached within castes.[78] On occasions, occupational groups come to arrangements. For instance, shortly before the beginning of the survey the ox-cart drivers of Medshal with common accord raised their prices. Such solidarity of action is generally prevented by lack of organisation, particularist interests and fragmentational vertical dependence on the part of the individuals.

Common ownership of land on the part of brothers, who do not divide their inheritance forms a special case and cannot be regarded as co-operation between separate economic units.[80] With these instances we have already listed what the peasants in the sample regard as the essential forms of co-operation without payment. Needed goods are increasingly being supplied for money as part of the growing use of money in the villages and this is no longer consistent with the image of "mutual help within the village community".

Harvest work, with workers becoming increasingly scarce at such times, is mainly provided for money. Here it is usual for men to get higher daily wages than women.[81] Credit is given only on payment of interest, except when neighbours and aquaintances lend each other small sums. Food grains are also lent on interest, except in the case of small quantities.

Wells and houses which are large and expensive projects, are constructed by-specialised work teams and not on the basis of neighbourly help.[82] The common use of wells is widespread. This, however, is not based on exchange relationships but concerns wells which are owned in common.[83]

Water together with land, the decisively scarce production factor, is treated in strictest ownership terms. Rich farmers who own huge irrigation wells, refuse to provide water for dried-out fields nearby, even if paid in work.[84] The scarcity of the means of production, the longstanding threat to existence and the sharply unequal division of goods have destroyed forms of mutual help.

Forms of Consciousness

These forms of relations are internalized in the value and norms of the peasants. The crass refusal to provide water for agricultural purposes unless this is to the advantage of the donor is regarded as justified. It is advocated without the slightest hesitancy on the basis of long-term experience. When the conditions under which people live and work in the villages are so restricted one must ask whether basic conditions for forms of consciousness oriented towards co-operation exist at all.[85]

The willingness to trust others and to accept their advice at least occasionally is one such condition. Its acceptance with the Indian peasants is to be examined in the first instance. In this connection it became apparent that readiness to take advice on economic questions was generally existent among the respondents. Only those over forty-five years of age seemed little inclined to accept advice. The exchange of observations and suggestions are part of peasants' regular social contacts. This is especially so since time is generally not of prime importance and conversation is one of the few forms of recreation in the villages. Advice proferred in such conversations, however does not directly affect economic and social actions.

The peasants do not decide in common on planting and harvesting: the risk involved is clearly so big that the community is not accorded sufficient authority for such decisions. On the other hand, there are certain questions, for instance, talks with the authorities about fertilizer, which can be dealt with in common. Undoubtedly, the problems of credits and debts and the conflicts they cause have undermined the readiness to trust each other.

Who then, do these peasants trust? It is not surprising that the family is placed first, for this is true of most societies.[86] It is nevertheless striking that only a few restrict their trust to their own caste or to friends. The Muslims are an exception. They limit their trust more to the in-group because of their historical and religious separation from the Hindus. In general, trustful relations transcend the individuals's caste; this is also true of Harijans.

Trust in friends where personal problems are involved is rarely mentioned. This is confirmed by an intensive study by Narasimha Rao in the highly developed village H 12 and the poorly developed village H 3. As a result of his extended stay in the villages, Rao came to the conclusion that friendship plays only a small role among Hindus, with the exception of some well-off people and the palmwine-producing caste of the Goundala. Naturally he met with conversations between neighbours, the village gossip which passes the time and conveys information. But when help is required, it is less usual to turn to friends. Instead, use is made of "Jajmani" relations if they exist. In the villages "friendship" is associated with visiting together, for instance, the cinema in the next town. The answer given by a Harijan is illuminating, "How can we have friends when we work the whole day? Once again the Muslims are an exception. They have more friendships (though not the group of the Dudekula Muslim with its closer Hindu affiliation). This Muslim characteristic is on the one hand culturally determined, on the other hand it increases with education and with urban contacts. Advice concerns among other things medical questions and money.

The respondents said that in addition to members of the family, they trusted a relatively large number of people in the village. But this excludes people who live outside the village. No firm proof that such tendencies determine concrete economic and personal decisions could be found. On the contrary, it is also applicable to the villages examined here. What W. and C. Wiser discovered in their classic study of a North Indian village, namely that social structure engenders considerable mistrust, the statement of one peasant

may stand for many: "I never ask anyone for advice, otherwise he later has claims on me".[87]

American studies attach a great deal of importance to the existence of trust.[88] What we have found suggests that this shoud be considerably modified. It is possible that trust exists in certain relations side by side with pronounced mistrust in other relations. Even there, where it exists, it is comparatively far removed from co-operative social action. This became evident in the villages where people who expressed their trust neither showed nor declared any high degree of readiness to co-operate. The under-privileged stressed that co-operation is "not possible" for economic reasons. Rich peasants said that it is "not necessary" for they themselves possess sufficient means of production.

It is true that rich peasants reveal a slightly higher degree of "Readiness to co-operate" compared with the average. Intensive study showed these statements to be merely declamatory. Such a general willingness to co-operate does not exist in reality. These privileged people fear that they are taking on a thankless task which will bring them more disadvantages than advantages. Considerations of economic advantage are the dominant factors in this thinking.[89] The willingness of these groups to co-operate is actually restricted to a limited clique of persons in the village, who support their power interests. If there is a dominant peasant caste in a village, such as the Reddys in Village H 6, increased "Readiness to co-operate" within this privileged group is observed.[90] It is of great economic and social importance for members of castes in a peripheral position with only a low economic standing to be involved in the interaction of such a group.[91] This naturally extends to power struggles in the political sphere.[92] The respondents were well aware who were the powerful in the village. Since they attach great importance to having good relations with these groups, the "Readiness to co-operate" of the under-privileged, too, is influenced by the question of power. The conditions in each village here are a deciding factor. None of the class or caste groups were characterised by a generally higher orientation towards co-operation.[93] The various groups were equally unsure whether it was possible to solve

difficult production problems by themselves without government help. Those asked were unable to fall back on convincing experience co-operation except in isolated cases. Although more rich farmers expressed their desire for "co-operation", closer examination revealed this in part to be merely words.

In other cases it turned out to be co-operation with interest groups to underpin social and political power. The "Readiness to co-operate" which in view of the shortage of the means of production could have a relevant and emancipatory role for the poor peasants and underprivileged castes, is suppressed by precisely these constraints and by the mistrust which predominates because there are no common activities. This attitude is a good example of the unfulfilled potential of these groups in the conflict between orientations, which are objective, meaningful perceptions offering chances of reducing oppression, and on the other hand of social pressures which suppress such consciousness.

"Propensity for innovations"

Socio-economic conditions for innovations

Agriculture follows traditional lines in the villages examined. In accordance with the principle of self-sufficiency, most of the normal inputs can be produced by the peasants themselves or cost relatively little.

There can be no doubt that these traditional methods are incapable of raising production as quickly as the present shortages and the increase in population requires. Important traditional methods are being neglected (for instance, irrigation by means of "tanks" which were once in very much better condition in India).

The term "innovation" refers here to the forms developed in the industrial societies, not to improvements of the traditional methods of production. Respondents especially mentioned:

—various kinds of chemical fertilizers,
—selected seeds and improved methods of planting (the "Japanese method for transplanting rice),

—pesticides,
—motor pumps for irrigation, and,
—above all, tractors.

Ecological methods in ploughing, house construction, compositing bio-gas installations, solar collectors now being applied increasingly in western industrial societies, are not used. Undoubtedly they would affect traditional pattern less than the "hard" methods mentioned above.

Chemical fertilizers are generally only used in the cultivation of rice and sugarcane. According to El-Shagi 42% of the peasants interviewed do not employ chemical fertilizers.[94] While the transplantation method has generally been adopted, only 25% of the peasants use selected seeds[95] and 21% pesticides.[96]

Only one in three wells is fitted with a pump and only 3 tractors were to be found in the 21 villages examined.[97]

Without going into detail here, the spending on innovations can be grouped under three headings:

1. Inputs which the farmer does not have to acquire on the market, such as more intensive use of labour and home-made tools.
2. Costs incurred by the peasant buying goods on the home market.
3. Spending on the world market implying the use of foreign currency reserves.

The last-named costs represent the greatest burden to society as a whole. They increase India's dependence because of the unequal relations of exchange. The big Indian spending in foreign currency on chemical fertilizers and oil forms part of this. Efforts to achieve home-grown development in the technological field need greater encouragement,[98] especially in the field of intermediate technology. Until 1976, the People's Republic of China in contrast attempted to mainly develop its own potential.[99] Useful technologies should be robust, cheap and simple enough to be

produced in the country. All technical transactions involving money call on the peasant to do a detailed calculation beforehand. The decisive factor here is that investments raise production only slowly and in part do not increase it at all.[100]

The peasants have found that the use of chemical fertilizers does not produce higher yields if it is followed by a dry period.[101]

Even investments which will increase production must be financed in advance of the harvest. Since a great number of the peasants, who live on the existence minimum, have not got this money, it has to be asked whether credit is available locally and what interest on it must be paid.[102]

If 24% a year interest is a normal rate as is in the area examined, then taking up a credit represents a risk which varies greatly according to the groups involved. The poor peasant in this way places the very foundations of his existence (his land) in the hands of the local usurers.

His risk is qualitatively different to that run by the rich farmer. Such risks represent a decisive obstacle to the use of innovations which must be bought on the market. In addition the power structures in the villages bolster the chances of the politically and economically privileged. It may happen that under-privileged are excluded from obtaining supplies of fertilizer because these are embezzled by the village notary and his group.[103]

Finally, the high degree to which the "Japanese" transplantation method has been adopted reveals that there is not a psychological opposition to innovations. Instead, an increased effort will be accepted when it can be produced by the peasant's own labour without becoming a financial burden.[104] Obstacles which stand in the way of innovations have a different impact depending on the over all calculations relevant to the various class groups.

Forms of Consciousness

The usual charge that "traditionalism" stands in the way of innovations is not true of the villages examined, for the very reason that every-where the peasants are using innovations in varying degrees. Where they are not

doing, they do have rational explanations. For instance, negative experience is mentioned by 15 to 35% of the respondents.[105]

Naturally some of these negative experiences result from mistakes which could be corrected, for instance, the use of chemical fertilizers at the wrong time or in the absence of sufficient water. Up to 26%, an especially high proportion, of the peasants interviewed lacked knowledge of the methods and advantages of using pesticides.[106] Even rich farmers complain of lack of advice from the village level workers within the framework of the Community Development Programme.[107] This is even more true of the under-privileged. A broader spectrum of useful agricultural knowledge may circulate among the members of one of the more numerous castes. Generally, knowledge of innovations decreases in the under-privileged classes.

When peasants put in too little or too much chemical fertilizer, this is generally not because of some mental obstacle but because of considerations of cost and risk mentioned above. The overwhelming majority of the peasants possesses a general aspiration for innovation. But this only becomes relevant in connection with the actual "Propensity for innovation" when the corresponding information and economic means are available. The poor peasants lack these.

It is true that level of education[108] and outside contacts[109] have a favourable influence on the "Propensity for innovation", but these factors in the final analysis can be traced back to the underlying economic status.

The view of E. Rogers that financial advantages are insufficient to induce subsistence farmers to employ innovations[110] calls for more precise definition according to our investigations. On the basis of the answers given, south Indian farmers regard such financial advantages favourably when they are concretely connected with innovations, when in addition the innovations fit with the methods they apply and are not wiped out by contrary experience.[111] Traditional methods do not represent an insurmountable obstacle as is indicated by the far-reaching positive attitude to western medicine among all groups.

Vaccination against smallpox had been carried out in all the villages, mostly within the space of the previous six months before our visits and most often in the more easily accessible villages H 4 and H 5. Anti-cholera injections had also been administered in some villages.

It is noticeable that this inadequate kind of immunisation had not prompted an aversion against western medicine. As could be observed, the immunisation was carried out by young people who had clearly not been given any very extensive medical or hygienic training. Little attention was paid to cleanliness. The villages were not given any advice, especially, the mothers whose small children were treated. This is all the more regrettable as it is known that a feverish reaction can set in a few days after immunisation against smallpox. This can come as a surprise to villagers and induce them to act incorrectly.

In the family planning sphere, too, little has been done to create positive attitudes. This is especially true of male sterilisation, the predominant method practised at the time of the study.

It is not enough when J, Kivlin maintains without presenting detailed evidence[112] that social norms in favour of male sterilisation do exist. In the first place, this contradicts the Hindu desire to have male heirs for the purpose of carrying out religious rites. In addition, one must bear some extremely negative experiences in mind. In the year 1972 and after, mainly poor men were induced to submit to the operation under pressure, on payment of a premium and partly also under the influence of alcohol.[113] The family planning teams were required to achieve certain set aims during Indira Gandhi's government. 50 rupees were paid to all those who agreed to the operation when "Intensive family planning campaigns" were underway. The government employees on the teams often kept ten rupees of these or sterilised old men past the age of fathering children. Like many other patients, a young man, father of one daughter, complained to us after sterilisation about an infected condition and about negative effects. He said that the government doctor had sent him away without treating him. Such a programme, without providing

regular post-operative care, hardly encourages "Propensity for innovations" in the field of medicine. Ultimately, the pressure and the negative aspects of the programme were an important cause of Indira Gandhi's political downfall in March 1977.[114] The fact that under privileged people are generally the ones to speak out against family planning[115] is not a proof of their backward views but of the pressures their group was specially exposed to from the government family planning teams. It should be added that Muslims as a group formed an exception as they rejected in the interviews family planning in general.[116]

"Inclination to education"

Education and rural situation

1. The lack of relevance of institutionalised school teaching

Education can serve an emancipatory interest and have a "liberating" influence (P. Freire) in the context of peasant experience when it enables the individual to treat nature in an ecologically acceptable way and to communicate with others on the basis of equality.

The educational institution with which the peasants in the villages examined are directly confronted, is the primary school. They are to be found in all the 21 villages studied, or in the immediate victinity. The schools in the villages have at least the first and second forms. Higher forms up to the sixth are available in 14 villages. In two villages education extends higher, up to the 9th and 10th form. So, education is offered on a relatively broad basis by the State of Andhra Pradesh which does so in accordance with constitutional obligation. But it is enjoyed by only a small minority as will be seen in section 2 below.

The schools examined belong to phase 2 and 3 of those drawn up for India by M.V. Rajagopal.[117] That is, the teachers at these schools are mostly insufficiently trained for their work, teaching is often based on a single book and methods are rigid or even meaningless from the point of view of the recipients.

Gandhi's aims of a "Basic Education" for India with productive activity in school and close contact between school and the world outside have not been realised. The suggestions of the 1964-66 Education Commission which point in the same direction have also not been put into effect.

A certain amount of book knowledge is imparted in these reading-and-writing-schools,[118] which touches occasionally on agricultural questions. But the schools are not concerned with providing help in questions of hygiene or in the use of new fertilizers or machines. Those studied lack a simple school garden. Attending school for a few years can of course support the employment of new ideas in agriculture, but their use does not depend on it.

School education does little to encourage people to pursue "modern" activities outside the agricultural sphere, for instance, by opening a shop. Simple reading and writing is here perhaps a help. Other factors, such as money, are much more significant. On the other hand, a higher degree of education increases the use of the media (Newspapers, radio)[119] and contacts with the town. Observations of the school education offered in the villages suggest that it lacks local relevance. This contradicts the wishful thinking that education as it is offered in the Third World is a way to breaking down traditional barriers.[120] There has been no success in breaking away from the British model in a consistent process and of concentrating on relevant experience in the Indian cultural context.

2. Inadequate spread of school education

Only 14% of the respondents have attended school for more than four years.[121] Official Indian statistics for the Hyderabad district (1971) note 16.2% "Literate and educated persons" and only 13.3.% for the Nizamabad district.[122] School education increases markedly for people under 20. Women are clearly at a disadvantage. The percentage of illiterate people has practically remained stagnant between 1971 and 1981.[123]

Parent's educational levels are reflected in their children. The peasants with a higher level of education were

more likely to send their children to school (including their daughters) as persons who had themselves received little education.

Many children end their education before completing primary school. The same report gives as reasons: "Economic backwardness on the part of people" and "Social obstacles to the education of girls". It is clear from the official statistics[124] that a considerable percentage of the children do not attend school and that girls are at a disadvantage. The All-India enrolment figures in historical perspective were for 1948 : 33% 1968-69: 77.3% and 1978: 85%.[125]

1968-69	Enrolment in % all children 6-11 years	Girls in same age group
India	77.3	58.5
Andhra Pradesh	72.7	58.8
Telangana	51.3	35.8

The survey in the villages, however, brought much lower figures to light. In 1972-73, on average, only 29% of the children in the age group attended school in the villages we examined. The same figure was found for both the districts Nizamabad and Hyderabad. The difference in school attendance between boys and girls was much greater than in the official statistics. 40% of the boys were at school but only 17% of the girls.

3. Women's education

The proportion of literate women in the surveyed villages, according to the Indian statistics of 1971,[126] numbered 4.46% in Hyderabad district ("Literate and educated persons") as against 23.67% for men, and no more than 2.21% in Nizamabad district (17.17% for men).

According to the village norms, school attendance does not increase a woman's chances of getting married. Only the upper group of privileged peasants[127] think it good when women can write and read letters.

These views influence the school attendance of the children. Here the disadvantaged position of village girls differs markedly from official statistics.

Significantly more Muslims than Hindus keep their daughters away from school, allegedly in the interest of their cultural identity. This is especially true of the Nizamabad district. Village N 1 has a separate school for Muslim girls in addition to the government school. Relatives of the priest teach them to recite Urdu tests. None of the Muslims in Village N 7 send their daughters to school and also do not provide them with any alternative education.

On the one hand this points to considerable Muslim reservations concerning the village school.[128] On the other hand it involves an attempt to rediscover their own identity. This includes attempts to learn Urdu, the language which the Muslims spoke during the period of their rule in Telangana and which is now official language in Pakistan.

This educationally under-privileged position of women runs very much counter to the objective interests of orientation in society. Although the present school education is only partially relevant to the rural situation, the exclusion of women from schooling is only part of a more comprehensive discrimination. It may be expected to exercise an influence even when educational improvements are made. Less education for women has no rational justification, because the girls no less than the boys play a useful role in supporting the peasant families. In family planning the importance of education for women is evident. Since women in Indian villages are mainly responsible for the socialization of the children, their lack of training, which is only part of their low social standing, plays a decisive negative role. This is not a case of oppression in accordance with power interests within the class system or because of faulty government development policy. It is rather one of failures to adapt cultural patterns to the demands of reality. The norms which exclude women from education represent an exception in the comprehensive rationality of the social action observed. Development

policy should especially be directed towards promoting change in this field.

4. Educational barriers of property and caste

Social history shows that child labour is the decisive counterforce to school education. Children in Indian villages work in the fields, and at home fetching water, herding animals, collecting manure, weaving mats, weeding or driving off birds. Some of these activities are almost entirely performed by children in the villages for reasons of low cost. Economically speaking, such work on the part of children is more important to under-privileged groups since additional income earned through child labour is essential for them to survive. In addition, 90% of the children at school must pay for their educational materials. Our results clearly show how economic constraints affect the under-privileged: In both districts 50% of the rich farmers reached the level of four years education and in contrast only 16% of the poor peasants.

Seen in the caste dimension, the level of education clearly varied between the upper castes and others (in both districts almost all the Brahmin and the Komati, i.e., traders had attended school); less clearly between the upper and peasant castes on the one hand and the service castes and Harijans on the other. The goldsmiths and the palm wine tappers, who are also largely active in trade, are more inclined to make use of the education on offer than the Reddys (Kapu) or the Lingayats, both important peasants castes of whom less than half had gone to school.

Even more disadvantaged were the Harijans. Of those only two had gone to school in Nizamabad district and only one in Hyderabad district.

In Andhra Pradesh as a whole 99.2% of the Harijans living in rural areas are illiterate. Only half as many of the Madigas have a knowledge of reading and writing as the Malas. This is connected with the fact that the Madigas pre-dominate in the backward highland of Telangana and the Malas in the fertile and advanced coastal provinces.[129]

Women, people who own little land, and Harijans, are at a disadvantage educationally. This adds to the

already existing under-privilege. Yet, education facilitates withdrawal from the village departure to the towns.[130] School attendance can only in exceptional cases be a means to advancement for Harijans.[131] They would then have to go away from the village.

If the children of the under-privileged stay away from school some, though slight, economic advantages accrue from their labour.[132] At the same time these families are not involved in the competition for prestige on the part of the privileged peasants who spend considerable sums on the education of their children,[133] without often being able to advance any reason for education except that their children should become "nice gentlemen".[134]

It would, however, be wrong to use any of this as an argument for the exclusion of the socially weak from the Indian education system. Indirectly, long-term effects beyond any immediate economic benefits definitely exist, for instance where attitudes to planning,[135] "empathy"[136] and the promotion of identity are concerned.

The educational system in India thus reflects the existing inequality . In its present form it cannot mobilise people for development. Even where a village teacher has attempted something of this kind, he has not the necessary means at his disposal. And the way Indian education is organised means that he is directly supervised by the local administrative bodies and the groups which dominate them.[137]

Forms of Consciousness

Almost half of the respondents felt unable to approve of school education for their children.[138] Altogether slightly more than these expressed doubts as to the benefits of education. In addition, one may justifiably doubt the statements made by some (about 15%) of those who approve of education for they nevertheless do not send their children to the village school.[139] Similarly when the question about girls' education elicits an almost unanimous positive response, most of those asked do not act accordingly. The quantitative data are therefore to be treated with caution. On the whole, we observed a continual

rise in the "Inclination to education" from the poor peasants through the middle peasants to the rich farmers. This is plausible because the limited relevance of education already decisively limits the "Inclination to education" on the part of the poorer peasants. This is also true, when they possess educational aspirations of a general nature.

Naturally, the rich farmers also have their doubts as to the use of the education offered:[140] I do not know, what ought to be taught in school. The parents are the experts. The children can learn all they need to know from them. Unless the children go to middle school they will not be able to read the pamphlets produced by the agricultural extension service".

This group, however, is not forced by socio-economic reasons to demand that education is of immediate use.

Speaking of caste and religious groups, the "Inclination to education" is most pronounced in both districts in the case of the Muslims. Their low tendency to send their girls to the government schools in the villages should not be forgotten, though.

Otherwise there are slight quantitative variations between the caste groups. But they hide essential qualitative differences, since styles of living in the caste sub-cultures and indentity concepts differ powerfully from each other. The attitude to education is an especially important part of these styles of living. The Reddys and the artisan castes are more inclined to allow their daughters to go to school than Muslims and other castes.[141] School attendance of daughters forms a less pronounced part of the living style of the lower castes and needs specific encouragement through the parents.[142]

Here, as with the other forms of consciousness discussed, the links with the power interests of the dominating groups and the conflicts in the village become evident. It is openly mentioned[143] that "influential leaders in the village" attempt to restrict the education of the underprivileged groups for their interests. Even the school inspector is said to be influenced by these powerful people. Significantly, these hints here come from a Brahmin. The reason is probably that the Brahmins in Telangana are

readier to ally themselves politically with the Harijans than the peasant and middle castes and so encourage their education as part of this process.[144]

On the other hand, the example of village H 6, dominated by the Reddys, sheds light on the repressive interests of the privileged Reddys. The child of a dependent peasant was thus excluded from educational opportunities.[145]

Since "Inclination to education" can only be tested against the actual education being offered, one finds that the groups which are economically and caste-wise more privileged reveal a more marked orientation towards education in terms of practical behaviour. For them considerations of prestige play a greater part than for under-privileged groups. The existing school system only marginally fulfills instrumental interests of the under-privileged. What then is required is that an education system developed for the Indian villages which corresponds better to the pressing need to secure livelihood. This then provides a meaningful objective for the under-privileged as well.

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1. Govt. of A.P., The Economic and Statistical Bulletin Vol. 12 (Hyderabad) 1968, p. 3752, 3754.
2. Compare innovations. *Infra* section 1 on socio-economic conditions.
3. An equivalent may be found in another survey : Peasants with dry land asked about their plans answered "As God wills", peasants with irrigated land spoke of concrete plans. (S. Ortiz, Reflections on the Concept of "Peasant Culture", and "Peasant Cognitions Systems", in Shanin (ed), *op. cit.*, p. 331.
4. S.K. Rao, Measurement of Unemployment in Rural India, in *EPW* Sept. 1973, Review of Agriculture, P.A. 85.
5. *Ibid.*, & P.A. 87.
6. El-Shagi discovered that during the period of the survey, less than seventeen percent of the peasants interviewed had received loans from co-operatives or banks. 69% took up private credits (58% of them had no other source available, *op. cit.*, p. 276). One study which is basically applicable to

Telangana broke down the sources of credit as follows :

1. Government	17.8%
2. Banks	1.6%
3. Co-operatives	13.0%
4. Moneylenders	67.6%
	100%

(W. Ladejinsky, Green Revolution in Bihar, the Kosi area : A Field trip, in : *E P W* 4 (1969) p.A.152)

7. The private money-lender in the villages surveyed, demanded interest rates between 18 and 36% a year, in most cases 24%. (El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 204).
8. *Supra*, Chapter II.
9. "Poor peasants" include agricultural labourers.
10. The group "rich farmers" includes traditional style landowners and farmers working on a capitalist basis. The averages are 0.59 (poor peasants) and 0.55 (middle peasants) on the one hand and 0.20 (rich farmers) on the other
11. The averages :

	Hyderabad District	Nizamabad District
Harijans	0.45	0.24
Peasant castes	0.26	0.15
Moslems	0.17	0.08

12. Provisional result of the study by N. Rao
13. Village H 6.
14. Village H 12, detailed description Appendix 7
15. Hundred Paise — One Rupee (1 Rupee — 0.2675 DM, 1978)
16. Village H 12.
17. This very general statement may be refined in terms of social strata. Comp. "the curvilinear effect of wealth" on innovations which is applicable to some of the values discussed here, F Cancian, Stratification and Risk-Taking : A Theory Tested on Agricultural Innovation, in *ASR* 32 (1967), pp. 912-927.
18. For instance J. Mencher, *op. cit.*, p. 199: "It is true that in rural areas there has only been a partial lessening of the traditional *jajmani* type of relationship".
19. *Cf.* "Other specialist castes—the carpenters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths and potters-are now employed by private contract in return for cash payments and no longer claim shares in the harvest of the village's grain. Similarly, as we have seen, tenant farmers, cowherds, and former agricultural serfs, although still (in the case of pannaiyals) paid partly in grain, depend upon contractual work for their livelihood and have lost their hereditary rights". K Gough, *op. cit.*, p.32.

It should be noted that Gough speaks of "tenant farmers" as a caste although today in South India-and in accordance with her argument-agricultue and thus tenancy is basically open to all.

20. Village N 2.
21. Village H 11.
22. Water distribution, crop stealing, animals on others' Land; *Cf.* further questions Appendix 5, No. 2.
23. Village H 7
24. Village N 6.
25. This information from Village H 6 helps in understanding an incident described later, p. 162.
26. In the Villages H 11 and N 3.
27. Some castes have elders or heads who can arbitrate.
28. Village H 7. Income from services is reliable but its extent should not be overestimated (for instance 2 rupees a day, slightly below the equivalent of a day's wage but all the year round. *Census of India* Vol. II Part VI. *Village Study* Pocharam Nizamabad District for a blacksmith).
29. See K.K. Singh : *Patterns of Caste Tension* (Bombay) 1967 p. 109.
30. Accordingly it is correct to demand the repayment of loans but one can be certain "that there will be conflict".
31. "The Harijans come to our well. We give them water." (A Sali in Village N 3). Agricultural castes receive credit from their employers.
32. Village H 6.
33. Peasant Village H 7.
34. Village H 4.
35. Village N 7. Another rich farmer (Village H 5) in regretting the lack of justice also turns against the capitalist peasant and village notary in this village (see Appendix 5 No. 2).
36. Reference to splits within the privileged classes. *Cf.* J Arens and J van Beurden : Jhagrapur : *Poor Peasants and Women in a Village in Bangladesh* (Amsterdam) 1977 p. 145.
37. Village H 6
38. Madiga in Village H 7
39. Village N 6. See also reports of the abduction of a Harijan woman by peasant caste members for instance in *Times of India* 27 March 1973 as well as the burning alive of a Harijan boy by members of the peasant castes in Andhra Pradesh for allegedly having stolen a pair of sandals and two metal pots. Committee on Untouchability *Economic and Educational Development of the Scheduled Castes*, Report, Department of Social Welfare (New Delhi) 1961 p. 16.
40. Village H 11.
41. In the Village H 5, 8, 10, N 6.
42. Village H 6.
43. For instance Villages H 5 and N 6 (App. 5 fig. 2).
44. J. Mencher underlines the surprising lack of open tension in the South Indian villages examined. She attributes it to the way that the rich and middle peasants exploit the caste distinction to prevent the underprivileged from coming together on the basis of their common interests. (Conflicts

and Contradictions in the "Green Revolution" in *E P W Annual* Number Feb. 1974 p. 317.

45. This norm is generally applied despite express prohibition under the Indian Constitution (Art. 17) and the "Untouchability (Offences) Act' of 1955 Sect. 4.
46. See this discrimination in practice The Committee on Untouchability *op. cit.* p. 15ff.
47. This project did important work for the people in the Chavella Block of the district of Hyderabad. Farmers were encouraged to start growing certain nutritious produce and to sell it as food for children to the project, which in its turn distributed it to the children(of poor and well-to-do families too). See B.C. Muthayya : *Child Welfare* (Hyderabad) 1972. The extent to which such a project is dependent on the views of those in power in a village is revealed by the discriminatory manner which certainly did not conform with the wishes of the Dutch donors in which the Harijan children sat separate from the others in the kindergarten. My protests to the project head in Hyderabad an experienced Indian administrator, only resulted in the head of the kindergarten in Village H 6 being informed. She then received me in a less friendly manner when I paid a further visit. The people in charge of the project apparently did nothing further to bring about equal treatment. One can either regard that as a mature reaction on the part of local personnel in line with preserving the given social situation. Or one can regard it as a depressing instance of developmental impulses failing to meet the basic needs of qual treatment.
48. See for details Appendix 4 (in one village there are no Harijans).
49. For instance in the Villages H1, 7, 8, 12 and N 2, 3 and 8 El-Shagi found in eleven cases in the Hydera bad district that none of the under-privileged agricultural workers who received land were able to grow anything on it because all lacked the means.
50. See further, though by no means all-inclusive details : State Evaluation Committee, *State Evaluation Study in the working of the scheme "Housing Colonies for Harijans"* (Planning and Local Administration Department, Hyderabad) 1968. On the further develop ment of the programme "Weaker Sections" in general, that is for groups defined not only by their caste standing but also by their proximity to the existence minimum, see Government of A.P. *Scheme for the Provision of House Sites to Landless Workers in Rural Areas* (Hyderabad) 1972, especially pp. 4ff. In its developed form this programme covers not only Harijans (Scheduled Castes), but also "Minorities" (especially Mountain Tribes) and what are called "Backward Classes".
51. In the case of a "Colony" in the Hyderabad East Block, which we can take as an example (a "Colony" on average covers 15 houses each with four families) construction was started six months before our visit, the houses were completed three months ago and in the meantime one of them was occupied. In Ibrahimpatan Taluk in Hyderabad District so far none of the 99 houses completed had been occupied according to information supplied to the author by the competent authorities.

52. The following example from p. 20 of the Committee report mentioned deserves to be quoted, because it is typical of unconcerned statements made by Indian bureaucracy : "A cement wall appears to have been constructed during 1960 at a cost of Rupees 1050-but existing condition is not reported". "
53. Government of A.P. Scheme for the Provision .... (1972) p. 9.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
55. This may be well true of a programme which primarily serves other purposes : Job creation programmes are carried through as part of drought relief. These bring members of various castes together under the same conditions. The work done mainly involves road-building, quarrying and stone-breaking and is inconsistent with a proper development policy. It would be better to undertake long term works which would more directly serve agricultural production, which is where the real emergency is (for instance, irrigation schemes). W. Ladejinsky underlines that the Collectors, the district officials, who are responsible for the development programmes, regard these job programmes in the first instance from the point of view of maintainining "law and order", and that these are not integrated development programmes. (Drought in Maharashtra in *E P W*, 17 Feb 1973, p. 388).
56. This is the view of S. Mehta : *Social Conflicts in a Village Community* (Delhi) 1971, p. 171, and so obscures the real problems.
57. See relevant findings by D. L. Phillips and K.J. Clancy, "Response Biases in Field Studies of Mental illness", in *ASR* 35 (1970), pp. 513.
58. Village H 6.
59. Village H 12.
60. See, Mencher, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
61. See, Subudhi, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
62. M. Rokeach accordingly found that American Blacks since they lack equality, value this more highly than American Whites. *Op. cit.*, p. 72.
63. D. Djurfeldt and S. Lindberg for the village they studied in Tamil Nadu. *Op. cit.*, p. 228.
64. P.M. Kolenda quoted after *ibid.*, p. 223.
65. The supposition of the distant observer Karl Marx that an "Asiatic mode of production" existed in India in the 19th century (Die britische Herrschaft in Indien, in Marx and Engels: *Ausqewählte Schriften*, Berlin 1966, pp. 317-323) is not supported by evidence.
66. For instance a road three miles long was constructed 10 years ago in Village N 2 with government support. See otherwise for Telangana S.C. Dube, *India's Changing Villages, Human Factors in Community Development*, (London) 1958, p. 135.
67. As an example taken from the villages examined, one may mention a credit co-operative in Village H 12 with 500 members.
68. See example Appendix 8.
69. *Ibid.*
70. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

71. The proportion of agricultural co-operatives to the number of families mainly engaged in agriculture amounted to only 0.35% (1967) and the proportion of the area cultivated by them to only 0.19%. Bronger, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
72. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p.182; V.R. Gaikwad, "Development of Weaker Sections: State Policy and the Need for New Structures and Strategies", in *Indian Society of Agricultural Economists* (Ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 180, note 7.
73. Bronger surveyed 387 "agricultural co-operatives" in 1970. No crops were being grown in 154 of them. Blenck, Bronger, Uhlig, *op. cit.*, p. 354.
74. This simple form of co-operation naturally involves neighbours to a greater degree and may transgress economic or caste barriers. Orenstein, Gaon H.: *Conflict and Cohesion in an Indian village* (Priceton) 1965 p. 161.
75. Ladejinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 393.
76. Village H 12.
77. Indian Society of Agricultural Economists (Ed.): *Seminar on Rural Development for Weaker Sections* (Bombay) 1974 p. 71.
78. It is also possible to transfer rights under the "Jajmani" Systems for money to others. Bronger, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
79. On mutual help among Harijans: S. Shivakumar, "Aspects of Agrarian Economy in Tamil Nadu: A Study of Two Villages," in *EPW* 6 May 1978, p. 769, note 3.
80. A well on a piece of land can be the economic reason for this. The customary division of the inheritance splits up land extensively and causes uneconomic production on mini-plots and widely scattered pieces of land.
    Asked about the advantages of not dividing inheritances, a man in Village H 5 said : "If we were to divide we would have to employ an addtional worker. We can help each other on the undivided land. We can do everything on a common basis, live together and cook together. That cuts housekeeping costs".
81. Widely differing wages are paid both in private employment and in the case of public works. At harvest time they are 10 to 50% higher. 2 to 3 rupees were paid a day to men and 1.25 to 1.80 rupees to women. Works on wells and irrigation systems are paid according to the amount of earth moved.
82. House construction is expensive and so is well construction because of the low ground water level and the severity of the work. Deepening an irrigation well of 10 ×10 metres by one yard cost 1,400 rupees in 1973. Generally, wells are 10 yards and more deep. In the case of wells we found no caste-specific restrictions on work despite the existence the Vaddara caste as traditional well-sinkers. Harijans often worked on well construction. In the case of house construction the former restriction on caste basis is on the decline.
83. Either the wells were sunk on a common basis, or they remained the property of all the heirs when the land was divided up.
84. "The rich in the village do not really help. They say that one should apply to the government". The person asked added in explanation :

"All suffer, so how can one expect help from them" ? "What's the point of having relations with the rich ? Even when you are dying they don't give you a drop of water". (village N 7).

85. This is questioned by Y. Goussault, *Stratifications Sociales et Cooperation Agricole*, in *Tiers-Monde* 14 (1973), p. 294.
86. It is more usual for Muslims than for Hindus to employ members of the family as ordinary workers on an agricultural holding.
87. For instance Village H 5 and H 12. See also W. and C. Wiser : *Behind Mud Walls* (Berkeley) 2nd ed., 1973, and Foreword by D. Mandelbaum, p. x.
88. See *supra* Chapter II.
89. A.R. Beal writes on such relationships : "Pervasive Factionalism in a South Indian Village", in M. Sherif (ed): *Intergroup Relations and Leadership* (New York) 1962, p. 261.
90. This is also confirmed by N. Rao for the Muslims in Village H 12.
91. A member of a smalll fisher caste rightly stresses : "It is a disadvantage to belong to so small and low a caste. I have no important friends. I do not know how I am to earn money". (Village N 2).
92. The higher the socio-economic status of the persons in Indian villages, the greater is their participation in the village and in co-operatives (B.S. Gupta, Die Partizipation ländlicher Bevölkerung Indiens an der Idee der Dorfdemokratie und des Genossenschaftswesens, in M. Turlach (ed): *Gesellschaft und Politik in Sud-und Sudostasien* (Bonn-Bad Godesberg) 1972, p. 23.
    The poor peasant are scarcely involved in the running of the village institutions. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 314.
93. D. Kantowsky also stresses that all castes and groups generally lack the willingness to co-operate and trust. *Dorfentwicklung und Dorfdemokratie in Indien* (Bielefed) 1970, p. 112 ff.
94. *Op. cit.*, p. 283, 60% of the holdings in the village examined by D. Bronger in A.P. used manures (on 40% of the area) and 7% chemical fertilizers (on 4% of the area).
95. 14% in Hyderabad district and 34% in Nizamabad district, the same.
96. 18% in Hyderabad district and 22% in Nizamabad district, the same.
97. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
98. See the difficulties of developing a domestic Indian tractor in G.S. Aurora and W. Morehouse, Dilemma of Technological Choice, in *EPW*, Aug 1972 special number, pp. 1633-1644. There is reference to the continuation of "technological colonialism" in India.
99. A "nationalist trauma", which is defended in historical and political terms, prompts both countries to use scarce resources for the production of expensive and unproductive things as atom bombs, space satellites etc.
100. See the study of an Indian village in which the use of chemical fertilizers produced profits from only a part of the land and of the varieties planted, S. Simon, The Village of Senapur, in J Mellor *et al: Developing Rural India* (Ithaca) 1968, p. 337.

101. It is possible that a part of the chemical fertilizers can be resold, assuming there is a buyer at the time of drought. The selected seed in the ground is lost when there is drought.
102. See *Supra* footnote to constraints of productive forces
103. Village H 5, see appendix 5.2.
104. G. MacPherson and D. Jackson, Village Technology for Rural Development, in *International Labour Review* 111 (1975) pp. 97-118, stress that peasants deciding between different technologies are trying hard to minimise cash spending. El-Shagi found innovations increased in accordance with the size of the holding. *Op. cit.*, p. 308 ff.
105. El-Shagi, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
107. "No regular check is made on the use of innovations. Therefore I lost the hybrid varieties which I sowed. No one comes to advise us". Rich peasants and village notary, Village N 7.
108. E. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
109. See Para 5.3.1.1. and B. Roy *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
110. E. Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
Th. Schultz may be charged with reductionist economism where the claims that situational experience and consciousness may be left out: "Since differences in profitability are strong explanatory variable, it is not necessary to appeal to difference in personality, education, and social environment." *Op. cit.*, p. 164.
111. It should be recalled that about twenty years ago, according to a study by N. Patnaik, peasants belonging to lower castes were subjected to derision by those belonging to a higher caste if they employed new methods. "Adoption of Agricultural Practices in a Peasant Community in Orissa", in T. Chawdhari (Ed.) : *Selected Readings on Community Development* (Hyderabad) 1967, p. 100. Patnaik himself points to the link with economic underprivilege. Purely caste obstacles to innovations were not observed in the villages we studied in 1972-73.
112. "Correlates of Family Planning in Eight Indian Villages", in J Kivlin *et al.*, *Innovation in Rural India*, (Bowling Green) 1971, pp. 239-269.
113. *Times of India*, 27 March 1973.
114. Jan Friese, Keine Angst mehr vor Indira, in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 4 March 1977. According to the Indian minister of Health, Raj Narain, 207 people died between July 1975 and March 1977, with 10.6 million being sterilised under the official programme in the same period.
No mention was made of the numerous instances of heath injury, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 26 June 1977.
115. Information from N. Rao in his intensive study of Village H 12.
116. As an example, a Muslim asked in Village N 7 did not refer expressly to the Koran but simply to the group norms of what he calls his "caste" : "Children are a gift from God. I want to produce as many of them as I Like".
117. M.V. Rajagopal : *Perspectives in Indian Education* (Machilipatnam) 1972, pp. 35 ff.

118. In India, one refers to the "R-R-R-Education". This points to the limited scope of this education which basically teachers reading, writing and arithmetic. One may compare how such "book knowledge" has been criticized and partly overcome in the People's Republic of China, especially following "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and the realisation of practice-oriented education. K. Mäding and B, Hellig : Mao Tse-tung's value orientation following the victory of "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" declared in April 1969, Hamburg 1972 pp. 42ff.
119. In Hyderabad district it was found that of the 183 respondents, 31 possessed school education of more than few years, of these 29 exceeded the value 4 on a media use Index (0-10). In Nizamabad district, of 151 respondents 16 (significantly fewer than in Hyderabad district) had been to school for more than four years. They all achieved a media use exceeding 4.
120. Ph. Foster (*Education and Social Change in Ghana*, London 1965, p. 269) and B. Strumpel (*op. cit.*, p. 285) assume this.
121. 29% of the respondents attended school at least for the first year and then mostly broke attendance off. Whatever the length of school attendance, the figures for Hyderabad district were always higher than those for Nizamabad district.
122. Government of India, *Census of India* 1971, *Andhra Pradesh, Part II-A* (Hyderabad) 1972, p. 192.
123. Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, Länderkurzbericht Indien 1982 (Stuttgart) 1982, p. 9.
124. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Planning and Co-operation Department, *Perspective plan for Telangana, Vol.* 1 (Hyderabad) 1972.
125. *Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, op. cit.*
126. See Appendix 9 for details.
127. Reddy and Artisan castes, not Mutrasi or Goundala (Information from our Indian colleague Narasimha Rao).
128. Rich Muslims in Village H 12 for instance overcome obstacles not to send their children to the village primary school, where Telugu is the medium of instruction, but send them to Hyderabad where they learn English.
129. U. Ramaswamy, *op. cit.*, p. 1157.
130. Intensive interviews in the Hyderabad and Nizamabad districts revealed that peasants unquestionably recognise this.
131. U. Ramaswamy, *op. cit.*, p. 1157.
132. For instance sixty rupees a month for animal minding.
133. 50 rupees a year are allegedly spent to attend in the local town. Other Information claims the spending of about 1000 rupees on seven years of education.
134. Village N 6
135. V. Griffiths : *The Problem of Rural Education* (Paris) 1968, p. 22.
136. E. Rogers. *op. cit.*, p. 288.

137. H. Beyer . Bildungssystem und Unterentwicklung in Indien, in G. Wurzbacher *et al : Störfaktoren der Entwicklungspolitik* (Stuttgart) 1975, p. 202.
138. Hyderabad district : 46%, Nizamabad district : 42%.
139. This reveals that despite the attempts to use as much as possible concrete expectations in the survey, unrealistic aspirations are still expressed in some of the answers.
140. Village H 6
141. Example. Village N 3. This is naturally even more true of the Brahmins, who regard learning as an essential part of their social functions. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 433, 456
142. Attempts mentioned by Mandelbaum (*ibid.*, p. 472) and A. Beteille (*op. cit.*, 1966, p. 231) by Harijans to get ahead via education are less relevant in the village which we examined, because of the lack of real chances of mobility.
143, Village N 7.
144. I owe knowledge of such a case (in village H 12) to N. Rao.
145. See appendix 10.

Chapter VI

Some Further Determinants

At the individual level

We have examined value orientations of Indian peasants as shaped by social structure. The aim was to grasp the social experience of the persons involved. "Possession of land" and "Caste position" were the two basic determinants of social experience in Indian villages.

An analysis of this type cannot be all-embracing. Some additional determinants will be mentioned now.

Communication—an expansion to experience ?

Reading of newspapers and of other printed matter increased with the size of land-holding and with caste rank among respondents. So neither exercised an influence independent of social status. All in all reading was so rare that no detailed conclusions are possible.

Radio reaches a greater number of people via transistor sets and the loudspeakers installed in village centres. The effect of radio on peasant consciousness and actions is however ambivalent. It cannot simply be described as positive as advocated by proponents of the communication theory. Informational and educational broadcasts on Indian radio which are concerned with rural problems made up only 6.5% of the total. Since peasants prefer to listen to music, the radio is more likely to support unrealistic or evasive tendencies than povide a situational orientation. Unlike the People's Republic of China India lacks any systematic

reinforcement of radio communication by means of village meetings for listening or discussion.

It is true that in 1975, 2,400 Indian villages received a TV set, suited to receiving television programmes with the aid of a satelite provided by the United States. But this programme costing millions, not only increased India's technical dependence on abroad, it also revealed a faulty development concept of the Indian Government. Instead of equipping local teachers better so that they who have personal contact with their pupils could fulfil their difficult task, a purely technical method was adopted. Apart from the costs incurred it was condemned to fail because according to observers only a fraction of the TV sets were working shortly after programmes got under way.

Have the respondents enlarged their experience by contracts with other places outside the village ? Contrary to the communication theory approach suggested by D. Lerner and E. Rogers, our survey points to the very diffused meaning of such contact with other places. To someone who learns a technical trade in a town, "contract" implies something qualitatively different than to a poor peasant who sells vegetables on the market, drinks a glass of tea at a stand and returns to his village without paying much attention to newspapers or cinema advertisements. It is not convincing to correlate contacts just as such with the use of modern methods (D. Lerner), or to make them responsible for the abandonment of traditional trades (E. Kropp).[2] This takes them out of their socio-economic context.

"Contact" is here defined in terms of the frequency of visits to the district capital, to the small towns and the surrounding villages and in terms of the purposes for which these visits are paid, buying and selling, work, visits to relations.

Agricultural workers visit the small towns less frequently. Such visits are for them less meaningful than for farmers marketing their produce or for persons engaged in small-trading. Intensive interviews brought to light acute differences which could only be comprehended within the framework of the status and the interactions of the respondents. In

the case of landowner of the dominant Reddy caste "Frequent contact" can include close relations with the Block Development Office. A Muslim who has an extensive land holding knows trustworthy people in the town who keep him constantly informed about market conditions.[3]

Other, poorer peasants who also visit the town frequently stress that they "attend to their business there but otherwise it is pointless seeking talks or advice there". They "simply have neither the money nor the equipment to put the advice into effect".[4]

Nevertheless within the limits of this situation a Harijan resolutely recognizes[5] that his contact with small towns could get him a place of work if he "had some money to bribe someone". Other Harijans scarcely leave the village and so demonstrate only "rare contacts". All the same they know quite a good deal about the depressing living conditions in India's major cities. Relatives of theirs who have gone away to Bombay tell them when they return to the village once a year for a few days.

It would be overstressing quantitative findings to suppose that outside contacts have an independent influence on the "Inclination to education". When contact exceeds a figure of "7" (on a scale running up to "10") it was found that respondents in the Nizamabad District evince a threefold rise in the average rating of their "Inclination to education" and those in the Hyderabad district a twofold increase. In our view, contact ultimately must be seen in the light of each peasant's social and economic situation. This category does not qualify for a direct determining effect on the forms of consciousness examined. Contrary to a formal view of communication theory, we feel that the use of the mass media and contact are means by which the Indian peasants improve existing socio-economic opportunities but which contain no independent potential.

Age—a factor modifying experience

The ages of Indian peasants dictate slight changes in their value orientations but do not prompt any break with the expectations dictated by ownership and caste. The

data, both qualitative and quantitative, agree in general with the findings of other studies on the influence of age.[6] "Propensity for innovations", for instance, decreases with age.[7]

In addition, our study reveals comparatively clearly that older people possess less trust and a reduced "Inclination to education" and that they are more likely to accept the inequality in the caste system. In their restricted situation their experience comprises more disappointments and less mobility expectations. More pronounced differences between the generations were met within the more "developed" villages. There, age is a more decisive factor. In addition, qualitative analysis revealed that the generation gap is quite 'pronounced among the under-privileged Madiga. Their old people could be classified mainly as belonging to a "complaining weary" type, while the younger people were more concerned to improve their position.

Determinants at village level

Quantitatvie situational data

The specific situation in each village is part and parcel of the factors shaping the consciousness and the actions of the peasants. If in a village, only 0. 59 % of the land is irrigated, then the norms and the value concepts of the reference group offer little reason to the inividual peasant to discard his "Respect for the power of environment" and look towards innovations. The situation in a village which possesses only a single drinking water well[8] exercises increased pressure in favour of "Concepts of equality.[9]

One must make the following distinctions for the various characteristics and the 21 villages examined. On the one hand, we have quantitative variables, to which the subject continously refers when defining his position. For instance, there is the proportion of irrigated land,[10] the relationship between "cultivators", that till the land on an independent basis and the dependent "agricultral labourers",[11] the proportion of "modern" trades, the existence of a village school and the number of classes it has, the proportion of literate people[12] and other factors. They can be asembled to form an

index of development of the village solely based on quantitative data.

On the other hand, there are variables in the village situation also influencing the consciousness and actions of the peasants which can only be grasped qualitatively. This involves the dominance of certain groups and castes, the total social history of each village, its conflicts as well as the changes promoted by developmental impulses.

Groupings inside the village and relations with the outside world.

Historically conditioned relations here influence the actions. This can only be grasped in its totality by someone who spends a considerable time observing events inside each village. This has been done in a number of village surveys, conducted among others by Indians.[13]

Such relationships appear in our study where the domination of castes is concerned but also where outside relations of a village, especially with the authorities are neglected.[14] Attempts to classify the "value orientations" of whole villages as "traditional" or "modern" should be rejected as inadequate simplifications. This follows from the deep-seated social inequality of the persons on which we have focussed which is effective within every village.[15]

1. Caste domination

In the Nizamabad district there is no village with more than 16% Harijans. In Hyderabad District nine villages exceed this proportion. Village H 11 even has 30% and Village H 8 36%.

Villages with a high proportion of Muslims are N 9 (82%), H 4 (27%), and H 12 (23%). Proceeding from this numerical distribution, one may recognise in qualitative processes how caste and group norms penetrate the whole life of the village and the economically privileged "dominant" castes exercise power.[16]

Many of the villages examined are alike in respect of the high proportion of "Peasant castes". However, this groups a number of varying castes which are in competition with each other. The difference becomes particularly clear when

one looks at the caste which in the area plays a privileged role on the basis of its land property, sense of identity and style of living - the Reddys (Kapus). This caste clearly dominates Village H 6. The power interests of a "dominant" caste exacerbate the oppression of the other groups under the "Ideal of Harmony",[17] and the restriction of the "Readiness to co-operate" towards a power clique.

In contrast there is a difference in the way the village situation permeates the value concepts in a village such as H 7, where three relatively high-ranking caste groups with roughly the same amount of land compete without groups and co-operate with the in-group.[18]

The absolute pre-dominance of the Muslims in Village N 9 may ,for instance, counteract disadvantage where school is concerned.[19] In this village the Muslims' specific interest in education (for sons) could overcome such obstacles.

2. Social history of the village and its conflicts

It is not possible to write a systematic history of the 21 villages examined, but one can take village N 6 as an example.[20] The village was founded about three hundred years ago by a Raja (Nagareddy) who owned all the land. Later, six other land owners in addition to the Raja established themselves. Following Indian independence a large part of the land belonging to the family of the former Raja was confiscated . Nevertheless, he is still the most powerful landowner.

The villagers still remember that once the Raja could throw people into prison, punish them and beat them. Intensive interviews might reveal special pressures bearing on the "Ideal of harmony" in this village.

3. Developmental impulses

If one draws up an index of government development measures[21] then four villages appear to be especially "modern":[22] H 6, H 4 and H 5 in the Hyderabad District and N6 in the Nizamabad District. Seven villages belong to the lowest group:[23] H 2, H 9, H 3, H 10 in the Hyderabad District and N 5, N 9 and N 3 in the Nizamabad District.

When comparing the proportion of women with school education, according to Indian statistics 1971,[24] one arrives at a ranking similar to this index of Village Development. As a whole government developmental mpulses are not concentrated enough to bring about real changes in the 21 villages examined.[25]

If one enlarges the index, adding such things as credits, agrarian reform measures or the intensity of the help provided by the particular village level worker, one still does not arrive at a specific representation of the total social process of each village.

The various impulses act through the social and power structure of each village and are transformed and filtered by them. The value concepts which are studied here, in general reveal no common tendency for specific villages. This justifies regarding the distribution of developmental impulses according to village only as a supplementary determinant. Orientations are comparably scattered each of the villages.[26] For instance, villages where land has been distributed and houses built for the Harijans show no measurable rise in "Concepts of equality for" the population as a whole. This can be different for the individual whose situation has been directly changed.

There are exceptions in cases of very intensive interventions. This was true of a village in the vicinity of the Nizamsagar reservoir with the highest proportion of irrigated land (76%).[27] There, a specially far-reaching intervention in the ecological conditions, which had taken place decades before, had altered not only the actions of those immediately affected by the improved water supply. It had also prompted long-time changes of consciousness on the part of the whole village which now showed more market orientation.

As an exception the propensity to accept western medicine was distributed according to village. The small number of rejections to be found in the Hyderabad District are concentrated in an out-of-the-way village (H 9). Here we are concerned with developmental measures so clearly able to solve burning problems that all classes and castes

are inclined to adopt it, but of course only in villages where it has been well propagated.

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3. Village N 7
4. Information supplied by a number of villagers in Village H 5 which is relatively near town.
5. Village H 12.
6. See K.K. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 111, 114; B.S. Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 222; Subudhi, *op. cit.*, p. 123f.
7. Accordingly E. Rogers, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 330.
8. Village N 3
9. Such influences only take effect by means of intervening variables. It is not convincing that F. Fliegel correlates village situational data directly with action, i.e., the adoption of innovations in 108 villages. "Community Organisation and Acceptance of Change in Rural India", in *Rural Sociology*, 34 (1964), pp. 167-181.
10. Appendix 1.
11. Appendix 2.
12. Appendix 9.
13. Then, tendencies as the following, based on observations in three villages, can be found : "A Village which is situated in an out-of-the-way place and is characterised by an almost equal distribution of wealth and where the authority and power are concentrated in the hands of a few elders and no caste seems to be decisively dominant, is more co-operative. As against this, a village which is accessible to easy communication, and where the distribution of wealth shows a great disparity and the leadership has changed hands from the old hereditary headman to the people's representative, is less co-operative". N. Patnaik: *Caste and Social Change* (Hyderabad) 1969, p. 161.
14. See Appendix 11 for Village N 9.
15. "Activism" could be cited as an example. Here, according to J. Kahl (*op. cit.*, p. 46) the status of the person is more important than the place of residence.
16. As understood by M.N. Srinivas (*op. cit.*) The importance of size, rank and economic power of the caste was confirmed also by F. Fliegel, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
17. Also confirmed for the exclusion of other people from education, (H 6 : Appendix 10).

18. Village H 7 : 156 households comprising :
    13 Reddy (ca. 10%) Own : together 50 acres.
    30 Kurumba (ca. 20%) together 60 acres
    28 Goundala (20%) together 60 acres.
19. Appendix 11.
20. Two further villages (H 7 and H 10) were once *Jagirs* (tax fiefs), that is they were put in the charge of followers of the Muslim rulers, *Jagirdars*, who did not own them but were permitted to exact taxes for their own disposal. See Khrusro, *op. cit.*, p. 2f.
21. 1. Social amenities :
    Primary Health Centre
    Kindergarten, Youth Club or Women's Association
    2. Housing for Harijans
    Houses built/houses occupied.
    3. Public radio.
    4. Appendix 9. Some villages will then be placed higher, for instance villages with a large proportion of Muslims such as H 12 and N 9, while Village H 6 falls back somewhat.
22. Rank from 18 to 21 points.
23. Rank of 6 and less
24. (4.1 Time since school foundation
    4.2 Highest form in school.)
25. By way of an exception, see the text that follows.
26. This coincides with the results of D. Sinha, who found the same structures of aspiration in advanced districts as in backward ones. *Motivation of Rural Population in a Developing Country* (Bombay) 1966, p. 44.
27. Appendix 1.

Chapter VII

Tenacious Struggle with Social Barriers

Orientational forms of consciousness have a specific function: moulded by the basic needs of the social subjects they cast light on their social existence and in this process rend the veil of social constraints. This represents a first chance of liberation which has to be transformed into practice. The development of the potential unconsciousness must form part of the strategy of social development.

Value orientations have been generated from the special structure of the Indian villages which are meaningful in the relation of the peasants to their environment. These forms of consciousness were not, as is usual in the "modernisation" approach, defined as a deficiency of "traditional" societies when compared with "modern" capitalist societies. Rather, they were developed as rational responses to the situation in the Indian villages. We tried to make the authentic experience of the peasants and the relevant social constraints[1] the central point of the study.

The intensification of social pressures

Inequality resulting from land ownership and caste position shapes the value concepts. Privilege and "underprivilege" are social processes pushing Indian rural society in the direction of two opposing social poles. On the one hand, peasants of high caste rank were historically land-owning groups. Today existing or newly acquired

land of a certain minimum size augments their opportunities to employ the innovations of the "Green Revolution" and this increases their yields. On the other hand, members of castes historically confined to the roles of service and land-labour have only slight chance of buying land enough to exceed their subsistence needs. And along with the under-employment which is increasing with the rise in population they are becoming subject to an intensifying process of "marginalisation"[2] leading to mass impoverishment. The agricultural conditions in the dry area examined are unable to feed an ever-growing population without far-reaching changes.[3]

A middle group of peasants in the research area finds itself confronted by opposite processes: although they can secure their subsistence by agriculture, the group is constantly threatened. Periods of drought, as at the time of this survey, or price decreases (the "threat from the market"[4]) can make such drastic inroads into their precarious situation that they can sink to the level of the poor peasants and agricultural workers. By accepting dependence on the rich farmers and attempting to participate in the power and co-operation cliques they try to escape this danger and perhaps even to climb up the social ladder.

The poor peasants are more violently affected by the forces pulling them down. Certainly, the population increase which has not yet been halted, scarce land resources, the generally practised division of land through inheritance and, in particular the power of adverse natural conditions, bear on all peasants. But those who are already most affected by exploitation and minimal living conditions are pushed deeper into poverty and degradation which threaten their existence. The chances of survival of the under-privileged part of the rural population are increasingly being blocked.

Peasant consciousness of the social framework

Looking at the value-orientations examined in their socio-structural context, it is possible to form two groups which are closely linked: firstly, "Respect for the power of the environment" and the "Ideal of harmony", and

secondly, "Concepts of equality" and the "Inclinations to co-operation", "innovation" and "education".

It could be plausible to regard both groups of value concepts as opposing elements in the value-profiles of the peasants and to assume that a pronounced orientation towards one group of values obstructs the other. This, at any rate, would accord with an all-to-common view which we suspect possesses an ideological bias we call "modernism".

E. Rogers[5] comes to the conclusion that "fatalism" correlates negatively with "empathy", "educational and work orientation" and "achievement motivation". It may be that in the industrial societies of Eurepe and America, the fatalistic views embody the neglect of *existing* possibilities for action. Experience from the First World is, however, not necessarily transferable to the Third World. We have tried to show that "Respect for the power of the environment" is not the same thing under the conditions of an Indian village as it is in western societies. Under conditions of precarious existence, it may rather be understood as a rational assessment of chances. It is therefore not appropriate to regard it simply as the opposite of "resource activating" ideas. The same is true in a modified form of the "Ideal of harmony", which refers to relations between people, which cannot be criticised on grounds of rationality but only with the aim of ending oppression. Our study shows that the value-orientations dealt with, with just a few exceptions, can appear together in a rational context. The contrast between "irrational traditionalism", and "rational modernism" cannot generally be maintained and places Indian peasants under false alternatives. These forms of consciousness differ in that the first group can make social oppression bearable, while the other can aim at reducing this oppression. The last-named group of values in this sense possesses an orientational relevance for the peasants.

The following exceptions to the principle of possible combined appearances of all six value-orientations became apparent in the study:

1. High "Respect for the power of the environment" was generally not observed where peasants showed a high "Propensity for innovations". Both values can suggest rational solutions it is true, but they appear to be oriented towards such different forms of action that they did not appear together. It was rare to find "Respect for the power of the environment" together with a high degree of "Readiness to co-operate" or "Inclination to education". Although, the two last-named value-orientations should not simply be declared to be "modern", they may contain elements of hope for changes which have been largely eliminated in fatalistic attitudes.[6]
2. The "Ideal of harmony" usually was not found in connection with decided "Concepts of equality". Where these two value-orientations seemed to be linked, it was possible to reveal a merely defensive declamation of egalitaran thinking.

Further analysis shows that it is not consistent for a powerful village notary[7] to declare his support for the equality of castes when shortly afterwards he accuses the Harijans of increasing neglect of their service duties. The same applied when a palm-wine tapper apparently links the "Ideal of harmony" and "Concept of equality", and then contradicts himself —by coming out in favour of the continued existence of the caste privilege which is profitable to him.[8]

Cutting across the apparent opposites of a simplified scheme of "traditional - modern" one finds the "Ideal of harmony", which is regarded as "traditional", joining up with the so-so called "modern" dispositions to co-operation and education. In Village H 6 which is dominated by the Reddy caste, these value concepts come together to form a meaningful whole. The "Ideal of harmony" as a concept of order then sustains a "Readiness to co-operate" in the framework of the existing power relationships and supports education as well in the sense of a status symbol for privileged groups. Although poor peasants[8] also demonstrated a pronounced "Propensity for innovations", their "Inclination to education" remained weak. So, here

a co-variation between two "modern" values was not found. The economic barriers more likely affect the "Inclination to education" than the "Propensity for Innovations". Innovations have more in their favour because they can directly serve to secure economic subsistence.

The supposition that value concepts in a sense of "modernism" are linked thus does not necessarily apply. But there exists an empirical basis to it. This, we believe, is only true of the richest peasants. Such co-variations apply in their case, for instance to a very high "Propensity for innovation" which goes hand in hand with a very high "Inclination to education", among other things.[10] The "Modernism" concept is an ideology which makes the privileged peasants in the Third World the yardstick. Value concepts copied from western industrial societies, which are implied in this sense of "modernism", are only to be found among the privileged peasants in India. The majority of the population of the "under-developed" areas would accordingly then be regarded as "traditional" that is "deficient" in respect of such things as western profit calculation achievement motivation and "spirit of enterprise". Both traditional German academic thinking and the American view of society are responsible for this unfortunate restriction of the development research which still predominates until today. The way that development research is partial in the direction of the privileged becomes clear in connection with our results. Only the big peasants fit "modernistic" implications. With their wide access to means of production, education does in fact become a decisive factor in combining innovations optimally.

Instead of basing development strategies on value concepts and behaviour which are applicable only to a small minority, one must proceed from the experience of the majority in the Indian village that means the underprivileged groups. So-called "modern" behaviour would not be rational for the majority of the peasants in an Indian village. This is why we regard it as inapplicable to press a study of Indian society into the framework of value concepts derived from "modernism". Instead of insisting on our ethnocentric scheme of "traditional" and "modern"

we should try to proceed from the existential needs of the peasants themselves. This has, of course, only been done scantily and would need further improvement. The following generalizations emerge for the six basic value orientations.

As one group of value-orientations, "Respect for the power of the environment" (in a "securing" function), "Propensity for innovations" and "Inclination to education" (both with a "mobilising" function) proved to be in the main economically determined and only shaped by caste standing when caste also had a limiting economic effect.

The economic aspect does not determine directly but is imparted through the specific form of the relations of production. Let us mention here another example. In a village with sufficient ground water[11], we found that insufficient use was being made of this. Not many wells had been dug and that there was a lack of innovatory action. One could have expected the tillers to show more initiative because the landowners lived as "absentee landlords" in the town. Although the producers only tilled the land as tenants, the fact, that the owners lived so far away should have made it possible to retain some of the higher yields. The socio-psychological chance of breaking through dependence was, however, blocked by two factors.

The landowners refused to provide the economic means to build the wells. They apparently did not think that under such production conditions the investment was promising enough. The tenants could possibly have raised the money by themselves. But they feared that after such inputs, the owners would move in. If they sank wells themselves, the land could be taken over by the owners. Or, at least the rent could be raised and in the case of refusal, it (the Land) could be given to other, more pliable villagers. As land is notoriously scarce, the owners so often manage to get their hands on the highest possible surplus value. This experience here represents a decisive restriction on the "Propensity for innovations". The legal order which makes this possible in India is in this case a brake on raising production.

Another group of value-orientations includes "Ideal of harmony" ("oppressive" function in the present village context in India), "Concepts of equality" and "Readiness to co-operate" (both with a "liberating" function).

These forms of consciousness were again clearly shaped by economic inequality, but not to the same extent as was the case with the first group. Rather, the caste system developed a certain mobility of its own. In such cases, high or low caste status could datermine value concepts without being reinforced economically. The results obtained permit the following analysis:

1. The privileged groups and the high-ranking castes use the "Ideal of harmony" to perpetuate their rule. This may be modified somewhat in the case of rich Muslims because different from the Hindu majority, they are in a lesser position to exercise such power. Therefore they are inclined to avoid social conflicts.

The privileged groups generally proclaimed "concepts of equality" to pull the wool over the peoples' eyes. "Readiness to co-operate" was pressed into the service of clique supremacy.

2. Orientational interests exist for the under-privileged and low-ranking castes to see through these veiling and mystifying concepts. But they are subject to the dominant ideology; although the "Ideal of harmony" runs counter to their interests to a great extent they accept it. Independent experience and insight from the subculture of oppressed groups exists alongside this, but is not pushed into any determined rejection of the power structure. The under-privileged groups do not express orientations towards equality and co-operation, which objectively could promote their interests, in any particularly determined fashion.

Their isolated vertical dependence as tenants, "sharecroppers" and agricultural workers and their membership of differing castes prevent them from standing up for their common class interests. There is a revealing example of this in the case of "debt bondage", which is widespread in Andhra Pradesh.[12] Here, deprivation culminates in an impossibility of self-determination similar to servitude.

The respondent (middle peasant)[13] said that he had not been working on his own land for sometime because of the drought. Because he was in debt to one landowner he had already previously been working for him. At the time of the study, this had become his only occupation. The wages paid only just exceeded the interest payable on his debts. "I will work for him until I have paid my debts. The landowner decides how much I pay off by day or by month through my work. If in the meantime I urgently need money to live, then he gives me some more money". When a man gets so dependent, his sons will eventually stand in "debt bondage" for him.[14]

It is plausible that faced by such isolating vertical dependence there is little consciousness of the need to exercise solidarity with members of the same interest group.

3. The "Ideal of harmony" can also serve the interests of middle peasants who are oriented towards adapting to the existing structures. If inclinations towards equality and co-operation mean that they should renounce some socio-economic advantages and give up, for instance, the exploitational underpayment of agricultural workers, then such value concepts would contradict their immediate self-interest. Values of equality and co-operation would hollow out their own interest in exploitation and so are pushed aside by an "Ideal of harmony". So when concepts of equality and co-operation imply some emancipatory detachment from economic pressures, the "Ideal of harmony" as a conventional support mechanism, overrules such orientation tendencies.

The question arises as to where social development could break through strengthening the poles- "privilege" and "under-privilege". The value concepts reveal themselves to be dependent on underlying economic and social structures. They are the expression of social conditions: on the one hand they strengthen the forces of social stagnation, on the other hand they can become channels for orientation, enlightenment and de-mystification. To this they are suited, where they have "mobilising" and "liberating" functions. This is true of the inclinations to education and innovation as well as the concepts of equality and

cooperation. Once again we stress that our findings support the view that among the poor the two last mentioned value-orientations are tied to a lesser degree by the economic situation. They can come into conflict with the traditional "Ideal of harmony".

Within the framework of the contextual analysis, the question arises as to how these oppressive mechanisms which are mutually supportive and are embedded in society as well as in the consciousness of the individuals can be overcome. Since in India processes of economic polarisation are becoming increasingly severe, it follows that there is less and less scope for emancipatory experience and action. Such restrictions nevertheless have their limits: in the long term the threat to existence destroys the veil of a complacent "Ideal of harmony".

The insights into the far-reaching pressures on the majority of India's peasants demand that ways and means be found to initiate meaningful development. This has to be seen in the context of mode of production, forms of consciousness and developmental impulses. A "Pedagogy of Liberation" (P. Freire) must examine existing chances of emancipation for their authenticity and their potential. Impulses towards change even if they remain isolated initially, must proceed from the interplay of structural forces in society. The practical process of change is decisive, it cannot be replaced by scientific study alone.

6.3 Approaches to reducing social pressures in rural India

The guiding principle of the so-called "open society" promises the individual to advance according to his ability. Round the world, however, the very opposite tendency is to be observed: quietly and as a matter of course the "closed society" is constantly being established with its privileges of birth, money, connections and power. This is not peculiar to Indian rural society. Yet, only here society rejects human endeavours so firmly.

The aims of "emancipation" and "liberation" are far from being realised. Therefore, the way leading in their

direction must begin at the point where the most fundamental needs are being ignored, that is, with essential basic needs.

Development strategies have been drawn up in many places with the express aim of securing a number of basic needs in order to counter the worst social pressures. Experience has confirmed the conclusion that the "growth" and "modernisation" strategies have not benefitted the majority of the people in the Third World. I think that it is realistic, in the sense of a "negative utilitarianism",[1] to take leave of idealistic ideas of maximisation and instead to pursue the aim of minimising social burdens.

Of the most pressing priority are physical basic needs such as the elimination of hunger and threats to health. This is especially relevant to the peasants in India. Ecological linkages in agriculture must be respected to support this goal. In addition, there are social basic needs (income, meaningful work mobility, equality, social respect, etc), political basic needs (solidarity) and others, as for instance, cultural basic needs. The way of life of Indian peasants determines their subjective appreciation of these needs. This experience fosters differences from the view in western societies.

I regard reducing the blocks on these needs as the main aim of development. Strategies should envisage improvements for a number of those basic needs at the same time. Looking at these needs, one notices that more employment opportunities would spread beneficial effects on most of them. While creating jobs, the principle of equality must constantly be kept in sight, because it is always threatened again by privileges.

It is not necessary to demonstrate here in detail what effects a reduction of unemployment and underemployment would have under Indian social conditions. It has, however, been shown that class and caste structures continue to play an influential role and that for a majority of the rural population in India they block and suppress chances of work and equality. There is no lack of productive forces and mental energy in India. They are fettered by certain social and political structures. In this way they

cannot evolve efficiently in the interest of the people. As the study in the villages showed, the forces centred in the ownership of land ultimately over-rule even caste structures where they deviate from the class structure. All in all, the caste system helps to limit economic opportunities, as has been shown in the case of the "Ideal of harmony".

Looking at society as a whole, there still are forces at work at present that foster economic inequality. Certainly, India does not lack programmes aimed at lessening the social pressure on the under-privileged groups. But to this day, such programmes have not been put into practice very vigorously.

Reform measures were started under Indira Gandhi's government, as for instance the "20-point-programme" which declared in 1975 the ending of "bonded labour" and the annulling of debts owed by the village under-privileged. But such declarations only led to isolated improvements here and there. In many rural areas they were not made public and were not implemented.

Despite the "Untouchability Act" of 1955, every year the privileged castes commit hundreds of violent crimes against the Harijans (killings, burnings, rape and injury).[16]

It is recognised, in the meantime, in India as elsewhere that under conventional growth strategies the benefits do not "trickle down"[17] to the lower classes of the population. The Planning Commission itself said when drawing up the 5th Five-Year-Plan in 1972: "....we seem to have assumed that a fast rate of growth of national income will by itself create more and fuller employment and produce higher living standards for the poor...." The result however has been that the absolute number of people below the poverty line today is just as large as it was two decades ago. And these people living in abject poverty constitute between two-fifths and one-half of all Indian citizens.[18]

Providing a favourable economic climate for the "capitalist farmer" may, raise production without extensive supporting measures, but it does not solve the problem of the livelihood of the majority of the population. It also increases the destruction of the environment because of the production techniques this class mainly uses.

It would be cynical to accept polarisation between modern large-scale peasant producers and traditional, marginal small-scale producers as a condition of so-called "modernisation" in India and to regard the second group as a welfare problem.[19]

This would mean thinking in terms of moving 240 million people from the rural to the urban sector[20] without there being any places of work for them. Keeping them alive in the slums of the towns would cost the state a great deal more than the measures to re-distribute land to small-scale enterprises which could support the peasants in the rural sector.

A strategy of relying on the middle peasant could also contribute to raising production. The incomes of a somewhat broader stratum of the population would increase. Indian experience reveals that middle peasants tend to produce higher yields per acre than the rich farmers.[21]

The repartition of surplus land belonging to landlords, capitalist farmers and rich peasants into holdings that could support individual families would still leave many millions in India without any land.[22] For them further improverishment would be the result. It is uncertain how far middle peasants would produce a marketable surplus like the big farms. Certainly, the consumption of the rural population would increase, but the question would remain unsolved whether food could be transferred from the country side to the towns.

In the interest of a basic-needs-strategy it could be advocated to distribute the available land on a strictly egalitarian basis and then to form co-operatives from the holdings since they could not survive on their own. This would give precedence to the goal of equality, but would call into question the goal of providing sufficient income. Without long transitory periods[23] and without powerful support from the state or a mass movement of rural producers[24], such a policy has no chance.[25] Thus far, the political scene in India is dominated by groups which mainly support the interests of urban capital or big landowners. For the time being, there are no signs of basic changes in these political circumstances.

For A.P. it was estimated that 405,000 hectares of land were above the prescribed ceiling for landed property in 1976. Of these, 85,000 hectares were declared as falling within the scope of land reform. Instead a mere 1,600 hectares were actually distributed:[26]

Employment could be created separately from a policy of land redistribution.[27] A minimal strategy would consist in organising unemployed rural labour for tasks in irrigation, social services and other areas.[28] This would have to be done on a decentralised basis as only about 30% of the rural unemployed agree to working outside their village[29] due to problems of transport, housing and food. In such employment programmes even a decrease in average productivity would be acceptable.[30]

So far, however, there must be serious doubts as to whether strategic approaches, as briefly outlined here, can at all be carried through under the present conditions in India.

Meanwhile the forces increasing social pressures in rural India prevail. The production of basic foodgrains has remained stagnant in the last four years (1978-79: 132 million tons provisional figures for 1982-83: 128 million tons).[31] A stagnant or even slowly increasing agrarian production with an average population increase of about 2%[32] as is the case in India today means that social pressures become stronger and stronger. A mitigating factor, though, is the increase in irrigated agricultural area from 30 million hectares in 1969-70 to 40 million hectares ten years later. But again, ecological degradation is occurring rapidly, afflicting in 1982, about 53% of India's total land area.[33]

Strategic considerations must take into account that socio-economic structures are in close connection with process of consciousness, create them and at the same time are overcome by them. As the study of value orientations of Indian peasants attempted to show, mobilisation processes can build upon existing concepts of "comprehensive" rationality. They are not precluded by any assumption of a "deficient" consciousness on the part of all or some rural groups. The idea of a "motivation deficit" of

groups in the Third World, is to all intents and purposes a myth. It has been pressed upon us with the political function of turning attention away from the need for far-reaching structural changes. Where these structures are immobile, they continually renew the feelings of submission and resignation. This covers up the chances of ending oppression. Where economic and ecological changes are initiated, such new experience expands existing value concepts. It would be illusory to expect that some value orientations which are cut off from structural changes could bring down the constraints of a long-established system.

With social pressure on the increase mystifying and submissive concepts of the peasants cannot be regarded as a way out. They would only lead to a further erosion of the basis of existence for the under-privileged groups. The "Ideal of harmony" is today in open contradiction to the concrete interests of the rural under-privileged.

The study found that orientational forms of consciousness are present in all class and caste groups in the south Indian villages. This is also true of the under-privileged despite the far-reaching limitations under which they have to live. Studies can all-too easily under-estimate this potential by applying inappropriate categories. In the sphere of "Concepts of equality" and "Readiness to co-operate" there are signs of a potential transgressing the existing economic restriction. Here special attention must be given to contradictory processes: on the one hand, caste position promotes economic dependency and hinders egalitarian interests. On the other hand, the caste system with its vertical scale of oppression creates at the various levels collective concepts which shed light on the common situation Thus, in recent times, under-privileged caste groups, especially the approximately 95 million Harijans who make up a seventh of the Indian population have raised more definite demands than previously. The existing social oppression is then not just reflected in value orientations; instead, broken up where long term perspectives emerge. So far, the Indian form of democracy has offered the masses

of the country's rural population few chances to realise such orientational interests.

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1. See, Negt and Kluge, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
2. S. Amin, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
3. Contrary to this are the special advantages of irrigation of rice, which under certain conditions permits the use of increasing numbers of workers at constant productivity. C. Geertz has examined this under the term of "agricultural involution". *Op. cit.*
4. After E. Wolf, *op. cit.*
5. *op. cit.*, p. 282 ff.
6. Interviews in Village H 6, Village N 1, 6 and 7.
7. Village N 2
8. Village H 6
9. Village H 5
10. Examples, Villages H 12 and N 7.
11. Village H 2
12. *The Committee on Untouchability, op. cit.*, p. 132, p. 156 f.
13. Village N 7
14. A washerman in village N 2 gave two of his sons as "bonded labourers" to his creditor. It was agreed that one will work seven, the other ten years for this debt.
Certainly, government officials sometimes step in by publicly declaring "bonded labourers" as free and thus interrupting such usurious exploitation. This is in accordance with Central Bonded Labour System (Abolition and Rehabilitation) Act, 1976 and with Point No. 6 of the new 20-point-program of Congress (I). A disappointed "bonded labourer" in Madhya Pradesh typically remarked :
"Yes, I know the law. I know I don't have to clear my debt with the landlord....These sahebs told us last year that we were free and then they did not come again for long. But they did not tell us what we should do with our freedom". This very succinctly points out that it is impossible for him to produce on his own when he lacks the means, and even needs further credit to survive. *India Today*, 15 April 1983, p. 126.
15. G. Adler-Karlsson, Kampf gegen die absolute Armut, in G. Adler-Karlsson *et al* : *Entwicklungshilfe in der Sackgasse* (Frankfurt am Main) 1977, p. 62.
16. During January 1971-October 1972, 1,567 cases came to light, and following the electoral victory of the Janata party, from March 1977 to September 1977, 3,240 cases. The Minister for Home Affairs, Government of India, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 18/19 Aug 73 and 21 Aug 1978. According to Prime Minister Morarji Desai, 1,600 cases were committed in 1976 in one state, Uttar Pradesh. All India Radio 18 Sept. 1977.

17. J Kuitenbrouwer : Continuity and Discontinuity in Community Development Theory (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague) Occ Paper no. 30, 1973, p. 2; J. Tinbergen, *et cl*: *Wir haben nur EINE Zukunft*, *Reform der internationalen Ordnung*, (Köln) 1976, p. 78; UNEP/UNCTAD-Symposium, *Erklärung von Cocoyoc*, Mexico, 8-12 Oct. 1974.
18. Government of India, Planning Commission, *Toward an Approach to the Fifth Plan* (New Delhi) 1972, p. 5.
19. This seems to be the position of B. Roy *et al*, Agricultural Innovation among Indian Farmers, in J-kivlin *et al* : Innovation in Rural India (Bowling Green), 1971, p. 211.
20. B. Michie, *op. cit.*, p. A. 74.
21. "There is now adequate evidence tc show that the average productivity per acre is less in larger holdings. The new technology is also such that it can be adopted on small holdings (given the necessary conditions]. Therefore, the transfer of lands from the larger holders to the landless labourers or the small farmers (includes our term "middle peasant") wnich would result from the land reforms, should not only not affect productivity adversely, but if given proper support should even lead to increase in productivity". Government of A.P., Planning and Co-operation Department, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Along the same lines, K. Griffen : *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change* (Cambridge, Mass) 1974 and' K. Bhardwaj, *op. cit.*, P.A 20 f.
22. Estimates suggest 20-25 million. See, "blätter des iz3w", no. 67, Feb 1978, p. 45.
23. H. Elsenhans : Agrarverfassung, Akkumulationsprozess and Demokratisierung, Mimecgraphed, Agrar-workshop, (Frankfurt a.M) 16 Feb. 1978, p. 49.
24. Experiences gained with peasants' self-organisation are reported by G. Huizer, Action Research and Peasant Resistance, Mimeograph, (Third World Centre Nijmegen) 1978, p. 31.
25. The Indian Co-operative movement to date provides no promising answers. See remarks in section "Readiness to cooperate", Chapter V above and the self-criticism of the National Commission on Agriculture, *Interim Report on Credit Societies and Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labourers* (New Delhi) 1971, p. 16.
26. Th. Bergmann, Die Interaktion agrarischer Bewegungen und politischer Veränderungen in Indien, Mimeograph, Conference on Social Movements in Developing Countries (Hamburg) 1981 p. 23.
27. That would, however, only mean partial changes with very limited effects. Here G. Myrdal is relevant: "While land reform and tenancy laws, when properly carried through, are instruments to effect fundamental changes in property rights and economic obligations, it is not possible to make a frontal attack on the existing unequal power structure with the other institutional measures. Their aim is rather to better conditions without affecting the structures and this in fact means ducking the question of equality." *Politisches Manifest uber die Armut in der Welt*, 2nd edition (Frankfurt a.M) 1974, p. 68.
28. See R. Krishna, Unemployment in India in *EPW* 3 Mar 1973 pp. 475-484.

29. 27th N.S.S. Survey quoted from R.C. Arora, *Integrated Rural Development* (New Delhi) 1979, p. 14.
30. R. Preiswerk, zum Bruch mit herkommlichen Entwicklungsmodellen, in A. Schmidt (ed): : *Strategien gegen Unterentwicklung* (Frankfurt a.M.) 1976, p. 32.
31. "*India Today*", April 15, 1983, p. 89.
32. World Bank, *World Development Report* 1982 (Washington D.C.) 1982, p. 150.
33. Centre for Science and Environment, *The State of India's Environment* 1982 (New Delhi) 1982, pp. 4, 6.

Research Data
(Unless indicated otherwise)

Appendix I

Production : proportion of irrigated land according to villages

(Survey within the project by E. El-Shagi)

Hyderabad District	Total area (acres)	proportion of irrigated land (%)
H 1	900	11.11
H 2	318	6.60
H 3	450	1.33
H 4	68	17.64
H 5	934	16.38
H 6	2350	14.89
H 7	2431	3.29
H 8	1250	2.40
H 9	470	28.72
H 10	138	25.36
H 11	2400	15.41
H 12	3690	17.61
Nizamabad District		
N 1	1423	18.27
N 2	1973	35.47
N 3	787	28.71
N 4	693	64.64
N 5	193	16.06
N 6	1510	32.45
N 7	917	76.11
N 8	2025	9.28
N 9	505	0.59

Average proportion of irrigated land : 21%

Appendix II

*Production : Forms of peasant work (principal work)**

Source : Census of India, 1971

Hyderabad	Total population	Cultivators (men+women)	Agricultural Labourers (men+women)	Participation of population in peasant work%
H 1	664	218	62	45.8
H 2	357	155	46	56.3
H 3	456	99	71	38.3
H 4	1732	35	70	8.4
H 5	592	108	54	33.8
H 6	1637	330	198	38.9
H 7	1202	434	184	56.1
H 8	653	194	152	53.6
H 9	410	150	52	49.3
H 10	569	141	55	37.2
H 11	1109	196	252	44.2
H 12	2664	438	323	36.1
Nizamabad				
N 1	1194	258	62	28.4
N 2	1632	325	83	29.4
N 3	912	161	161	36.5
N 4	1246	605	129	58.9
N 5	273	153	24	67.8
N 6	1627	331	174	32.4
N 7	961	374	163	57.7
N 8	1350	101	254	31.4
N 9	289	43	31	28.4

* These official statistics leave room for criticism especially where the low pecentages for "participation in peasant work" are concerned. The relationship between more independent ("Cultivators") and more dependent work ("Agricultural Labourers") gives a more reliable picture. But this too should be treated with care.

Appendix III

Castes : Number of households per caste group and village

Drawn on the basis of own survey

	Caste rank							Total Households	Harijans in%
	7	6	5	4	3	2	1		
Hyderabad District Villages									21.49
H 1	2	37	2	8	1	—	22	72	25
H 2	—	33	—	5	7	—	9	54	17
H 3	—	27	2	21	6	—	13	69	21
H 4	2	108	2	42	65	—	23	242	10
H 5	8	34	5	24	3	—	11	81	13
H 6	—	169	11	43	10	10	66	309	19
H 7	3	48	11	50	3	1	40	156	23
H 8	4	41	3	7	13	—	48	116	36
H 9	1	46	2	9	—	10	7	85	11
H 10	—	52	2	17	2	—	36	109	23
H 11	3	73	8	42	7	—	92	220	30
H 12	4	36	9	57	47	—	59	212	17
Nizamabad District Villages									16.53
N 1	3	84	6	33	24	12	32	192	7
N 2	4	158	16	104	11	—	43	346	16
N 3	—	169	13	16	1	4	20	223	9
N 4	3	71	7	38	6	44	42	186	6
N 5	—	41	—	2	—	3	—	46	0
N 6	7	96	8	74	10	60	70	333	7
N 7	4	141	3	14	15	2	16	195	10
N 8	3	144	7	89	25	1	25	294	12
N 9	—	2	—	—	40	—	7	49	12

Ranking order of castes : 7. Upper castes, 6. Peasant castes, 5. Artisans, 4. Service castes, 3. Muslims, 2. Minorities, 1. Harijans.

Appendix IV

Inequality in the caste system 1

Index of social discrimination of Harijans according to villages

Level of discrimination	Measure	Villages
High	(45)	H 1, H 2, H 3, H 5, H 8, H 9; N 2.
Medium	(38-34)	H 6, H 7, H 10, H11, H 12; N 1, N 3, N 4, N 6, N 7, N 9.
Low	(30)	H 4; N 5
		Not applicable since no Harijans live there

Appendix V

Inequality in the caste system II

1. Services under the "Ideal of harmony"

1.1. Artisan castes

Blacksmiths: These still fulfil important function despite social changes. So a number of blacksmiths in the villages in the Hyderabad and Nizamabad districts are able to live mainly from the proceeds of their caste activities. At harvest time, they are paid at a flat rate in kind (for instance, they receive 10 kilos of rice from each of ten households after the harvest). A blacksmith in a big village, H 12, serves ten households (altogether there are eight blacksmiths in this village). Blacksmiths are especially in favour of the "Ideal of harmony".

Goldsmiths: These possess less traditional views than the blacksmiths, since they are constantly in contact with the town because of the price of gold. They are paid for their individual work and traditionally this is in money (One goldsmith estimated his income from his caste occupation at 300 rupees a half year).

Some *carpenters* said in interview that they were paid on a half-yearly basis. They do jobs in addition to their service duties. In some places they are no longer in demand for reasons of price.

1.2 *Service Castes*

Some products, bricks especially, are no longer made by the *potters* who serve one or more villages. These are bought outside.

The traditional service of the *washerman* continues to exist although some what changed.

A big village (N 2) has seven washermen, who serve between 5 to 30 households. In the case of a Reddy, payment takes the form of a sack of rice (roughly 75 kilos) per household at harvest time. Poorer people pay fifteen rupees at the same time. The washermen work every day and need at most half a day to complete what they have to

do. One of them with a large circle of customers estimates his daily income at about 3 rupees.[1]

In another village a washerman serves four households and twice a year receives a little grain. Since there are nearly 40 washermen in the village there are disagreements about the distribution of the households.

The *barbers* mainly go about their business in accordance with a distribution of customers laid down for this caste. They are paid in kind for their normal services. Additional services are paid for in cash.

In one village all the shops were run by *palm Wine tappers*. Since these are protected against outside competitors by their caste position and tapping is a lucrative occupation (for instance, with an income per year of over 300 rupees), they have been able to put their money into trade which is not limited by caste considerations.

1.3 *Harijans*

Competition with cheap sandals made in town is a limiting factor on the Madigas' leather work. Only two Madiga families out of a total of 20 in one village still make shoes. In another village, Madigas repair shoes only now and then, and do so for payment in cash. Rope making has also ceased because it does not pay.

Their function as agricultural workers means that they have a service duty even towards Muslims in a village (N 9) which is Muslim-dominated. Compared with the artisan and service castes few Harijans are in favour of the preservation of the service system. It is disadvantageous to them.

2. Village conflict in contrast to the "Ideal of harmony" (Example: *Village* H 5)

The accusation of the Harijans against the rich landowner and village notary (*Patwari*) :

The government wanted to distribute land. The *Patwari* stopped this. We paid for all the land which we re-

1. See the instructive list of the various sources of income of a washerman in Bronger, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

ceived from the *Patwari.* In fact, the *Patwari* sold his enormous holding to people from another village and not to the local people who had served him all their lives. In any case, land is not put out to rent in the village because the tenant would then be protected by law.

In accordance with his interests the *Patwari* inadmissably combined land with government land as "forest area". We made many applications, but the *Patwari* only needs to give the Collector a bottle of brandy to get his way.

We brought the land distribution question to the attention of the *Tehsildar* (Revenue Officer). He promised to distribute the land, but when he came the next time the *Patwari* had already got him in his pocket.

The *Patwari* stopped repairs to the irrigation tank, for which loans were to be given to all neighbours, because then some acres of his land would have been flooded.

The *Patwari* collected 16 rupees each from a number of people. The money was for draught oxen to be provided by the government, but these have never been delivered.

Appendix VI

Standardised questionnaire concerning Basic questions in English and Telugu

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction: We are here on a project sponsored by Osmania University of Hydarabad. To learn about the life of farmers May we ask you a few questions, please ?

1. Personal Data of Respondent:

Name of Village:

Caste

Sex:

Age:

Married - Unmarried - Widowed - Divorced

Education:

Number :

Sex & Age of Children

Occupation of Respondent: main - sideline occupations

Owner (how many acres: (Wet Dry)

Tenant(" " " (Wet - Dry -)

Land Labourer

2.

2.1 Do you think that for economic questions, as planting of crops buying of fertilizer. selling of crops. it is better to decide alone or with the advice of others ?

Alone: With advices:

2.2. Whose opinion can you trust in economic matters ?

No one

family

same caste

village officials (Which one ? How often do you meet them ?) anyone

2.3 Do they also rely on your advice ? (If not, why ?)

2.4. Are there questions concerning your family or your children in which you can rely on other people's advice ?

Yes:- No:-

2.5. Those opinion can you trust in these questions ?

friends

same caste

same village

village officials (Which one ? How often do you meet them ?)

anyone.

2.6. Do they also rely on your advice (If not, why?)

2.7. On which economic matters do you consult with your wife? (Specify)

2.8. are there questions she may decide alone ? (Specify)

..1. Some important village problems as better production, more wells and irrigation could be solved even without government help, through cooperation among the people.

Strongly agree/Agree/Don't know/Disagree/Strongly disagree

In case of disagreement, why not ?

Lack of finance/quarrels/other reasons

3.2. How many examples do you know in this village of irrigation wells being built

With initiative Without Government help

by individuals alone.

in cooperation of several persons.

3.3. What is the greatest problem for constructing wells ?

3.4. Have you experienced cooperation with people like yourself in the last year.

	free of charge	against payment
Well-digging		
help at harvest times.		
Borrowing of bullocks.		
borrowing of implements.		
which other ways?		
If no, check with many more examples.		

will
To whom ?

How often ?

3.5.1 Some people say: Ten years ago there were less quarrels and more harmonious relations in the village.

Strongly agree/ Agree/Don't know/ Disagree/ Strongly disagree

That has most changed ?

3.5.2 Is it true that if the economic situation turns to the worse also social relations among the villagers suffer ?
If yes, please give examples (note in full).
3. Please tell us who is to blame for such conflicts ?

3.6. If someone whom you know is in economic difficulties, do you see a possibility to help him ? Yes: No:
if yes, how (note in full)

Have you ever received such help ? Yes: No:

If yes, which one ?

When was it happening most recently ?

Did it happen.

3.7. ~~Is that possible~~ with people of other castes ? Yes: No:
If yes, which ones ?

4.

4.1. Some people say: 'It is nd use to make plans, because plans usually fail.
Do you strongly/agree/not know/disagree/strongly disagree ?
agree

4.2. Some people say: If you do not have personal connections to help you, even hard work is bound to fail.
Do you ~~strongly agree~~/agree/not know/disagree/strongly disagree?
With whom is it most important to have good connections ? With which caste ?

4.3. Whenever one starts something, one feels afraid, it will fail.
Do you strongly agree/agree/not know/disagree/strongly disagree ?

4.4. Under the local conditions, one can never get rid of debts.
Do you strongly agree/agree/not know/disagree/strongly disagree?

4.5. Do you have debts ? Yes: ——
If yes, to people in the village
to people outside the village ?
Have you mortgaged land to people outside the village ?
Yes: — No:
If yes, how many acres ?

5.

5.1. Some people say, modern farming techniques as fertilizer and high-yielding varieties have more disadgantages than advantages.
Do you strongly agree/agree/not know/disagree/strongly disagree ?

5.2. If more disadvantages, which ones ?

5.3. Have you ever used modern farming techniques ? Yes: No:
If yes, which ones ?

5.4. Have you heard of other modern methods ? Yes: No:
If yes, which ones ?

5.5. From whom did you learn about these methods ?
- Development officers from outside:
- village officials:
- village people:
- newspaper:
- radio?
- films :

6.

6.1. Have you ever visited Hyderabad ? Yes: No:
If yes, how often at all ?
How often in the last year ?
How often did you visit the neighbouring towns in the last year ?

How often did you visit the nearby villages in the last month?

What was the purpose of these visits to other places ?
Visit of relatives. Marketing Work:
Shopping

6.2. How often do you listen to radio, read a newspaper ?
Weekly
Monthly

6.3. Have you ever done a different work from your present occupation
Yes: No:
If yes, which ones ?

6.4. Do you plan to do one ? Yes: No:
If yes, which one ?

7.

7. Education for my children is/not possible, because
we have no money/they must help with work/other rea:

Strongly agree
agree
don't know -
disagree -
strongly disagree -

7.2. If a child goes to school
- it will have more success as a farmer - it will be happier

strongly agree
agree
don't know

disagree
strongly disagree

7.3. Girls should go to school the same as boys:
strongly agree
agree
don't know
disagree
strongly disagree

7.4
Have all your children of school age been to school ?
If not, how many were at school ? Boys: Girls:

7.5. On the whole, do you prefer Western medicine to traditional medicine ?

7.6. When was the last vaccination in this village ?
against what ?

8.

8.1. Concerning the differences among castes, have they much changed in this village in the last five years ?
Please give some examples :

Do different castes eat each others food ? Yes: No:

With which caste does your caste interdine ?

8.2. Some people say, that the lower castes today have much better social standing than five years ago.

Strongly agree/agree/don't know/ Disagree/Strongly disagree

Please give some examples :

8.3. Is it better that the castes become more equal or should the differences remain ?

Equal: Different: Why?

8.4. (Only for high caste respondents) Is it true that low caste people do not work properly for other castes any more?

Yes: No:

(Only for low caste respondents:) Are the people from the high castes exploiting the lower Castes?

Yes: No:

If yes, how?

8.5. (Only for high caste respondents:) Would it be disadvantageous to the village if the low caste people become more educated ?

Yes: No:

(Only for low caste respondents:) Are high castes opposed to low caste people being educated ?

Yes: No:

8.6. Does your caste have a headman ?

Yes: No:

yes, did he become headman because of inheritance of post from ner generation/ wealth/education/wisdom.

7. Has he ever helped you ? Yes: No:

yes,in what ways?

: he settle disputes in the caste/between castes ?

What else can he decide ?

Are there great differences in wealth inside your caste?

Yes: No:

How many acres maximum/minimum do people in your caste own?

Appendix VII
The relativity of restrictions

1. The "independent-minded" from a low caste Madiga ("converted" size of holding: 5 acres) in village H-12

Chances of autonomy despite social "under-privilege"

The respondent is the tenant on five acres of irrigated land belonging to a landlord in Hyderabad. He pays a rent in kind, 720 kilos of rice, annually. The previous year and the year of the study he had not paid anything because of a poor harvest. The landowner agreed to waive payment without interest until the next harvest (it was doubtful, though, whether the tenant would pay then, three times the annual amount of rice, in the opinion of the present author). The "Absentee landlord" does not decide as to what should be planted. The rent was laid down in paddy and the same amount had been payable for 20 years. The tenant had improved the land. When the previous year the landlord had demanded an increase in rent the tenant refused. He told the landowner: "I am not going to leave the land which I have been cultivating for 20 years. It would be unjust to throw me out". The tenant knows that he is protected under the Tenancy Act.

In the meantime, the tenancy agreement drawn up twenty years before has been lost. It had been signed by the owner and the tenant as well as by Mali Patel and the Police Patel of the village. ("Nobody keeps documents of that kind here".)

Like others in the village this tenant uses his own agricultural tools. He says that the tenants work hard on the land to produce the highest surplus possible. He uses his own two draught oxen to raise water for the fields. The landlord turned down his request for a water pump. He thinks that it is the job of the landlord to deepen the irrigation well, but he plans to do the work himself if the land lord continues to do nothing. The tenant underlines that he had not been able to achieve anything by co-operation where his farming problems are concerned.

The tenant plans his farm work on an efficient basis. He has obtained a loan in order to buy draught oxen. "I can keep the extra gains with rent remaining the same". He has not received any fertiliser from the government for the past five years just like the other villages. He must buy it in the black market. He also uses it to cultivate vegetables. He plans the vegetable area in accordance with the money which he has to invest.

"Propensity for innovations": His positive attitude to innovations can only be partially realised. He knows that he is using less fertiliser than would be optimal and is not planting improved seed because he has little money. He has found that improved methods increase yields and has a clear idea of the advantages of this. His contacts with the nearest town have been of no use in this respect, he has come to know all the innovations in the village. He has never sought advice from the "Village level worker".

Basically, he trusts other people, although he knows there is mutual mistrust in the village. "The people no longer trust each other because of the drought and the unfavourable economic situation and it is difficult to obtain a loan". His attitude to advice appears to be excellent on the basis of what he says, since he discusses all farming questions with other peasants, although he makes his decisions on his own. He received a loan-from the village co-operative . He applied to the government for a subsidy to meet the costs of animal feed. Although he had to pay 8 *paisa* for the form "the application came to nothing". Animal feed subsidies were given in other villages "but not in ours. That is the fault of our mayor".

The tenant goes to the town to sell his vegetables. He does not put the matter in the hands of a trader but rents his own pitch. He must pay 10% of his returns for this. He describes how slightly his contact with the town influences his "Propensity for innovations" : "What else could I do in the town? What is there to see? I have been going there since my chidhood. Therefore when I have completed my work I come back". He does not look at the cinema advertising or go to the films, he drinks no tea, but occasionally some spirits.

2. The "dependent-minded share-cropper" from a high caste

(Size: 14 1/2 acres, Reddy, Village : H 12) The influence of economic dependence, from "share-cropping" on an apparently "Privileged" peasant)

In addition to 3 1/2 acres of his own land (mainly dry land, apart from 1 acre) he tends 3 acres belonging to a landlord, which are irrigated (conversion 3:1). Here he must hand over 3/4 of the harvest. This is relatively high considering that this "share-cropper" employs his own draught oxen on the landlord's land. This landlord also provides draught animals. He inspects the fields once a week and gives instructions.

"Propensity for innovation" His admission that he does not know what to think of innovations is not his way of avoiding the question but directly expresses his lack of experience with innovations. He thinks that a better harvest depends solely on the rain and that the land he works is not suitable for improved seeds. (This, in our opinion, is not so because the larger portion of it is irrigated). The respondent thinks nothing of co-operation because, as he says, all the other small and middle peasants need their means of production at the same time when the harvest is on.

He is advised by his wife. He has little contact with places nearby. He does not sell his produce in the twon but just makes some small domestic purchases. He does not visit the landlord there.

He possesses a positive "inclination to education", but it is diffused. His two sons but only a third of his daughters attend the village school. They will, however, leave it after only a few years so that they can work on the land.

Appendix VIII

New forms of cooperation

1. Production co-operative of the Toddy-Tappers (Village N 6)

The rich Kapu and the Muslims used to buy the palms at auction and employed the palm wine tappers as their workers. In those days the tapper made a bigger profit because the organisation was not so strict and "he could take as many trees as he wanted".

Today, work is done under a government licence. The co-operative pays 820 rupees a month for about 700 trees. The costs and the proceeds are distributed among the 12 tappers in the village.

2. Production co-operative of the weavers (Village N6)

Three influential people suggested that the 20 weavers' households should set up a production co-operation at the end of 1972. They applied to the government and received short-term financial aid under Drought Relief. The members have now applied for an extension. The respondent is apparently determined to continue this co-operation even if government aid is not forthcoming. The co-operative provides the members with thread yarn and they produce cloth.

Appendix IX

Unequal educational opportunies
by sex : "Literate and educated persons"*

Sources : *Census of India* 1971

Hyderabad district Village population	Total	Men	Percentage	Women	Percentage
H 1	664	75	22.26	10	3.06
H 2	357	7	4.02	—	—
H 3	456	55	23.81	7	3.11
H 4	1,732	292	31.53	82	10.17
H 5	592	81	27.36	21	7.09
H 6	1,637	245	29.03	44	5.55
H 7	1,202	93	14.79	6	1.05
H 8	653	65	19.94	17	5.20
H 9	410	28	13.40	—	—
H 10	569	91	31.27	—	—
H 11	1,109	147	27.74	26	4.49
H 12	2,664	409	29.96	180	13.86
Nizamabad District Village					
N 1	1,194	120	20.41	21	3.47
N 2	1,632	88	10.89	15	1.82
N 3	912	39	8.67	7	1.52
N 4	1,246	111	17.76	9	1.45
N 5	273	6	4.20	—	—
N 6	1,627	177	21.80	29	3.56
N 7	961	87	18.39	13	2.66
N 8	1,350	156	22.87	14	2.10
N 9	289	40	28.78	5	3.33

* "Literate persons can both read and write" (*Nizamabad District Handbook*, p. B 13), "educated persons" have been to school, if only for a short time.

Appendix X

Continuing class restrictions on education

The instance of the child of an agricultural worker/poor peasant not attending kindergarten

In Village H, 6 children, who do not yet go to school, have the rare opportunity of being placed in the care of the "Indo-Dutch Child Food Project" when they are over the age of four. This includes a meal for the children.

In the presence of the village mayor, I suggest to an agricultural worker that he send his four year old son there. Before, he had incorrectly claimed that his other older son was already attending school. "The four year old boy is too young", the agriculture worker said (incorrectly), "he is unable to talk". The village mayor agrees, pointing out that one cannot look after small children in the kinder-garten properly. Anyway, the agricultural worker says, he and his wife must go to work on the land and so they must take their children with them. Otherwise, there would be none at home when the kinder-garten ended.

When I repeat my suggestion he apparently accepts the idea saying "we will send him there". As I offer that we could go along together, a significant incident takes place. The village mayor orders the agricultural worker not to visit the kinder-garten. Immediately the labourer obsequiously agrees; he says: "As long as the visitors are in the village I will stay in the mayor's office".

I refuse to drop my suggestion, and visit the mother. She says with conviction: "If the children were sent to school or to the kinder-garten they would not remain a day there, they would come back." The smaller child refuses to come along with his mother to the kinder-garten, although she is clearly interested in persuading him. The question remains, if she has done all to overcome external social pressures. the father certainly has succumbed. I call on the head of the kinder-garten alone and suggest that she attempts to get the child to attend.

Appendix XI

Restrictions resulting from the situation in the village

There are complaints in a village with Muslim majority that the teacher is providing poor instruction. The complaint was made to the responsible authority but without any effect since the teacher wielded influence in the village. He also happens to be a Muslim and has the support of the village notary. He teaches there only once in five days. The Muslim priest (*Vazirpatel*) conducts only prayers He does no teaching The school was built entirely with the efforts of the local Muslim population All the earlier attempts to get a school had failed. Before it was set up, 10 or 12 children went to the nearest small town of Chetlur for going to the school. In village N 9, complaints are generally there that there is too little official support or attention to the interests of the people of the village.

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AJS *American Journal of Sociology* (Chicago)
EPW *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay)
JAS *Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor, Mich.)
JCA *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (London)
KZfS *Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* (Cologne, West Germany)
POQ *Public Opinion Quarterly* (New York)
ZfS *Zeitschrift fur Soziologie* (Bidefield, West Germany)

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